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ABSTRACT
The Rise and Run of Women Corporate Leaders
by
Alicia R. Ingersoll, Doctor of Philosophy
Utah State University, 2019
Major Professor: Christy Glass, Ph.D.
Department: Sociology
In light of the renewed emphasis on the need for more women in corporate
leadership it is important to understand the characteristics of women who have ascended
the corporate ladder thus far. Examining the mechanisms that work to overcome existing
barriers is key in helping more women to achieve corporate leadership positions. This
study analyzed three sequential and interconnected facets of women corporate leaders:
(1) educational attainment and networks; (2) risk taking; and (3) presence and influence.
Using an author-constructed data set of all S&P 500 organizations, the study offers a
theory-driven expansion of existing research in order to extend our understanding of the
conditions under which women attain corporate leadership opportunities. Findings reveal
some of the complexity in both the antecedents and consequences of gender diversity
within top leadership of large U.S. firms. Taken together, the results convey the
organizational and societal contexts that lead to more diverse corporate leadership.
(188 pages)
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PUBLIC ABSTRACT
The Rise and Run of Women Corporate Leaders
Alicia R. Ingersoll
The purpose of this research was to understand the contexts that support the
barriers to women’s advancement and to identify the conditions under which women
leaders overcome the barriers to attain top corporate leadership positions. I have
identified and discussed three distinct approaches for understanding how we can increase
women’s representation and influence in the executive and director ranks within top U.S.
corporations. The first approach investigates the complexities of leveraging the social and
cultural capital attained through post-secondary education in order gain entry into the
corporate elite. The second approach examines gendered stereotypes of risk-taking versus
the organizational risk-taking realities that are inherent in women corporate leaders’
climb to the top. The final approach considers the impact of external pressures in
increasing the prevalence, power and influence of women corporate directors. Findings
reveal some of the complexity in both the antecedents and consequences of gender
diversity within top leadership of large U.S. firms. Taken together, the results convey the
organizational and societal contexts that lead to more diverse corporate leadership.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Although women have made inroads within organizations since the 1960s, they
are still severely underrepresented within the top leadership of our largest corporations.
Women account for only slightly more than 5% of the Chief Executive Officers (CEOs)
within S&P 500 indexed organizations (Catalyst, 2017a), which are some of the largest
and most prestigious organization within the U.S. Additionally, only 15% of global
boards of director positions are held by women (Catalyst, 2017b), a statistic that includes
directors in countries that have imposed quotas for gender parity. Women’s
underrepresentation in leadership positions as a symptom of greater gender inequality has
led scholars to suggest that the progress of women has slowed, or even stalled (Cohen,
Huffman, & Knauer, 2009; England, 2010).
The recent #MeToo movement has unearthed gender inequalities within all fields
of work and has demonstrated the need for more women leaders. Scholars emphasize that
women occupying corporate leadership positions are the key to decreasing the amount of
sexual harassment and inequality within the workplace (Dobbin & Kalev, 2017). Popular
news stories and polls also demonstrate that both men and women would prefer to see
more women leaders (Holden, 2017; McGregor, 2017). However, similar reports suggest
that the recent climate has left men feeling uneasy in their workplace dealings with
women. Some men are now unwilling to mentor ascending women, thus exacerbating an
obstacle for women trying to reach a position of leadership (Thomas & Brown-Philpot,
2018; Zarya, 2018). While we may have seen an overall increase in the number of
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women within top corporate positions over the past few decades, the numbers are not
keeping pace with women’s workforce representation (Terjesen, Aguilera, & Lorenz,
2015). Further, even given the consequences of women’s exclusion from the corporate
elite, the barriers to women’s mobility seem firmly intact. In light of the renewed
emphasis on the need for women within corporate leadership and combined with the
current climate of fortifying the barriers that keep women from reaching these positions,
it is important to understand the forces driving women to overcome obstacles to attain top
leadership positions. The women who have successfully navigated the existing barriers
give potential voice and power to other aspiring women leaders not only by example, but
by providing the route maps to leadership. Further, understanding women who have
successfully navigated the obstacles assists in recognizing the conditions under which
these barriers can be overcome. Thus, a key in helping more women to attain corporate
leadership positions is to understand what has led us to this point. Why are women not
better represented in corporate leadership roles? Specifically, what factors help or hinder
corporate women in their trajectories to top leadership positions?
In order to answer the research questions, I examine three sequential and
interconnected facets of women corporate leaders: (1) educational attainment and
networks; (2) risk taking; and (3) presence and influence. The first phase of the research
study examines the importance of educational attainment and educational networks for
women leaders. This initial work examines not only the human capital and experience of
women corporate executives as measured by degree(s) awarded, but also the educational
networks developed through the school(s) they attended and how each of these areas
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differ from male executives. The second phase of research analyzes risk taking among
women corporate executives and directors compared to their male counterparts. Research
suggests that women must take risky assignments all along their path to a leadership
position (Glass & Cook, 2016). Thus, risk can be posed as both a barrier and a conduit to
women reaching top positions. This work analyzes if firms with women leaders are more
apt to take on risk than those led by men. Finally, I examine the presence and influence of
women corporate directors. I propose that key institutional pressures have led to changes
in women’s presence and level of influence on corporate boards, such as in the number of
women directors and the number of boards on which they serve. Additionally, I suggest
these same institutional pressures have also impacted the influence of women corporate
directors in board roles and committee assignments.
This research contributes to the existing body of research in important ways. First,
an update and expansion to previous work examining the human capital and social
networks of women in top corporate leadership is offered through the first phase.
Previous studies, such as Hodigere and Bilimoria (2015), examined human capital and
social networks among corporate directors for the period 2005-2010. The study expands
upon this earlier work to examine corporate executives, versus directors, for the period
2009-2013 using a new author constructed dataset. Further, the quantitative analysis
focuses solely on higher education and educational networks, thus providing a unique
look into the social capital of top women executives.
Next, the research is theory driven and brings key sociological insights to bear
upon organizations in new ways. I begin he first phase by exploring Bourdieu’s
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explanations of social class and education, then I advance through an examination of risk
taking and the tension between job role and gender roles in the second phase before
concluding with institutional theory to explain the changes we see in the number of and
power of women directors.
Finally, the research extends our understanding of the conditions under which
women attain corporate leadership opportunities. Analyzing when change happens, in
terms of increased representation for women, and the context around that change enables
scholars to critically evaluate institutional mechanisms and change models surrounding
women’s advancement in the corporate world.
I begin addressing the research question by first discussing what we know about
the barriers faced by women in climbing the corporate ladder. Scholars have identified a
myriad of issues that women face throughout their career trajectories and I present
research that identifies these existing obstacles. After a review of the barriers to women’s
mobility, I present a brief introduction for each of the three phases, which will be
explored in more detail within each chapter. I conclude the introduction with a discussion
of the contribution of the project.
Literature Review of Barriers to Advancement
The persistent underrepresentation of women in organizational leadership has
created a puzzle for scholars of gender and organizations. Previous research has
distinguished between supply side and demand side explanations for the
underrepresentation of women in corporate leadership (Gabaldon, De Anca, Mateos De
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Cabo, & Gimeno, 2016). The supply side explanations include elements such as work
family conflicts, social gender role ascription and gender differences in values and
attitudes (Terjesen, Sealy, & Singh, 2009). Another commonly held supply side
assumption within the corporate realm is that women lack the necessary human capital to
serve as corporate leaders (Burke, 2000). However, research demonstrates that women
are just as highly qualified as their male counterparts (Peterson & Philpot, 2007). In fact,
women’s educational and work experience gains over the past few decades have provided
the human capital necessary to fill the pipeline with qualified women (Goldin, 1990;
Goldin & Mitchell, 2017; Jacobs, 1992). A 2008 study by Singh, Terjesen, and
Vinnicombe found that women corporate directors are more likely to have an MBA
degree and prior international business experience. The advanced education element is
supported by findings from Hillman, Canella, and Harris (2002), who find that women
directors are much more likely to have an advanced degree than their male counterparts.
Indeed, research suggests women corporate leaders are more highly invested in the
accumulation of human capital versus their male peers (Ward, Orazem, & Schmidt,
1992). Corporations also benefit from the human capital of their women leaders with
research suggesting that women directors contribute unique functional experience to their
boards, leading to a higher monetary value for the firm (Kim & Starks, 2016).
Unfortunately, even when women directors have the same levels of corporate and board
experience as men, they occupy lower level leadership positions, are less powerful and
earn considerably less than men directors (Zelechowski & Bilimoria, 2004). The dearth
of women occupying top organizational leadership positions demonstrates there may be
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more to the story than human capital accumulation.
Another supply side explanation for the scarcity of women in corporate leadership
positions posits that women opt out of the high-power career paths leading to these
positions (Stone, 2008). The rationale behind opting out is that women choose to spend
more time at home, where they are primarily responsible for home and child care (Stone,
2008). Women have to devote more time to home and family than men, yet are expected
to work the same number of hours professionally (Hochschild, 1997; Hochschild &
Machung, 1989). The time constraints and lack of flexibility with corporate jobs deters
women from joining corporate leadership (Fuller & Hirsh, 2013) and leads to unequal
opportunities for career (Straub, 2007). However, confirmation of the work-family barrier
is inconclusive, as research indicates that not all women experience work-family conflict
(Powell & Greenhaus, 2010).
Other supply side research has noted that cultural beliefs concerning gender may
bias women’s perception of themselves as corporate leaders, leading them to lean away
from corporate leadership roles (Correll, 2004). The perceived conflict between the
gendered self-image of the women and the gendered image of the corporate leadership
role means that some women may not even attempt upper level managerial roles
(Eddleston, Veiga, & Powell, 2006). In this case, gender norms have been socialized
strongly enough to create a gender self-schema (Bem, 1981), which does not align with
corporate leadership roles (Schein, 1973).
Further explanations from the supply side perspective include gender differences
in attitudes and values (Terjesen et al., 2009). Gender differences regarding the
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motivation to attain top leadership roles may impact organizational outcomes (Eagly,
2005). Research suggests that women are less power-motivated than men (Adams &
Funk, 2012) and may be more conservative than men in corporate settings (BaixauliSoler, Belda-Ruiz, & Sanchez-Marin, 2015). A less innocuous example of gendered
attitude difference is found in women’s negative recruitment experiences (Brands &
Fernandez-mateo, 2016). Brands and Fernandez-Mateo suggest that women leaders may
not pursue future opportunities if they have previously been denied opportunities by the
company.
Demand side proponents look to sources external to the women in order to
identify barriers for women’s advancement (Gabaldon et al., 2016). Proponents of the
“glass ceiling” metaphor contend that it is more difficult for women to be promoted to
positions of authority than men and that there are obstacles they face as they move up
within the organizational hierarchy (Baxter & Wright, 2000). This unseen and
unbreachable barrier constrains women’s rise up the corporate ladder, despite their
qualifications or achievements (Federal Glass Cieling Commission, 1995). The concept
of the glass ceiling permeates gender research, but empirical tests have resulted in mixed
findings. Previous work by Cotter, Hermsen, and Vanneman (2001), along with work by
Maume (1999), find support for the glass ceiling through a panel study of income
dynamics. However, Morgan (1998) suggests that a cohort effect better explains the
penalties women are said to face due to the glass ceiling, while Baxter and Wright (2000)
find no glass ceiling effects at higher levels of the organizational hierarchy. Others
suggest that the glass ceiling metaphor itself is outdated and changing to a “firewall”
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metaphor would better capture the contextual complexity of the barriers women face
(Bendl & Schmidt, 2010). Regardless, the glass ceiling metaphor continues to dominate
current organizational research and to act as the metaphor for the various barriers women
face in career advancement (Faniko, Ellemers, Derks, & Lorenzi-Cioldi, 2017; Fernandez
& Campero, 2017; Mun & Jung, 2017; Ng & Sears, 2017).
Research has also identified cognitive bias as a primary barrier throughout
women’s career trajectories. Cognitive bias refers to the distortion of information during
the decision-making process based upon categorical or ascriptive beliefs (Bielby, 2000;
Reskin, 2000). The human brain relies on heuristics, or snap judgments, in the processing
of information. Research suggests that cultural schemas based upon ascriptive beliefs
form the basis of our heuristics (Gorman, 2005). In the workplace, cognitive bias begins
when employers classify job candidates or employees into positions based upon
heuristics and beliefs (Ridgeway, 1997). The categorical distinctions stemming from
these judgments give rise to status beliefs, which attach value to status and lead to
inequities between statuses (Stainback, Tomaskovic-Devey, & Skaggs, 2010).
One of the consequences of status beliefs is stereotype creation (Gorman, 2005;
Ridgeway & Correll, 2004). Status beliefs are reflected within stereotypes where status
inequity is reified through attributing cultural beliefs to all group members. One of the
earliest studies of gender stereotypes within organizations uncovered the “think manager,
think male” phenomenon where psychological sex typing was identified as a barrier for
women’s advancement (Schein, 1973). This barrier was found to be still intact in a global
replication of Schein’s work conducted almost three decades later (Schein, 2001). Bielby

9
and Baron (1986) contend that employers find it unduly costly to ascertain differences
between individuals for different jobs. Therefore, employers rely on stereotypes to
differentiate between applicants and employees when placing them into positions. Once a
job is sex labeled through this process, it becomes very difficult to change (Bielby &
Baron, 1986). Similarly, Gorman’s (2005) study of U.S. law firms demonstrates how
stereotypes based on gender traits creates schemas for job roles. She argues,
Organizational decision makers are likely to form the opinion that male
candidates possess stereotypically masculine characteristics, such as decisiveness
and assertiveness, whereas they are likely to see female candidates possessing
stereotypically feminine characteristics, such as friendliness. (Gorman, 2005, p.
704)
The formation of status characteristics, status expectations and stereotypes are
firmly rooted in the societal construction of gender roles. Parsons (1942) discussed how
social roles developed within his classic examination of American families. He posits
women play the mother role at home and teach girl children home making skills while
men play the breadwinner role and leave the home for work. Each gender supports the
other and their roles are “symmetrical.” Parson’s sex roles theory focuses on the home
and work as the places of the production and reproduction of gender roles. While
Parson’s work was very much a product of the time and place in which it was written, the
culturally expected roles for men and women within the U.S. discussed in his work
continue to influence modern society. Most notably, as women seek positions of power
within the workforce, gender roles become much more salient. Eagly and Karau (2002)
suggest that perceived incongruity between women’s gender role and the leadership role
leads to viewing women’s occupation of leadership roles less favorably than men and
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also to evaluating women less favorably than men when they do occupy the leadership
role. Women leaders also face injunctive norms based upon their prescribed gender role
(Bielby, 2000). Men in leadership positions have much more freedom in how they lead
and the style in which they lead without reaping negative repercussions (Eagly & Carli,
2007; Eagly & Karau, 2002; Eagly, Makhijani, & Klonsky, 1992; Koenig, Eagly,
Mitchell, & Ristikari, 2011). This leaves women leaders to negotiate a “double-bind” in
having to demonstrate masculine leadership traits, such as assertiveness, along with
prescribed feminine traits, such as warmth, and facing backlash for both (Eagly & Karau,
2002; Kelly, Ammons, Chermack, & Moen, 2010; Ridgeway & Correll, 2004). Even
outside of the context of leadership, research suggests women workers are viewed as
women first and workers second (Bobbitt-zeher, 2011).
The research discussed thus far indicates that cognitive bias reaches into the
policies and practices of employers and creates inequality in outcomes based on gender,
thus creating barriers to mobility. Employees are segregated and ranked based upon
preconceived categorical bias instead of skill or ability. The cognitive biases leading to
workplace inequality are driven by group differentiation. In Economy and Society, Weber
(1978) discusses a process of differentiating between groups, which he termed “social
closure.” As Weber (1978) describes it,
One frequent economic determinant is the competition for livelihood. Usually one
group takes some externally identifiable characteristic of another group of
competitors…as a pretext for attempting their exclusion. (pp. 341-342)
Thus, salient categories become a means of evaluating others where dissimilar
characteristics are viewed as less favorable (DiTomaso, Post, & Parks-Yancy, 2007).
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Proponents of social closure as a mechanism that limits women’s mobility suggest that
those in positions of power as a majority group have a vested interest in maintaining the
status quo (Smith, 2002). In what has been referred to in the social psychology literature
as in-group bias, this stream of research demonstrates that people tend to favor those that
have similar demographic characteristics or status distinctions (Fiske, 1998, 2002). The
in-group categorical distinctions translate into boundaries used to limit access to positions
and resources by outsiders (Elliott & Smith, 2001; Stainback, 2008; Stainback, Kleiner,
& Skaggs, 2016; Tomaskovic-Devey & Stainback, 2007).
Kanter (1977a) finds that men in high-level management positions tend to hire
other men into top management in a concept she terms homosocial reproduction. This
concept is explored extensively within extant research (Britton & Logan, 2008; Glass &
Cook, 2016; Gorman, 2006; Huffman, Cohen, & Pearlman, 2010; Kalev, 2009; Skaggs,
Stainback, & Duncan, 2012). Homophily is another concept similar to Kanter’s
homosocial reproduction used in social network analysis to explain why contact occurs
between similar people at a higher rate than among dissimilar people (Mcpherson, Smithlovin, & Cook, 2001). Studies of gender and social networks have found that men have a
greater degree of homophily within their networks, while women have more network ties
outside of their sex (Ibarra, 1992). Further research on the effects of homophily among
managerial networks suggest that women in positions of power may need access to the
resources provided by a broader array of network contacts (Ibarra, 1997). Unfortunately,
the extant research suggests that senior women may find it difficult to expand their workbased network due to homophily and male resistance to include them within work
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networks (Charles & Davies, 2000; Martin, 2006; Tsui & O’Reilly, 1989).
Stemming from the concepts of homophily and homosocial reproduction, scholars
suggests that more women in positions of organizational power may erode gender
inequality within the organization. Studies show that women in organizational power
positions may further the career prospects of all women within the organization through
enhancing opportunities for networking and mentorship (Ibarra, 1993; Konrad, Kramer,
& Erkut, 2008), along with reducing overall gender stereotypes (Ely, 1995). Hultin and
Szulkin (1999), found that women’s wages tend to be higher in organizations with a
greater number of women in leadership. In a later study they found even greater support
of the effects of women in leadership roles in decreasing the gender wage gap (Hultin &
Szulkin, 2003). In further studies Cook and Glass (2014, 2015) found that having a
woman on the corporate board increased the likelihood of a woman being appointed CEO
of the organization. Similar studies also point to the power of women as “change agents”
(Cohen & Huffman, 2007), where organizations with women managers show less overall
sex segregation (Stainback & Kwon, 2012). However, in a follow-up study the effect
sizes of women leaders on sex segregation appear to be small with results indicating that
women would need to occupy 55% of board positions in order to eliminate managerial
gender segregation (Skaggs et al., 2012). Thus, a lack of women in leadership has
consequences for all women in the workforce.
While research suggests that women in power can act as change agents for other
women within organizations, the negative consequences for women in these positions can
be severe. Since women are in a minority within senior leadership ranks, they are
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susceptible to what Kanter (1977a) describes as token pressures. Those in an extreme
numerical minority can face social isolation, enhanced scrutiny and increased stereotype.
While they may feel overlooked, they are actually highly visible due to their minority
status. Tokens face extreme stereotyping by the majority group and feel pressure to
behave in ways that may undermine stereotypes (Kanter, 1977a). Tokens also face
boundary heightening where the dominant culture is exaggerated in order to create
difference and polarization (Kanter, 1977b). Extant research also suggests that gender is
highly salient as a category for organizational exclusion, making women token
employees differentially disadvantaged (Turco, 2010).
While the barriers for women trying to ascend the corporate ladder are wellestablished, less well understood are the mechanisms that enable women to overcome
these barriers and to achieve top leadership roles. I now turn to consider the research
design for the three potential mechanisms: education, risk taking and institutional
isomorphism.
Research Design
Data
All three phases of the research rely upon a common author-constructed dataset.
The dataset includes over 200 variables collected from over 500 companies for each year
of the study. I analyze this unique dataset consisting of all S&P 500 executives and
directors covering the period 2009-2013. The dataset is a consolidation of multiple
sources of secondary data. The Compustat database, available through Wharton Research

14
Data Services (WRDS), provides a list of all companies on the S&P 500 index for each
year of the study. I add all corporate executives for each firm as reported by the
Execucomp database and the Institutional Shareholder Services database, both available
through WRDS. Additional data on executive tenure and educational attainment is
collected from biographical websites and added to the dataset.
Phase 1: Education and Experience
Prior research suggests that a range of barriers bar women from corporate
leadership roles. Factors such as employer preference, discrimination, biased employment
practices, and economic pressures all work in ways to limit women’s mobility (Baron,
1984; Bielby, 2000; Bielby & Baron, 1986; Reskin, 1993). Kanter’s (1977a) seminal
work on homosocial reproduction argues that top-level corporate leaders prefer to hire
those with the same demographic characteristics as themselves. The argument is that we
are most comfortable, or share perceived common interests, with people who are similar
to ourselves. It both consciously and unconsciously creates an in-group in our own image
(Kanter, 1977a).
Homosocial reproduction persists on levels that interact specifically with class
and gender as well. In her 2009 audit study, Michelle Jackson found that employers were
more receptive to job candidates from higher social classes, while Rivera and Tilcsik
(2016) found that gender moderates the effect of social class signals when hiring for elite
corporate positions.
The unresolved debate regarding the interaction between homosocial reproduction
and social class influence fuels the need for further research. Education is a powerful tool
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and I suggest it is a potential mechanism for overcoming homosocial reproduction not
only through educational attainment, but through educational networks. However, how
corporate leaders take advantage of educational networks is uncertain and leads me to ask
do women executives receive similar advantages as men executives based upon
attainment of baccalaureate and advanced degrees? Additionally, does the reputation of
the institution attended by corporate executives provide occupational benefits that differ
according to gender?
Phase 2: Risk Taking
Recent research examining the prevalence of narcissism among CEOs of S&P
1500 companies indicates that narcissistic women CEOs undertake as much risk as
narcissistic men CEOs (Ingersoll, Glass, Cook, & Olsen, 2017). Key findings of the study
indicate that women CEOs high in narcissism are as risk taking, but more ethical than
narcissistic men CEOs. Similarly, other studies show that men CEOs exhibit higher levels
of overconfidence compared with women CEOs and that corporate risk taking reduces
with the transition to a woman as CEO (Faccio, Marchica, & Mura, 2016). Further
research also suggests that gender diversity within the top management team leads to
more conservative behavior by the firm, versus those companies with a less diverse top
management (Baixauli-Soler et al., 2015). However, the latter study examined risk taking
in the context of employee stock option grants, which could be influenced by the gender
pay gap. While the extant research suggests that women corporate leaders are more riskadverse than their male counterparts, separate research streams focused specifically on
how gender is experienced in corporate leadership find that women have to take risks in
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order to get ahead within the organization (Glass & Cook, 2016). Indeed, research shows
that the “think manager, think male” mantra (Schein, 1973, 2001) is often sidelined when
the firm is facing pressures from lack of performance (Ryan, Haslam, Hersby, &
Bongiorno, 2011). Additional experimental research has also called into question gender
stereotypes concerning risk aversion by finding that women are just as willing as men to
take risks (Schubert, Brown, Gysler, & Brachinger, 1999). Given that women are
required to take risks in order to move up the corporate ladder and that they are more
likely to be placed in leadership roles within poor performing organizations, we need to
ask if women corporate leaders are required to pursue greater risk than their male peers in
order to obtain and fulfill leadership roles? Specifically, do firms led by women CEOs,
women Chief Financial Officers (CFO), women executives, or women directors
undertake greater organizational risks than those led by men?
Phase 3: Presence and Influence
The importance and influence of a corporate board as defined by the composition
of the directors has grown from a hot topic for scholars to a point of concern for all
corporate stakeholders. Recent legislation in European countries mandating female board
representation, or quotas, has enlivened the conversation and has sparked research into
the gender composition of corporate boards. Extant research has analyzed the gendered
differences of human and social capital within the boardroom (Hodigere & Bilimoria,
2015; Ibarra, 1993; Singh et al., 2008), as well as the networks that drive board relations
(Borgatti & Foster, 2003; Galaskiewicz, 1985; Westphal & Zajac, 1995). Further research
also examines the impacts of diverse boards on firm performance and strategy (Glass,
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Cook, & Ingersoll, 2016; Konrad et al., 2008; Torchia, Calabro, & Huse, 2011).
While current research helps to explain the business case for the inclusion of
women on boards it fails to problematize the corporate board as a gendered institution.
Instead of searching for the answers to opening the door to the boardroom, we need to
understand the underlying pressures responsible for maintaining the status quo. Questions
on how gender inequality is produced and sustained through the corporate board structure
have not been adequately addressed. In order to understand what opportunities have
arisen and how they have led to change, we need to examine the institutional pressures to
appoint women directors and their impact not only on the number of women directors,
but on their authority within the corporate boardroom. Examining the longitudinal
trajectory of women directors helps us to understand not only how change has occurred in
the number of women on boards, but in the power granted to women who reach director
seats. Phase three of the study addresses the research question of how have isomorphic
institutional pressures influenced the appointment of women directors over time? In
addition, what impacts are there from institutional pressures to the overall number of
women directors, and in the authority and influence of women directors?
Contribution and Limitations
The proposed dataset is a major source of strength for the research. Phase one,
analyzing the educational attainment and networks of all executives in the S&P 500 over
the course of five years expands upon current research conducted by Brint and
Yoshikawa (2017), who examined educational attainment and reputation, but only for a
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single year of 2014 with a select group of approximately 3,000 executives. Additionally,
gender effects were not explored in their research. My dataset includes over 13,000
executive/year observations spanning a five-year period. The additional observations and
longitudinal data lend themselves to more robust statistical testing.
Additional contribution to the literature is made in the phase two analysis of
gender and firm financial risk across all levels of top organizational leadership. Previous
studies have examined gender and risk taking among CEOs (Elsaid & Ursel, 2011;
Faccio et al., 2016; Khan & Vieito, 2013) or boards of directors (Adams & Funk, 2012),
but none have combined the board and the entire senior executive team. Using data from
all S&P 500 listed firms over the period 2009-2013, I examine risk taking in terms of
both accounting-based measures of corporate expenditures and market-based measures of
stock price volatility in order to present a unique picture of gender and corporate risk.
The study design of phase three also contributes to fill a gap in literature through
the longitudinal nature of the data on U.S. firms. The majority of existing work
examining institutional factors and board gender composition focus on either crosssectional data or data specific to European countries. This study examines how
isomorphic pressures help to shape U.S. board gender composition.
As with most research the study has limitations. First, the proposed research is
specific to large U.S. companies. It does not speak to if the same gendered elements are
present with women executives and directors of smaller U.S. firms or within a wider
international context. Available data is a major limitation when seeking to expand the
scope away from large U.S. firms.
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A second limitation of the research is the sole focus on gender. Race is treated as
a control variable in the study when it may speak to many of the same issues we see with
executive and director gender within corporations. Further, gender norms and stereotypes
vary across cultures and ethnicities. Examining the relationship between gender and race
could help to uncover potential paths and pitfalls to career mobility for ethnic and racial
minorities within organizations.
Finally, while the dataset itself is a potential source of strength for the project, the
scope of the collection effort and reliance on secondary sources could limit the
examination. Gaps in collection and inaccurate data from the secondary sources present
potential problems. Further, data may become unavailable through a lapsed subscription
at any point during the study leading to problems with replication.
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CHAPTER 2
CREDENTIALED FOR SUCCESS
Education and training are the most important investment an individual can make
in their human capital (Becker, 1994). Indeed, social mobility within industrialized
societies is often predicated upon educational attainment (Blau & Duncan, 1967). Extant
research concludes that the academic and occupational attainment necessary for social
mobility are largely determined through family origin and educational experiences
(Bielby, 1981; Sewell & Hauser, 1972). Previous sociological work has focused on the
role of socioeconomic status and family dynamics in educational achievement and human
capital attainment (Tramonte & Willms, 2010; Weininger & Lareau, 2003). The
explanations of educational outcomes within the sociological literature often discuss
forms of capital—economic, social, and cultural—as resources to draw upon that are at
least partly achieved through the educational system (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1990; De
Graaf, De Graaf, & Kraaykamp, 2000; Farkas, 2003). Early work by classic theorists
within the discipline, such as Comte, Durkheim and Cooley, examined education as a
means of inheritance of social and cultural value (Sewell & Hauser, 1972). The school as
a mechanism of social stratification was first presented by Sorokin in 1927 and has been
the focus of much of the sociological research concerning education since publication.
Parsons (1959) expanded on Sorokin’s view to include the school as a source of
socialization, specifically in terms of valuing achievement. Yet, even within this wide
body of literature, few studies examine gender differences related to educational
outcomes and occupational attainment.
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The predominant studies within the literature which specifically examine gender
in terms of education and occupational achievement are either based upon a dated picture
of the labor market (Sewell, Hauser, & Wolf, 1980; Useem & Karabel, 1986) or focus
specifically on social networks (Benschop, 2009; Ibarra, 1993, 1997; Kane, 2004;
Mcpherson, Smith-lovin, &, 2001). The current study contributes to the body of literature
by examining gender, educational achievement and occupational attainment among the
corporate elite. I specifically examine not only the gender differences in educational
achievement among corporate executives, but also the social and cultural influences of
higher education upon their occupational attainment. Women are graduating at much
higher rates from both undergraduate and graduate programs than men. The U.S.
Department of Education estimates for 2013 (the last year of my study period) show that
women were awarded 56.7% of all bachelor’s degrees and 59.9% of all Master’s degrees
for the year (Kirst, 2013). Previous studies also suggest that there are differences in how
women utilize social and cultural capital as compared to men (Kane, 2004; Robinson &
Garnier, 1985). However, research to date has not tied this difference to education and
career. This study seeks to uncover the differences in the pathways to executive
leadership positions for women versus men as they relate to higher education. Do women
executives receive similar advantages as men executives based upon attainment of
baccalaureate and advanced degrees? Additionally, does the reputation of the institution
attended by corporate executives provide occupational benefits that differ according to
gender?
In order to answer these pressing questions, I will begin with a brief overview of
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Bourdieu’s theories of capital and habitus and how they are reified through higher
education. Next, I will contrast Bourdieu’s theories of social and culture capital with
Weber’s credentialing theory. Here I will elaborate on the notion that academic
achievement is not a merit- based certification of skill and ability, but is instead a signal
of social and cultural capital serving as an occupational entry barrier (Brown, 2001). I
will then extend these theories to gender to develop hypotheses that will be statistically
analyzed using a sample of all corporate executives from S&P 500 indexed firms over the
5-year period 2009-2013.
Literature Review
Forms of Capital
Bourdieu theorizes the concept of capital as extending beyond the economic
realm to encompass what he terms cultural and social capital. Cultural capital refers to
the collection of skills, behaviors and knowledge that a person can access in order to
demonstrate cultural competence and social class (Bourdieu, 1984). Lamont and Lareau
(1988) distill Bourdieu’s writings to a definition of cultural capital as “institutionalized,
i.e., widely shared, high status cultural signals (attitudes, preferences, formal knowledge,
behaviors, goals, and credentials) used for social and cultural exclusion” (p. 156).
Whether cultural capital is a general resource or of benefit to only the elite is a source of
conflict within the literature (Kingston, 2001). However, scholars tend to agree that
cultural capital provides benefits for those who have it and can be used as a basis for
exclusion for those who do not (Bourdieu, 1984; Bourdieu & Passeron, 1990; DiMaggio,
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1982; Lamont & Lareau, 1988; Tramonte & Willms, 2010).
Cultural capital manifests in three states; the embodied state, the objectified state
and the institutionalized states. Bourdieu describes the embodied state of cultural capital
as acquired over time through education and socialization. Examples of embodied
cultural capital include language, manners and even gendered behavior such as dress. We
display and perform our embodied cultural capital as we interact within society.
Bourdieu’s second sate, the objectified state of cultural capital, refers to the material
objects we own and use, such as vehicles and homes. These objects serve as a signal to
others of the level of cultural capital one possesses. However, the embedded and
objectified states are not mutually exclusive, as objectified state of cultural capital is
reliant on the embodied state of cultural capital as “the means of consuming” the object
(Bourdieu, 1986, p. 50). Finally, the institutionalized state of cultural capital is concerned
with the institutional recognition of the cultural capital possessed (Bourdieu, 1986). It
refers to how cultural capital is measured, ranked or certified through institutional
processes. Examples of cultural capital within the institutionalized state include academic
degrees, job titles and credentials.
The importance of the theory of cultural capital lies in its ability to explain how
social stratification is maintained (Lamont & Lareau, 1988). It demonstrates how the
social and cultural resources of the private sphere can shape success within the public
realm. Bourdieu’s theoretical framework positions cultural capital as an implicit source of
power, a mechanism for social class selection and as an academic standard (Lamont &
Lareau, 1988).
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The concept of social capital is widely used and increasing popular within social
science. Broadly, social capital has been described as goodwill formed through social
relations that can be mobilized for a purpose (Adler & Kwon, 2002). Social capital for
Bourdieu is situated within relationships and is comprised of the network connections or
group memberships that one has at their disposal (Bourdieu, 1986). Social capital is
measured by the size, or number, of network connections that can be effectively
mobilized and the volume of total capital (economic, cultural and social) that is held by
each of the connections. Here individual capital becomes aggregated, mobilized and
exchanged.
While Bourdieu conceptualized social capital as external resources, other theorists
view social capital as an in group collective process that forms group cohesion (Brehm &
Rahn, 1997; Coleman, 1988; Thomas, 1996). However, Bourdieu is not alone in his
conceptualization of social capital as being fueled by external forces (see Baker, 1990;
Boxman, De Graaf, & Flap, 1991; Burt, 2009). Indeed, the entire field of social network
analysis is predicated on the notion of the strength of external ties (Borgatti & Foster,
2003; Burt, 2000; Granovetter, 1973; Knoke, 1999). This “bridging” view of social
capital focuses on social capital as a resource that externally ties an individual to others.
The alternate, “bonding,” view of social capital views social capital as internal linkages
among individuals within a group (see Gittell & Vidal, 1998; Putnam, 2000). Regardless
of the approach to social capital, the research generally agrees on the multitude of
benefits from social capital. Access to broader sources of information, increased power
and social solidarity are among the benefits gained from high social capital (Adler &
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Kwon, 2002; Boxman et al., 1991; Burt, 1998; Coleman, 1988; Granovetter, 1973).
The forms of capital, as discussed, exist within a system of exchange and all three
forms of capital; economic, cultural and social, can be exchanged for the another
(Bourdieu, 1984, 1986). Economic capital can be invested to access higher education and
prestigious schools. The rewards of the economic investment include cultural and social
capital in the form of academic credentials and the networks associated with higher
education. The cultural and social capital rewards achieved from attending a college or
university can then be exchanged back into economic capital through employment.
Again, the levels of capital vary among individuals with elite colleges and universities
providing the highest amounts of capital (Cookson & Persell, 2008; Persell & Cookson,
1985; Rivera, 2016).
Habitus and Cultural Capital
Pierre Bourdieu argues that relationships of social inequality are reproduced
through the education system. He believes that the educational system is a product that is
produced and reproduced through the dominant culture that one must be familiar with in
order to fully realize educational success (Bourdieu, 1984). A key concept within
Bourdieu’s work is “habitus,” which refers to the dispositions, habits and skills that are
ingrained within individuals based upon our life experience (Bourdieu & Nice, 1977).
Habitus goes beyond an individual process and is a social process whereby cultural
capital becomes embodied within the individual (Reay, 2004). Habitus is expressed
through ways “of standing, speaking, walking and thereby of feeling and thinking
(Bourdieu, 1990, p. 70).” A person’s tastes and preferences are also developed through
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habitus, which can change over time and context (Bourdieu, 1984). Bourdieu views the
concept of habitus as the bridge between structure and agency, being equally shaped by
both (Bourdieu, 1984). The familial inheritance of social and cultural capital serves as the
starting point for Bourdieu’s concept of habitus (Bourdieu, 1986). The educational
system receives students with varying levels of inherited cultural capital where the class
distinctions associated with levels of cultural capital are reproduced and legitimated
(Weininger & Lareau, 2003). In this way, Bourdieu views the educational system as a
means of acquiring tastes, preferences and connections beyond one’s initial social class
background (Bourdieu, 1984). Therefore, the educational system is not only a result of
inherited habitus, but also a source of habitus.
Capital and Credentials
Similar to Bourdieu’s institutionalized form of cultural capital, credentialing
theory views academic degrees as culturally based, stratifying barriers to entry into
organizations and occupations. Max Weber (1978) is credited with the earliest work
related to credentialing in his observations of education within China. Weber later
expanded upon this theory in his 1922 work, Economy and Society. Weber argues that
academic credentials are unrelated to the demands of the workplace, but instead are a
cultural-political construct related to competence and loyalty (Weber, 1946). Weber’s
ideas on social exchange and credentials influenced Bourdieu’s work, which is evident in
some of the similarities between their theories. Academic credentials, to Weber, act as a
form of symbolic social credit (Weber, 1978). The exchange of this social credit is
particularly salient within the uncertain conditions related to the hiring and promotion
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processes of organizations. In these situations, an academic degree signals
trustworthiness and competence (Brown, 2001; Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978; Shapiro, 1987).
Neo-Weberian theorist Randall Collins (1979) contributed a seminal work to the
field of credentialing theory by arguing that group competition is the main cause of labor
market stratification based upon credentials. This status competition model views
academic credentials as a means of capital accumulation and boundary keeping among
status groups, as opposed to a meritocratic valuation of technical skills. This assessment
aligns with findings that both college recruiters at elite schools and occupational
recruiters at elite firms are more preoccupied with the cultural “fit” of candidates than
with skill or potential productivity (Brinton & Kariya, 1998; Kingston & Clawson, 1990;
Rivera, 2016).
Gender and Credentials
Research suggests that women must prove themselves in the work place beyond
that required of their male peers (Davies-Netzley, 1998; Gorman, 2006; Gorman &
Kmec, 2007). Findings indicate that due to cognitive biases based upon gender roles and
social characteristics, women are treated as less knowledgeable and less competent than
men (Gorman, 2005; Kanter, 1977). Women in positions of leadership are particularly
susceptible to biased competence perceptions (Carli & Eagly, 1999; Eagly, Makhijani, &
Klonsky, 1992; Ridgeway, 2001). We see women on par with, and in some cases
surpassing, men for college graduation rates (Goldin, Katz, & Kuziemko, 2006).
However, women still struggle with entry into corporate professions due to being held to
higher standards during the hiring, evaluation and promotion processes (Biernat &
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Fuegen, 2001).
Examinations of gender, education and occupational achievement suggest that sex
differences exist not only in the returns that men and women obtain for their educational
attainment, but in the timing of those returns. Women’s reliance on credentials and
formal qualifications extend later into their careers than men (Sewell et al., 1980). While
an argument can be made that this is due to family demands as women exit and re-enter
the workforce, an argument just as powerful can be made that in-group bias and boundary
keeping is at the heart of the issue. Men can rely on their automatic membership in the
“old-boys club” to pull them along their trajectory to the top (Charles & Davies, 2000;
Gorman & Kmec, 2009). Since women are not privy to the informal social connections of
many of their male peers (Davies-Netzley, 1998; Kalev, Dobbin, & Kelly, 2006), they
must find an alternative source of legitimacy in order to break into top management
positions. A potential source of solidarity between men and women lies within cultural
capital, both within the embedded and institutionalized forms. The possession of a valued
academic credential can signal similarity and in-group status. Peer similarity has been
found to break down barriers and advantage women’s advancement (Davies-Netzley,
1998; Ibarra, 1992).
Women’s social capital in terms of network connections seems to be their weakest
link when trying to ascend the corporate ladder (Lutter, 2015; Tsui & O’Reilly, 1989).
Research demonstrates that the social networks of men and women tend to be
homophilous with men benefitting from stronger professional networks comprised of
other men (Burt, 1998; Ibarra, 1997; Mcpherson et al., 2001). In order to break into
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men’s professional circles, women must exchange their cultural capital for insider status.
The exchangeability of economic, social and cultural capital means that having high
capital in one form can buy entry into other forms. The academic credentials that women
bring to the organization provide a potential source of the institutional form of cultural
capital necessary for women to gain access. Further, elite academic credentials from toprated schools and programs signal a higher level of cultural capital. Drawing from
Weber’s credentialing theory, I would expect an academic credential, in the form of a
baccalaureate, to buy the initial access across the organizational social boundary.
However, a higher level of cultural capital in the form of advanced degrees and elite
academic credentials would be necessary to achieve insider status. Women must
compensate for their lower status through stronger educational credentials. As previously
discussed, cultural capital comprises a similarity of tastes, ideas and desires within the
embedded form (Bourdieu, 1984, 1986). These similarities develop into habitus through
shared experience and education, both of which come to bear within the collegiate and
organizational settings. A shared habitus could lead to an opening of boundaries and
enhanced legitimacy for women within the firm. Previous research suggests that
corporate executives must have either strong social capital or strong credentials for entry
and advancement within the firm (Useem & Karabel, 1986). I posit that women
executives must have both strong credentials and strong social capital for entry and
advancement within organizations, leading me to hypothesize the following.
H1: Women executives will have higher levels of educational attainment than
executive men.
H2: Women executives will graduate from higher ranked colleges and universities
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than executive men.
Gender and Social/Cultural Attainment
Erickson (1996) argues that Bourdieu’s assessment of social structure, as it relates
to social and cultural capital, neglects two important elements; personal networks and
work relationships. Building on Bourdieu’s theories, she suggests that the most widely
useful cultural resource is cultural variety and that network variety is the key to building
cultural variety. Work by Bourdieu (1984) in France and R. A. Peterson (1992) in the
U.S. shows that there is no one form of cultural capital or means of cultural “distinction”
based on social class. Instead those with a higher social class standing have access to a
range of cultural experiences from which they can draw. Cultural variety refers to this
range of cultural experiences and connections, which can be used in varying contexts for
advantage. For example, members of a high social class understand both sets of class
rules for either eating at a fine dining establishment or attending a rock concert because
they have been exposed to both of those situations. Members from a lower social class
may not have been afforded the opportunity to attend an opera or eat at an upscale
restaurant and may not be comfortable in the setting or understand the unspoken rules and
etiquette. In this case, social capital is tightly linked with cultural capital and variety in
networks and experience. Social networks can provide a means of greater cultural variety
with Erickson (p. 118) arguing that networks have a greater impact on culture than class
does. In this sense, habitus can develop from cultural variety within social networks.
Extant literature analyzing the connection between networks and work
relationships find that men and women have very different network forms (Burt, 1998;
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Ibarra, 1992, 1997; Lutter, 2015). Women’s social networks have been found to be more
constrained with fewer ties to outside networks, or opportunities for brokerage between
networks than men (Burt, 1998; Lutter, 2015). Network homophily, or associations with
the members of the same gender, is also high among both men and women within an
organizational setting (Ibarra, 1992; Lutter, 2015). Granovetter (1973) argues that having
a higher number of weak ties builds a more influential network than having higher
numbers of strong ties. Weak ties are defined as acquaintance type connections, whereas
the strong ties denote close friendships. Acquaintance style connections can provide
access to the groups of close friends for each acquaintance contact, therefore greatly
expanding the level of social capital within the network (Granovetter, 1973, 1983, 1995).
Granovetter’s (1973) theory aligns with Erickson’s (1996) assessment in that variety is
the key to the highly valuable social capital. Unfortunately, corporate women lack the
quantity of weak ties that corporate men do (Burt, 1998; Hodigere & Bilimoria, 2015;
Lutter, 2015). Thus, Burt suggests that women must borrow social capital from men
through their network connections in order to get ahead within the organization.
Meaning, women in general do not have the cultural variety that men do within their
networks from which to draw upon. Women who have ascended to the top of their field
would have had to draw upon multiple sources of social and cultural capital in order to
overcome gender role biases, network homophily and exclusion from men’s networks.
The social and cultural capital gained through educational networks could serve as a
source of network strength for executive women. These women can draw upon the large
college or university class and alumni connections as weak ties in order to create
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occupational opportunities. A potential pathway for women to enhance their social capital
is through the cultural capital they gain through education, specifically elite education.
Thus, I offer the following hypothesis;
H3: The prevalence of within firm college or university network ties will be
stronger for women executives than men executives.
Methods and Data
Data
My dataset was compiled from multiple complimentary sources. The Compustat
database, accessed through Wharton Research Data Services (WDRS), was queried to
provide company information for the 500 companies that comprise the Standard & Poor’s
500 Index (S&P 500) for the 5- year study period of 2009-2013. The S&P 500 is
comprised of some of the largest U.S. companies and represents approximately 80% of
the total market capitalization of the U.S. stock market (S&P Dow Jones Indices, 2018).
The S&P 500 was introduced in 1957 as a tool to track the largest companies listed on the
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the NASDAQ. Firms such as GE and IBM have
been consistently listed within the S&P 500 since its inception. However, firms are added
and deleted from the index annually for a variety of reasons. For example, H.J. Heinz and
Dean Foods were removed from the index in 2013. H.J. Heinz was removed due to the
company going private and no longer being publicly listed. Dean Foods divided the
company with a spin-off that decreased the overall market value of the company to where
it no longer met the requirements for listing. General Motors and Kansas City Southern
were added to replace these two losses (Krantz, 2013). Due to the changing nature of this
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index and the longitudinal nature of these data, all companies listed within the 5-year
period remained static within the study. Meaning, data were gathered for all 5-years
regardless of the year of listing. For example, Alliance Data Services (ADS) was added to
the S&P 500 in the last year of my study period, 2013. However, data were collected and
included for ADS for the entire period of 2009-2013. Deletions made from the index
during the study period also remained in the sample for the full period. This led an initial
sample of 2,882 firm/year observations for 496 companies.
The Execucomp database, also accessed through WRDS, provided detailed
information for each corporate executive of the S&P 500 listed companies. The
Execucomp database collects data on up to nine named executives for each firm, although
the majority of firms usually only report data on five executives (Wharton Research Data
Services, 2018). Information collected from Execucomp included executive age, position
and board affiliation. This initial executive sample included 13,638 executive/firm/year
observations.
Biographical data for each executive was collected from multiple sources
including; company websites, news sources (from Lexis Nexus) and SEC filings (from
EDGAR). These data include information on executive gender, company tenure,
company position, education levels and college or university attended, if applicable.
College and university rankings were gathered from U.S. News and World Report,
including overall school ranking, specific program rankings and if the institution was
considered a liberal arts school. Both U.S. and international institutions are ranked by
U.S. News and World Report. Additional industry information was collected from the
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U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Listwise deletion was used for observations where data was missing. The
variables of interest for this study, primarily gender and education, are not time variant.
Many of the reported executives had tenures with their organizations for each year of the
study period. Therefore, I compiled a cross-sectional database consisting of all executives
within the data based on the first year they were reported as an S&P 500 executive, as
determined by the unique executive/company identifier provided by the Execucomp
database. The final cross-sectional sample consists of 3,936 observations.
Variables and Measures
Dependent variables. A dummy variable indicating whether the executive has
been awarded an undergraduate degree was recorded with (1) indicating a degree was
received and (0) that no undergraduate graduate degree has been awarded. The same
process was followed for graduate degree awards. Additional categorical and ordinal
variables indicating the type of degree and the level of the advanced degree; Master of
Science/Arts or equivalent., Master of Business Administration, Juris Doctorate or
Doctorate, were also collected and analyzed to check the robustness of the analysis and
proved consistent with the reported findings. Use of the single dummy variable for the
graduate degree award proved to be the most parsimonious model.
Educational reputation. The dependent variable of interest for hypothesis two is
the reputation of the institution from which the degree was awarded. This variable is
recorded as an ordinal variable based upon the U.S. News and World Report annual
college rankings. Prior research indicates that the U.S. News and World Report ranking
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serves as a signal of institutional quality and prestige (Sauder & Lancaster, 2006).
Additionally, students and administrators use the U.S. News and World Report ranking in
order to make admissions decisions with prior studies demonstrating sensitivity to
ranking tiers (Bowman & Bastedo, 2009). Organizations also refer to these rankings
when deciding on which colleges or universities to focus recruiting efforts (Rivera,
2016). The rank of the degree awarding institution is included for each year of the study.
Institutions are grouped according to their ranking, with the group rankings consisting of
the Top 10, 11-25, 26-50, 51-100 and greater than 100. The results are reverse coded with
the Top 10 institution categorized as 5, 11-25 as 4, and so on. Data were collected for
both undergraduate and graduate programs.
Educational interlinks. Social capital has been described as “a capital of social
connections, honorability and respectability that is often necessary in winning and
keeping the confidence of high society, and with it a clientele” (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 122).
In order to delve further into the debate over the power of women’s networks, I will
examine the educational connections, or interlinks, between executives within firms. The
educational interlinks speak to the social capital the executive may have at their disposal.
“Interlinks” are used extensively within board of director research where they are counted
as the number of ties a board member has to members of other boards (Cook & Glass,
2015). Extending this operationalization from board of director research, I will measure
educational interlinks as a dichotomous variable of the ties an executive has to other
executives, based upon educational institution. If the executive has one or more academic
ties to other executives within the firm the variable will be coded as 1, if no ties exist then
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it is coded as 0. This measure will focus on classmates and alumni networks as a means
of network power. Both undergraduate and graduate within firm academic network ties
will be collected and recorded, as well as a combined total within firm academic network
ties to account for both graduate and undergraduate interlinks.
Independent variables. Executive gender is the main predictor variable, which is
operationalized through a binary dummy code for women (1) and men (0). The executive
gender is reported through the Execucomp database.
Firm performance. Previous research indicates the need to control for marketbased measures of the firm (Waddock & Graves, 1997). Further, research into the “glass
cliff” phenomenon demonstrates that firm performance can drive leadership decisions
specific to gender (Ryan & Haslam, 2005). The methods of measuring firm performance
fall into either accounting-based performance measures or market-based measures. I will
use the accounting-based performance measure of return on equity (ROE) to
operationalize firm performance. ROE is calculated as net income divided by equity and
is reported in percentages from the Compustat database. Accounting performance
measures are preferred when studying organizational change (Keats & Hitt, 1988) and
have been used extensively in research examining gender and change within
organizations (Adams & Ferreira, 2007; Carter, D’Souza, Simkins, & Simpson, 2010;
Peterson & Philpot, 2007; Triana, Miller, & Trzebiatowski, 2014; Zajac, 1990).
Firm size. Firm size is an important consideration when examining board and
executive diversity. Larger firms have more resources at their disposal for recruitment
and retainment purposes. In addition, the larger firms are more visible and more often in
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the public spotlight, leading to increased public pressure and scrutiny. Firm size will be
operationalized as the natural log of the number of employees, initially reported in
thousands by the Compustat database. The natural log function will be used in order to
normalize the distribution and to account for any larger organizations and employee
heavy industries.
Industry. The Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code at the 4-digit level
will be used to indicate the industry in which firms operate Due to the sheer number of
industries represented within the SIC classification, industry will be dummy coded and
categorized into 13 different industries as suggested by Waddock and Graves (1997).
Industry percent women. Scholars suggest that women have to employ unique
tactics in order to overcome the higher obstacles when working within a predominantly
male industry (Agarwal, Qian, Reeb, & Sing, 2016). Industries, such as service
industries, also employ women at much higher rates than men, which leads to more
women in the pipeline for leadership opportunities. Therefore, the percent women within
the industry is an important consideration in the analyses.
Industry percent women in senior management. The proportion of senior roles
held by women varies considerably by industry. Women leaders tend to be overrepresented inservice industries, while men dominate the executive ranks of traditional
industries (King, 2015). Therefore, I control for the percent women within senior
management per industry.
Age. The age of each executive is collected and recorded for each year of the
study. Age data are queried from the ExecuComp database and from biographical
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websites.
Race. The race of each executive is also collected and recorded for each year of
the study. Race data is queried from the ExecuComp database and from biographical
websites. Race is dummy coded with white/Caucasian (1) as the reference category and
all other responses (0).
Analyses
I use a maximum likelihood logistic regression model to estimate the odds of a
women executive being awarded an undergraduate or graduate degree in order to test my
first hypothesis. The logistic regression, or logit, model is used extensively in research
that analyses dichotomous dependent variables (Allison, 1999; Long, 1997). Two models
are estimated, the first examines the odds that women executives will be more likely to
have an undergraduate degree than men executives. The second model exchanges the
undergraduate degree variable with graduate degree within the model in order to examine
the odds that women executives are more likely to have a graduate degree.
To estimate the odds that women executives will graduate from higher ranked
colleges and universities for hypothesis two, I use an ordered logistic regression model.
Two models are tested for this hypothesis, the first based upon undergraduate institution
and the second based upon graduate institution. I regress the categorical school rank
variable with gender as the main predictor variable using a generalized ordered logit
model for undergraduate rankings and an ordered logistic model for graduate rankings.
Controls are included for industry, firm size, firm performance, industry percent women,
industry percent women in senior management, executive age and executive race. I
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initially conducted both analyses using ordered logistics regression. Upon testing, the
Brant test indicated that the undergraduate model violated the parallel regression
assumption. An assumption underlying the ordered logistic regression is that parameters
do not change for different categories and that the dependent variable’s categories are
parallel (or proportionate) to each other (Ari & Yildiz, 2014; Kleinbaum & Klein, 2010).
Figure 2.1 demonstrates the conditions concerning the assumption.

Reprinted from Ari, E, & Yildiz, Z. (2014). Parallel lines assumption in ordinal logistic regression and
analysis approaches. International Interdisciplinary Journal of Scientific Research 1(3): 8-23.

Figure 2.1. Conditions for ordered logistic regression.
The generalized ordered logistic model is a good model choice when the
proportional odds assumption does not hold for ordered logistic regression. The
generalized ordered logit model allows for some of the β coefficients to vary and others
to remain static within a partial proportional odds model (Fullerton & Xu, 2012).
Williams (2016b) suggests using his gologit2 program within Stata in order to generate a
generalized ordinal logit model. This program, when run with the autofit option, leads to
an iterative process where Stata fits a fully unconstrained model and then runs a series of
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Wald tests to determine if the coefficients differ across equations. The model is then refit
with constraints until the final model does not violate the parallel lines assumption, thus
providing a more accurate partial proportional odds model (Williams, 2016a).
A maximum likelihood logistic regression is used again to estimate the odds that
women executives are more likely to have within firm network ties for hypothesis three.
Three analyses were conducted to test for within firm academic interlinks at the
undergraduate, graduate and combined levels. I transformed the unstandardized beta
coefficients to odds ratios in order to simplify interpretation of the results.
Results
Three hypotheses were tested: first, whether women executives are more likely
than men to have been awarded a college degree; second, whether women executives are
more likely to graduate from higher ranked colleges and universities than men; and third,
whether women executives are more likely to have in firm academic network ties than
men. Correlations and descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2.1.
The first hypothesis predicts that women executives will be more likely to have
undergraduate and graduate degrees than men executives. In the correlations table (refer
to Table 2.1), women executives are significantly and positively associated with both
undergraduate and graduate degree attainment. For this hypothesis, I conducted a logistic
regression analysis. In the first model, I regressed the award of an undergraduate degree
on the explanatory variable of gender. I controlled for industry, firm size, firm
performance, the percent women within the industry, the percent women in senior

Table 2.1
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
Variables

Mean

1

SD

2

3

4

5

6

1. Undergraduate degree

0.95

0.23

1

2. Graduate degree

0.64

0.48

0.30*

1

3. Total academic
interlinks

0.18

0.38

0.11*

0.15*

4. Undergrad interlinks

0.08

0.28

0.07* -0.04

0.65*

1

5. Graduate interlinks

0.11

0.31

0.08*

0.25*

0.76*

0.08*

1

6. Graduate ranking

2.07

2.05

0.24*

0.76*

0.24*

0.00

0.33*

1

7. Undergrad ranking

2.17

1.43

0.05*

0.19*

0.13*

0.08*

0.10*

0.30*

8. Firm size

3.02

1.39

-0.03

0.00

27.96 231.01

0.01

-0.02

0.01

9. Firm performance

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

1

-0.04* -0.03

1

-0.03

0.03

-0.01

1

0.02

0.00

-0.03

-0.01

-0.01

1

10. Industry % women

0.34

0.17

-0.02

-0.01

0.00

0.00

-0.01

0.04

0.05* 0.12*

-0.01

1

11. Industry % women in
senior mgmt.

0.20

0.09

-0.02

0.00

0.02

0.02

0.01

0.04*

0.05* 0.08*

-0.02

0.95* 1

12. Age

51.93

6.42

-0.02

0.05* -0.02

-0.02

-0.01

-0.01

-0.03

0.07*

0.01

13. Race

0.93

0.26

-0.02

-0.05*

0.01

0.01

0.00

-0.05*

0.02

-0.03

-0.03

14. Gender

0.10

0.29

0.03

0.03

-0.02

-0.02

0.00

0.04*

0.00

0.04*

0.07*

-0.06* -0.07* 1
0.02

0.01

0.04

1

0.04

0.03*

-0.07 -0.03 1

* Significant at the p < .05 level or above.
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management within the industry, executive age and executive race. In the second model, I
regressed the award of a graduate degree on the main predictor variable of gender, again
using the same control variables as the undergraduate model. I find support for the
hypothesis within both models (refer to Tables 2.2 and 2.3). In the undergraduate
analysis, findings suggest a significant relationship (p < 0.05) for women executives
being more likely to have a baccalaureate than men. The results suggest that the odds of
women executives having an undergraduate degree are nearly twice that of men
executives, holding all other variables constant. The Hosmer and Lemeshow test was
conducted to determine the goodness of fit, but not reported on the table. A good fit for
this test returns a high p-value. The model returned an insignificant p-value of 0.69,
which signifies that the model fits the data well (Lemeshow & Hosmer, 1982).
Table 2.2
Logistic Regression of Undergraduate Degree Attainment by Executives

Undergraduate degree
Firm size

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Logit Coeff

se

Odds ratio

P > |z|

-0.01

0.06

0.97

0.81

Firm performance

0.00

0.00

1.00

0.87

Industry % women

-1.75

2.35

0.17

0.46

4.13

4.06

62.28

0.31

Age

-0.02

0.01

0.98

0.10

Race

-0.33

0.33

0.71

0.31

Industry % women in senior management

Gender

0.62**

0.31

1.85**

0.04

Constant

3.61***

1.34

37.00***

0.01

Observations
3,835
3,835
Note. Operating industry is dummy coded and categorized into 13 different industries. The values are not
reported for space purposes.
**

p < 0.05.

*** p < 0.01.
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Table 2.3
Logistic Regression of Graduate Degree Attainment by Executives
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Logit Coeff.

se

Odds ratio

P > |z|

0.04

0.03

1.04

0.20

Firm performance

-0.00

0.00

1.00

0.13

Industry % women

-2.47**

1.16

0.08**

0.03

Industry % women in senior management

4.86**

1.98

129.20**

0.01

Age

0.02***

0.01

1.02***

0.00

Race

-0.39***

0.14

0.67***

0.01

0.28**

0.12

1.33**

0.02

0.73

0.75

0.70

Graduate degree
Firm size

Gender
Constant

-0.28

Observations
3,835
3,835
Note. Operating industry is dummy coded and categorized into 13 different industries. The values are not
reported for space purposes.
**

p < 0.05.

*** p < 0.01.

I find further support that women executives outperform men executives in terms
of educational attainment with graduate degree completion (refer to Table 2.3). The
results again show a significant relationship (p < 0.05), suggesting that the odds of
women executives having a graduate degree are 1.3 times higher than the odds of men,
holding all other variables constant. The Hosmer and Lemeshow test for this model again
demonstrated a good fit with a p value of 0.42.
Hypothesis two predicts that women executives will graduate from higher ranked
colleges and universities than men executives. Two models examining undergraduate and
graduate rankings were constructed. The first model presents a generalized ordered
logistics regression of the university or college that the executive attended for their
undergraduate degree. Due to the violation of the proportional odds (parallel lines)
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assumption necessary for an ordered logistic regression, a partial proportional odds model
was constructed. The generalized ordered logit model relaxes the proportional odds
assumption and permits the covariates to have differential effects across the J - 1ordered
categories. This type of model has been used and discussed extensively within research
(see Fullerton, 2009; Williams, 2016b).
Table 2.4 presents the odds ratios from the generalized ordered logit model. The
table provides the J-1sets of odds ratios for each of the independent variables, where J
Table 2.4
Generalized Ordered Logistic Regression of Executive Undergraduate University/
College Ranking Odds Ratios
Undergraduate ranking
─────────────────────
Variables
Firm size

𝐶𝐶1

0.99
(0.02)

Firm performance
Industry % women
Industry % women in senior management
Age

a

Gender
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.

a

𝐶𝐶3

𝐶𝐶4

0.99

0.99

0.99

(0.02)

(0.02)

(0.02)

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

0.92

3.34

1.60

3.75

(0.57)

(2.15)

(1.14)

(3.37)

2.33

0.39

1.63

0.27

(2.61)

(0.46)

(2.08)

(0.42)

0.99

0.99

1.00

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

1.15

0.99

(0.23)

(0.16)

(0.15)

1.15

0.97

0.88

(0.13)

(0.11)

(0.12)

0.99***
(0.01)

Race

𝐶𝐶2

1.74***

0.67**
(0.12)
0.61***
(0.12)
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denotes the undergraduate school ranking categories. The ordered category variables are
coded so that a higher score denotes a higher undergraduate school ranking. The ranking
categories are comprised of 1 = Raked 100+, 2 = Ranked 51-100, 3 = Ranked 26-50, 4 =
Ranked 11-25 and 5 = Top 10. The first column labeled as “𝐶𝐶1 “ indicating cutpoint 1,

provides the odds ratio of an executive attending a school ranked above the first cutpoint
(i.e., within the top 100 ranked schools) versus attending a school ranked below the first
cutpoint, or outside of the top 100. The second column labeled “𝐶𝐶2 “ provides the odds

ratio of an executive’s undergraduate institution being ranked above the second cutpoint,
or within the top 50 schools versus being ranked below the second cutpoint, or outside of
the top 50. The third column “𝐶𝐶3 ,” gives the odds ratio of the executive’s college or

university being ranked above the third cutpoint, or within the top 25, versus outside of
the top 25. The fourth column “𝐶𝐶4 ,” refers to the fourth cutpoint and provides the odds

ratio of an executive’s college or university being ranked above this cutpoint, or within
the top 10, versus outside of the top 10. The model maintains the ordinality of the data,
but relaxes the assumption of proportionality. Each odds ratio is stand-alone and the
outcome corresponds to a given ranking at either above or below the cutpoint. In
examining the results in Table 2.4, we see the odds of being above each cutpoint
decreases, as would be expected when examining more prestigious and exclusive schools.
Unfortunately, the results indicate that men have higher odds of attending a ranked
college or university. The only significant result related to the gender variable is within
the fourth cutpoint column, which refers to the odds of attending a top 10 school. The
odds of women executives attending a top 10 school are 1.4 times lower than men
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executives. Therefore, the analysis of undergraduate program reputation does not support
the hypothesis.
The second model examined the odds that a women executive will graduate from
a higher ranked graduate program than men. The graduate program ranking was
regressed with gender as the main predictor variable. The findings support my hypothesis
by suggesting that women executives are significantly more likely (p < 0.05), to graduate
from a higher ranked program than men. The odds that women executives are likely to
graduate from a higher ranked program are 1.3 times that of men (refer to Table 2.5).
This model finds support for hypothesis two, but when taken with the previous model
Table 2.5
Ordered Logistic Regression of Executive Graduate School Ranking

Graduate degree
Firm size

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Logit Coeff.

se

Odds ratio

P > |z|

0.05**

0.02

1.05**

0.05

1.00*

0.06

Firm performance

-0.00*

0.00

Industry % women

-1.66*

0.99

0.19*

0.09

Industry % women in senior management

3.48**

1.67

32.42**

0.04

Age

0.00

0.01

1.00

0.38

-0.28**

0.11

0.76**

0.01

0.23**

0.10

1.26**

0.02

Race
Gender
Constant cut1

-0.78

0.67

0.46

0.25

Constant cut2

-0.061

0.67

0.94

0.93

Constant cut3

0.24

0.67

1.27

0.72

Constant cut4

0.52

0.67

1.68

0.44

Constant cut5

0.98

0.67

2.65

0.15

Observations
3,835
3,835
Note. Operating industry is dummy coded and categorized into 13 different industries. The values are not
reported for space purposes.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
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examining the undergraduate situation, findings are somewhat mixed. Men executives are
significantly more likely to attend higher ranked schools for their undergraduate
education, but that changes with graduate school where women are significantly more
likely to graduate from top programs.
Hypothesis 3 suggests that women executives will have more within firm
academic network ties than their male peers. Three models using logistic regression
analysis were examined to assess the hypothesis. The first model, as reported in Table
2.6, regressed the total presence of within firm academic interlinks for both
Table 2.6
Logistic Regression of Total Academic Interlinks by Executives
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Graduate degree
Logit Coeff.
se
Odds ratio
P > |z|
Firm size
-0.07*
0.04
0.93**
0.03
Firm performance
0.00**
0.00
1.00*
0.07
Industry % women
0.38
1.50
1.39
0.83
Industry % women in senior management
-0.98
2.53
0.50
0.78
1.School Rank 100+
0.34**
0.16
1.24
0.15
2.School Rank 50-100
0.25
0.21
1.30
0.21
3. School Rank 26-50
0.82***
0.19
2.32***
0.00
4.School Rank 11-25
0.41**
0.18
1.59***
0.01
5.Top 10 School
1 .64***
0.12
5.36***
0.00
International
-0.89***
0.20
Age
-0.01
0.01
1.00
0.62
Race
0.05
0.18
1.27
0.18
Gender
-0.28*
0.16
0.80
0.16
Constant
-1.76*
0.96
0.13**
0.03
Observations
3,721
3,835
Note. Operating industry is dummy coded and categorized into 13 different industries. The values are not
reported for space purposes.
*
p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
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undergraduate and graduate networks using the explanatory variable of gender. Industry,
firm size, firm performance, the percent women within industry and the percent women
within senior management within the industry were controlled in all of the model. An
additional variable of whether or not the institution attended was outside of the U.S. was
included in all of the models for analysis. The variable was added as a precaution for
international students not having the opportunity to make as robust connections to
American students and companies as U.S. students. The results are inconclusive, the
trend suggest (p < 0.10) that the odds of men executives having within firm academic
network connections may be higher than women (refer to Table 6). Therefore, the results
do not support the hypothesis. An interesting result from the model does suggest that
academic interlinks are more prevalent within the networks of higher ranked schools.
The second model examined for hypothesis three uses a logit model to regress the
within firm academic interlinks based upon institution attended for undergraduate
education with gender as the predictor variable (refer to Table 2.7). The rank of the
undergraduate school is used as a control variable in the analysis. The results do not
support the hypothesis and dispute the hypothesis by suggesting that men executives have
significantly higher odds (p < 0.05) of within firm interlinks based upon undergraduate
networks. Women executives are 1.4 times less likely to have undergraduate connections
within their firms. Again, we see significantly higher odds of network connections among
the highest ranked schools, along with significantly negative odds for international
students to have undergraduate network connections within their firms.
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Table 2.7
Logistic Regression of Undergraduate Institution Interlinks by Executives
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Graduate degree
Logit Coeff.
se
Odds ratio
P > |z|
Firm size
-0.04
0.05
0.96
0.45
Firm performance
0.00*
0.00
1.00*
0.08
Industry % women
-0.11
2.00
0.90
0.96
Industry % women in senior management
0.63
3.36
1.88
0.85
2.School Rank 50-100
0.86***
0.16
2.37***
0.00
3. School Rank 26-50
0.30
0.23
1.34
0.19
4.School Rank 11-25
0.96***
0.19
2.60***
0.00
5.Top 10 School
0.86***
0.19
2.35***
0.00
International
-1.41***
0.40
0.24***
0.00
Age
-0.01
0.01
0.99
0.40
Race
-0.21
0.25
0.81
0.40
Gender
-0.46**
0.23
0.63**
0.04
Constant
-2.37***
0.85
0.09***
0.01
Observations
3,631
3,631
Note. Operating industry is dummy coded and categorized into 13 different industries. The values are not
reported for space purposes.
*
p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.

The final model presented in Table 2.8 examines the executive’s networks based
upon their graduate institution attended. The rank of the graduate program is used as a
control variable in the analysis. The results of the logistic regression are inconclusive
and, therefore, do not support the hypothesis. All three examinations of within firm
academic network connections analyzing three levels interlinks; the total academic
interlinks, undergraduate and graduate found no support for hypothesis three. Indeed,
results suggest the opposite of the prediction with men executives demonstrating higher
academic network connections within their firms. The Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness of fit
test was conducted for all three models with each model returning a nonsignificant pvalue.
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Table 2.8
Logistic Regression of Graduate Institution Interlinks by Executives
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Graduate degree
Logit Coeff.
se
Odds ratio
P > |z|
Firm size
-0.07
0.05
0.94
0.17
Firm performance
0.00
0.00
1.00
0.33
Industry % women
-0.52
1.93
0.60
0.79
Industry % women in senior management
-1.00
3.25
0.37
0.76
2.School Rank 50-100
-0.05
0.27
0.95
0.85
3. School Rank 26-50
0.35
0.25
1.41
0.17
4.School Rank 11-25
0.273
0.23
1.31
0.23
5.Top 10 School
1.50***
0.17
4.47***
0.00
International
-0.44*
0.24
0.65*
0.07
Age
-0.01
0.01
1.00
0.57
Race
0.19
0.23
1.21
0.41
Gender
-0.14
0.19
0.87
0.47
Constant
-1.16
1.10
0.31
0.29
Observations
2,348
2,348
Note. Operating industry is dummy coded and categorized into 13 different industries. The values are not
reported for space purposes.
*
p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.

Discussion and Conclusion
The results reveal first, that among senior corporate executives, women are more
likely to possess stronger and higher status academic credentials. Reaffirming the existing
data on women’s increasing graduation rates, I find that the executive suite is not much
different than the general population when it comes to who has academic credentials. It is
surprising that the rate at which women executives outpace men in having a Bachelor’s
degree, with the odds being nearly two to one. It would also be easy to dismiss the higher
likelihood of women executives earning a graduate degree than men, given the
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aforementioned statistics. However, upon further examination of the sample data, I find
that over 51% of the executives with a graduate degree have a Master of Business
Administration (MBA). Out of the executive women, 39% of them have an MBA, versus
37% for executive men. This is quite interesting considering that women comprise only
36% of MBA graduates nationally, a figure that has remained relatively flat for the past
five years (Graduate Management Admissions Council, 2016). Taken together the results
reaffirm the notion that women executives have to work harder and bring more to the
table in order to prove themselves beyond what is required of their male colleagues
(Bielby, 2000; Charles & Davies, 2000; Fiske, 1998). The academic credentials
possessed by the women executives within the study act as a source of both cultural and
social capital that provides legitimacy and validates the women’s claims on their
positions.
Examination of the level, or rank, of post-secondary schools attended by the
executives in the study provides mixed, yet interesting results. Men executives are more
likely to attend higher ranked schools for their undergraduate degrees, while the odds are
women executives are more likely to attend higher ranked graduate schools. The central
tenant upon which the hypothesis is predicated is that a higher ranked school signals a
higher level of cultural capital and acts as an enhanced credential. The quiet shift from
more men to more women earning undergraduate degrees began in 1978 (Kirst, 2013).
Given that the median age of the study sample is 51, many of the executives were either
attending or graduating from college in the early ‘80s as this shift began taking shape.
While women may have gained ground in graduation rates, it may have taken longer for
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this shift to occur within the top institutions. For example, Yale University had a total
student enrollment of 10,103 students in 1981, of those 4,273, or 42%, were women
(Waters, 2001). Explanations for this gap could include a dearth of cultural and social
capital on the part of aspiring women. Women had yet to prove that they could develop a
taste for the highly competitive world of elite colleges and universities, and thus go
against the heavily prescribed social norms of gender. Gorman (2005) discusses how
gender-based stereotypes lead to role incumbent schemas where the gender of the
position holder dictates gender as an asset for the role. Lacking a frame for legitimacy
these schemas could take hold and further entrench gender homophily with the “old boys
club” of top institutions being reluctant to open their doors to women students. As
women begin to gain capital and credentials, they have tools to assist them in overcoming
stereotypes and bias and to be welcomed into the elite schools. This can be evidenced by
the higher odds of the same women receiving a graduate degree from a top ranked school.
The results from hypothesis three reaffirm that men executives continue to have
stronger network ties than women, specifically when it comes to their undergraduate
networks. Prior research suggests that women need men within their networks to
strengthen them, while the network resources reached through ties to women are
relatively poor (Burt, 1998; Lutter, 2015; Tsui & O’Reilly, 1989). This helps explain the
finding that men executive’s undergraduate network ties are stronger and goes hand in
hand with the findings for hypothesis two that men executives are more likely to graduate
from higher ranked schools with their Bachelor’s degree. The results indicate that higher
ranked schools tend to have higher levels of within firm corporate interlinks. Since men
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have historically had higher access to top schools, it goes without saying that their
networks would benefit from that access. While women have made great strides over the
past few decades in terms of graduation rates from elite schools and programs, it may
take more time before the network benefits catch up.
Overall, the results of the study suggest that executive women within the largest
U.S. companies rely on cultural capital and credentials as part of the package to
overcome preconceived notions of stereotypical male leadership and to grant them
legitimacy within their positions. While the social capital of executive women has not
caught up to that of men, the potential for forms of capital exchange offers a promising
outlook for women executives in the future.
Moving forward this study has several limitations that offer potential paths for
future research. Executive race was not examined as a predictor variable in this study, but
the results from statistical testing suggest that there may be important racial effects
related to forms of capital, education and occupational achievement that should be
explored in further detail. Additionally, a more expansive dataset to include both earlier
and more recent observations could help illuminate potential pathways for women
executives and assist in clarifying mixed findings related to the value of prestige for
academic credentials. Inclusion and analysis of cohort effects could be particularly
illuminating. Finally, the same type of analysis of educational attainment versus
outcomes could be extended to the board of directors in order to understand if more or
less cultural capital and credential legitimacy is required for board positions and the
related social network effects.
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CHAPTER 3
A FREE SOLO IN HIGH HEELS: CORPORATE RISK TAKING
AMONG WOMEN EXECUTIVES AND DIRECTORS
At the 2011 Forbes Most Powerful Women Conference, Ginni Rometty, CEO of
IBM, offered advice and anecdotes for women seeking professional mobility. Rometty
related the story of when early in her career she was offered a “big job.” Her initial
reaction was “I’m not ready. I need more time, I need more experience…” and “I need to
go home and think about it.”
After returning home and discussing the situation with her husband, his response
to her was, “Do you think a man would have ever answered that question that way?”
Rometty credits this key moment as the time she learned to value risk as part of her
career (Barnett, 2011).
Women’s perceived risk-aversion, and the perceived biological basis for it, has
been a salient factor in the reproduction of organizational inequality (Johnson & Powell,
2005; Schubert, Brown, Gysler, & Brachinger, 1999). Perceived gendered difference in
risk-taking is often used as a justification of women’s underrepresentation in corporate
leadership roles and the subsequent gender pay gap (Croson & Gneezy, 2009; Hoffman &
Yoeli, 2013). Traditional studies of the gendered dimension of risk taking have found
men to be more risk taking than women (Charness & Gneezy, 2012; Levin, Snyder, &
Chapman, 1988; Sapienza, Zingales, & Maestripieri, 2009). However, recent studies
examining risk taking specifically within a corporate context have disputed the claim that
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women are more risk-averse (Goldin & Katz, 2016; Iqbal, Sewon, & Baek, 2006;
Morgenroth, Fine, Ryan, & Genat, 2018; Roszkowski & Gramble, 2005). Indeed, echoing
the sentiments of Ginni Rometty, scholars have argued that corporate women are in fact
required to take risks all along their career paths (Glass & Cook, 2016).
In the sport of rock climbing, the free solo ascent is the riskiest of all types of
climbing. Free of the supporting ropes, harnesses and other safety equipment, the climber
works their way to the top of the rock with only the aid of their climbing shoes and a
chalk bag. The corporate ascent of women executives is very similar to the free solo rock
climb. Women scale the corporate ladder free of many of the traditional supports of
gender role alignment (Bielby, 2000), and powerful networks (Burt, 2000), that
advantage their male colleagues. Gender stereotypes and bias present challenges for
corporate women and maintain social notions that women are inferior leaders within the
corporate world (Koenig, Eagly, Mitchell, & Ristikari, 2011; Schein, 1973). Much like
the free solo climber, senior executive women may overcome these challenges through
perseverance and measured risk taking. This study seeks to examine if women corporate
leaders are positioned to pursue greater risk than their male peers. Specifically, do firms
led by women Chief Executive Officers (CEO), women Chief Financial Officers (CFO),
women executives or women board directors undertake greater organizational risks than
those led by men?
Research regarding gender and risk taking has a long and prolific history across
multiple disciplines. The majority of studies start from the assumptions that gender
differences in risk taking exist and that women are more risk adverse than men. A meta-
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analysis on gender and risk reviewed over 150 academic papers to conclude that men are
more likely to take risks than women (Byrnes, Miller, & Schafer, 1999). These overall
findings were confirmed in a later study suggesting that women are more risk adverse in
both individual and group contexts, and specifically in a group leadership context (Ertac
& Gurdal, 2012). A rare change to this pattern occurred recently with researchers
suggesting that confirmation bias exists in the measurement of risk taking, which biases
results in favor of men (Morgenroth et al., 2018). However, nowhere within the literature
does the notion of women being more risk taking than men drive the research. Leading to
the stereotype of women’s risk aversion continuing to dominate the discussion. A shift in
the perspective related to gender differences in corporate risk taking is important for two
reasons. First, there is evidence that women are only offered top positions that are risky
to take (Cook & Glass, 2014a, 2014b; Glass & Cook, 2016; Ryan & Haslam, 2005; Ryan,
Haslam, Hersby, & Bongiorno, 2011). Second, context matters. Women in top leadership
roles face the unique challenge where they must walk a line between conforming to
societal gender roles and societal expectations of leadership (Eagly & Karau, 2002;
Koenig et al., 2011). Women who take risks within the corporate setting may end up
crossing this line. The sanctions and penalties faced through gender role/job role
incongruity sets up an impossible position where women are expected to take risks as
leaders, yet are penalized for doing do as women due to gender stereotypes (Eagly &
Karau, 2002). When women leaders are a statistical minority within the firm, they also
face issues of legitimacy and may lack the corporate resources that men have to
undertake corporate risk (Fiske, 2016; Glass & Cook, 2016; Kanter, 1977b, 1977a). The
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corporate social setting magnifies gender differences in risk-taking behavior by
reinforcing accountability to gender norms (Fiske, 2016; Wagner & Berger, 1997).
Unfortunately, this tension between social roles and status essentializes social norms of
gender within the organization and removes the importance of context (Ely, 1995), which
could be a critical element in risk taking behavior. For example, Carr and Steele (2010)
enacted a stereotype threat element in their experimental study where subjects were asked
to record their gender either prior to or after the experiment. There was no difference in
results when gender was recorded after the experiment, but they found very large
differences when gender was recorded before the risk-taking experiment. In this case, the
timing of gender being activated as a differentiator was the key to the stereotypical
behavior. Ronay and Kim (2006) found evidence of group preference and social identity
activation related to risk in their experiment when men were placed in groups of the same
sex. Gender, complete with the requisite social norms and stereotypes, was activated as a
group identity leading to higher risk-taking behavior. Taken together the research
suggests that context matters with risk-taking behavior. Under controlled economic
circumstances, research suggests that the gender stereotypic assumption of women’s riskaversion is simply not the case (Schubert et al., 1999). Unfortunately, the ramifications of
the stereotype continue to persist for women within corporate leadership. Women
leaders’ risk aversion has been linked as a contributor to the glass ceiling effect (Johnson
& Powell, 2005). This stereotype contributes to women leaders being less trusted than
men to make risky decisions for the firm (Schubert et al., 1999).
The contribution of this study is in the analysis of gender and firm financial risk
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across all levels of top organizational leadership. Previous studies have examined gender
and risk taking among CEOs (Elsaid & Ursel, 2011; Faccio, Marchica, & Mura, 2016;
Khan & Vieito, 2013) or boards of directors (Adams & Funk, 2012), but none have
combined the board and the entire senior executive team. Using data from all S&P 500
listed firms over the period 2009-2013, I examine risk taking in terms of both accountingbased measures of corporate expenditures and market-based measures of stock price
volatility in order to present a unique picture of gender and corporate risk. Answers to
questions of gendered differences in corporate risk taking prove vital in our
understanding of how women at the top of the corporate structure navigate risk as a
source of social rewards and career mobility (Fiske, 2016; Kanter, 1977a; Ng, Eby,
Sorensen, & Feldman, 2005). Gender role stereotypes assume women are more risk
averse than men (Fiske, 2016); and research has historically reinforced this notion
thereby supporting assumptions that women may be inferior leaders due to their inability
to take risks (Fiske, 2016; Johnson & Powell, 2005; Schubert et al., 1999). However,
more recent research challenges these views by suggesting that (1) risk taking is
contextual (Morgenroth et al., 2018; Ronay & Kim, 2006; Schubert et al., 1999), and (2)
women leaders may not be typical (Glass & Cook, 2016). Instead, women may benefit
from taking risk or be required to take risks in order to overcome bias and achieve
upward mobility in leadership.
I will begin by examining the current literature and what it tells us about women
and risk taking. I will then briefly discuss the influence of social roles and status
expectations before turning my attention to the glass cliff phenomenon and my research
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hypotheses. The data and analyses will then be presented followed by a discussion of the
results and implications for the research.
Literature Review
Gendered Risk Taking
Research within the fields of behavioral economics and social psychology suggest
that gender affects both the predilections for risk and the overall risk tolerance of
individuals. A main category of risk-taking theories, multifactor models, include models
that seek to explain risk taking within specific contexts (Byrnes et al., 1999). These
models examine the risks undertaken by specific people within specific situations.
Multifactor models can consider a wide range of factors involved in risk taking, such as
expectations and values (expectancy-value model), which posit that people take risks
because they believe they will be successful, or value success within a certain context
(Wigfield & Eccles, 1992). Early experiments examining gender differences in risk
taking were situated within the expectancy-value models. These were based on gambling
scenarios controlling probability versus return. Findings from these studies suggested that
women preferred a guaranteed return on their investment, where they opted for higher
probability wins while the men tended to prefer the high stakes gamble with options for
higher returns (Coombs & Pruitt, 1960; Kass, 1964). Other studies conducted during this
same period found no association between gender and risk taking (Arenson, 1978; Tajfel,
Richardson, & Everstine, 1964).
More recent experimental research has continued to stress gender differences in
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relation to risk taking. Multiple studies conducted by researchers using the same type of
gambling or lottery scenarios as earlier studies find that women are more risk averse in
the experimental setting, thus affirming the gender difference arguments (Borghans,
Golsteyn, Heckman, & Meijers, 2009; Charness & Gneezy, 2012; Croson & Gneezy,
2009; Eckel & Grossman, 2008; Johnson & Powell, 2005). Further economic research
into the financial decisions of women in the real world confirm that women are more risk
averse and more conservative with their financial investments (Halko, Kaustia, &
Alanko, 2012; Jianakoplos & Bernasek, 1998; Sunden & Surette, 1998).
A key criticism of much of the psychological and economic research is that it
does not take social context into consideration. Specifically, early studies conducted on
children did not account for the growing salience of gender roles as we age (Coet &
McDermott, 1979). Rawn and Vohs (2011) suggest that risk-taking behavior can be
influenced by social pressures such as gendered expectations and peer groups.
Researchers have also found that risk taking behaviors do not extend to all context
(Hanoch, Johnson, & Wilke, 2006; Weber, Blais, & Betz, 2002). For example, someone
may be prone to high stakes gambling, but unlikely to bungee jump. Further, feelings of
societal privilege and safety work to influence risk assessments with white men feeling
the most secure to take risks (Flynn, Slovic, & Mertz, 1994). Indeed, risk taking
behaviors have been linked as a prescriptive aspect central to masculinity (Connell &
Messerschmidt, 2005).
The socialization model of risk taking suggests that cultural restrictions may
decrease the propensity for risk taking (Arnett, 1992). Here culture would be considered

79
the laws and norms of society, which also extend into organizational culture. Cultural
norms dictate that women are risk averse (Maxfield, Shapiro, Gupta, & Hass, 2010),
while men are viewed as naturally more agentic and risk taking (Eagly, Makhijani, &
Klonsky, 1992). These preconceived notions of gender roles often dictate not only how
women are treated, but also how women behave. Prior research suggests that women
managers are perceived as more risk-averse than male managers, which limits their
promotion potential (Johnson & Powell, 2005). Further, women who do act in more
assertive or competitive ways within the organization often suffer for their actions
through an “agency penalty,” often conferring lower salary, lack of promotion and lower
status (Brescoll & Uhlmann, 2008; Eagly & Karau, 2002; Rudman & Glick, 2001).
However, recent research suggests that women directors are more prone to take risks than
their male peers and that having more women on the board of directors actually increases
the portfolio risk of the firm (Adams & Funk, 2012; Berger, Kick, & Schaeck, 2014).
Adams and Funk suggest that this may be due to the fact that women in high-ranking
corporate positions need to behave according to more masculine gender norms in order to
be successful. Both studies put forth the idea that once women are above the glass
ceiling, risk-aversion disappears.
The Glass Cliff
Contrary to gender role proscriptions, some scholars support the idea that women
are just as risk taking as men in financial contexts (Gupta, Maxfield, Shapiro, & Hass,
2009; Maxfield et al., 2010; Schubert et al., 1999). In order to reach the upper echelons of
the corporate elite, women have to navigate the double bind of being a strong business
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leader while confronting societal gender role expectations (Correll & Ridgeway, 2003;
Elsesser & Lever, 2011; Ely & Padavic, 2007). Indeed, research indicates that women
can be denied promotions for adhering to feminine stereotypes (Branson, 2006). This
makes the women who occupy top corporate positions a distinct group. For example, they
embrace the competitive environment often avoided by other women (Adams & Funk,
2012). Unfortunately, as women ascend the corporate ranks, they are faced with greater
work uncertainty (Gorman & Kmec, 2009). Women corporate leaders have been found to
occupy less promising positions within the organization than their male counterparts
(Ryan & Haslam, 2005). In what has been deemed “the glass cliff,” research has
demonstrated that women are more likely to be promoted to leadership roles within the
organization during times of crisis or poor performance (Bruckmüller & Branscombe,
2010; Ryan & Haslam, 2005, 2007; Ryan et al., 2016). Specifically, women tend to be
promoted when organizations are struggling and the position is tenuous and a risk for the
occupant (Cook & Glass, 2014a; Haslam, Ryan, Kulich, Trojanowski, & Atkins, 2009;
Ryan & Haslam, 2005). Glass and Cook (2016) suggest that women have to take risky
assignments all along their career trajectory in order gain opportunities for advancement.
Indeed, women often do not have the option to pass on risky assignments and therefore,
view them as career opportunities (Haslam & Ryan, 2008; Ryan & Haslam, 2007). If
women fail in their risky assignments, the organization is unforgiving and seeks to
replace these women with men, in what has been termed the “savior effect” (Cook &
Glass, 2014a, 2014b). Further, it is likely that women leaders who fail will be blamed for
all negative outcomes, even those out of their control (Meindl, 1993). Even though men
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overall are viewed as more risk taking culturally, it is corporate women who must take
the risky assignments in order to gain opportunities for advancement.
Women’s lack of self- promotion has been well documented within the literature
(Gardner, 1992; Kumra & Vinnicombe, 2008, 2010; L. C. Miller, Cooke, Tsang, &
Morgan, 1992; Singh & Vinnicombe, 2001, 2004). The lack of self-promotion among
women may serve to sweep their personal successes into the success of the larger
organization and to keep their risk-taking behaviors hidden (Maxfield et al., 2010).
Women executives prefer to let their work “speak for itself (Gardner, 1992),” which leads
their actions to materialize in the actions of the firm. Therefore, I would expect the risktaking behavior of women executives and directors would likely manifest in greater risktaking for the overall firm. Further women within specific positions of power, such as the
CEO or CFO may have greater leeway in regards to firm risk decisions (Hambrick &
Finkelstein, 1987). As statistical gender minorities within their positions, Women CEOs
and CFOs may face greater pressure to undertake risk in order to legitimize themselves as
leaders and to push firm success (Fiske, 2016; Kanter, 1977b). Given the unique position
and pressures faced by women corporate leaders, I hypothesize the following:
H1: Firms led by women CEOs will undertake greater financial risk than those
led by men CEOs.
H2: Firms with women CFOs will undertake greater financial risk than those with
men CFOs.
H3: Firms with a more gender diverse top management team will undertake
greater financial risk than firms with less gender diversity among top
management.
H4: Firms with a more gender diverse board of directors will undertake greater
financial risk than firms with a less gender diverse board.
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Methods and Data
Data
In order to answer the research question, I analyze a unique dataset consisting of
all S&P 500 executives and directors covering the period 2009-2013. The dataset consists
of a consolidation of multiple sources of archival data. The Compustat database, available
through Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS), was used to provide a list of all
companies on the S&P 500 index for each year of the study. In addition, Compustat also
provides data on organizational size, performance, as well as industry information for
each firm. Corporate executives for each firm are recorded from the Execucomp
database, also available through WRDS. The executive data includes the variables of
name, gender, age and tenure. Additional data on executive race was collected from both
company and biographical websites.
Corporate directors for each firm are reported through the Execucomp database
and the Institutional Shareholder Services database (ISS), both available through WRDS.
The director data include similar information as the executive data such as name, gender,
age, tenure, race and committee appointments. Daily stock return information was
queried from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). The complete dataset
presents a panel of the entire executive and director populations of all S&P 500 indexed
companies for the study period, which includes 37,847 total observations. Listwise
deletion was used for missing data, leading to 23,421 director/year observations and
13,006 executive/year observations. A per company director or per company executive
identification number was assigned for each executive/company or director/company
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combination. This resulted in 6,073 director/company observations and 4,102
executive/company observations.
Variables
Independent variables. Risk taking as expenditures is calculated as the natural
logarithm of the sum of expenditures in research and development (R&D), capital
expenditures, and acquisitions. Prior research has validated this measure as capturing the
three main components of risk-taking spending within organizations (Beckman &
Haunschild, 2002; Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2011; Zhu & Chen, 2015). R&D, capital
expenditures and acquisitions data were acquired from CompStat and coded accordingly.
Risk-taking as volatility. Prior research argues that risk taking within firms can be
captured by the stock price volatility when analyzing historical data (Alford & Boatsman,
1995; Baixauli-Soler, Belda-Ruiz, & Sanchez-Marin, 2015). Volatility involves the up or
down change in the price of the security. High fluctuations leading to an increase in the
stock price indicate a volatile and risky investment, which while having the potential for
increased returns, may drive investors from the organization (French, Schwert, &
Stambaugh, 1987). Research suggest that corporate executives with company stockoptions may also undertake actions to increase firm risks in order to increase the volatility
of the stock and drive the price of the stock higher for personal benefit (Rajgopal &
Shevlin, 2002). Having been validated as a measure of firm risk taking with prior studies
(Baixauli-Soler et al., 2015; Vieito & Khan, 2012), Risk-taking as volatility is calculated
as the standard deviation of daily stock returns over each annual period. The annual stock
return information was queried from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP).
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The two different measures of firm risk-taking provide different pictures of corporate risk
and serve to measure the same construct in a different manner.
Dependent variables. The gender of each executive and director are collected
from Compustat and ISS databases. Missing cases were researched on company and
biographical websites and recorded. Gender is coded as a dummy variable of (1) for
women and (0) for men.
Woman as CEO. Numerous studies have demonstrated the connection between
CEO characteristics and organizational outcomes (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007;
Ingersoll, Glass, Cook, & Olsen, 2017; Olsen, Dworkis, & Young, 2014). Much of the
connection is due to the CEO position having discretion concerning corporate
investments and corporate strategy (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2011; Hambrick &
Finkelstein, 1987). I do not suggest that the CEO has sole discretion over corporate
investment and strategy. Prior research suggests that CEOs are constrained by the firm
environment and depend upon others within the firm to assist in decision making
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Porter & van der Linde, 1995). Further, the CEO must win
board approval for all major expenditures or strategic decisions (Westphal & Fredrickson,
2001; Westphal & Zajac, 1995). However, the risk-taking characteristics of the CEO as
the organizational leader is an important consideration in examining risk taking.
Woman as CFO. Similar to the CEO, the CFO has significant influence over
financial decisions of the firm (Geiger & North, 2006). The accounting-based measure of
risk-taking could be influenced by the risk-taking behavior of the position incumbent and
the inclusion of this variable allows me to explore the association.
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Number of women executives. The number of women executives within the top
management team of the firm is counted and recorded as a continuous variable. Women
executives are identified through the Compustat database and the total number of women
executives for the firm/year observation is recorded for each executive. The top executive
team of the firm leads the strategic direction of the organization. This group of executives
shapes the organization through both individual and shared decisions (Finkelstein,
Hambrick, & Cannella, 2009). Therefore, analyzing the number of women in this position
to shape organizational decisions related to risk will provide insight into the women’s
risk-taking propensity.
Number of women directors. The number of women directors serving on the
board of the firm is counted and recorded as a continuous variable in the same manner as
executives. Women directors are identified through the ISS database and the total number
of women directors for the firm/year observation is recorded for each director. The board
of directors of a firm is responsible for the oversight of the executive team. The
characteristics of individual board members have been demonstrated to impact
organizational decisions related to financial decisions, such as R&D spending and
acquisitions (Golden & Zajac, 2001; Shen & Cannella, 2002).
Critical mass of women directors. Prior research suggests that having three or
more women on a board of directors creates a climate of comfort for women directors
(Konrad, Kramer, & Erkut, 2008). This critical mass normalizes women as part of the
director’s group and leads to less constraint in their decision making and influence
(Konrad et al., 2008; Torchia, Calabro, & Huse, 2011). Critical mass is coded as a
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dummy variable where (1) represents a board containing three or more women directors
and (0) represents a board containing two or less women directors. The variable is
recorded for each firm/year observation for every executive and director within the
dataset.
Age. The age of each executive and director is collected and recorded for each
executive or director year from the CompStat and ISS databases. Missing data is obtained
through company and biographical websites.
Race. The race of each executive and director is collected and recorded for each
executive or director year also from the CompStat and ISS databases. Missing data is
again obtained through company and biographical websites. Race is coded as a dummy
variable with the reference category of (1) being white/Caucasian and all other responses
as (0).
Tenure. The tenure length at the firm for each executive or director is calculated
by subtracting the year of appointment, collected from CompStat, by the observation
year. Tenure is an important consideration when analyzing the top management team and
board of directors. Firm tenure has been tied to managerial decision making and firm
outcomes by numerous studies (Beasley, 1996; Huang & Hilary, 2018; Sorensen, 2000).
Firm performance. The accounting-based measure of return on equity (ROE) will
be used to measure firm performance. ROE is calculated as the net income of the firm
divided by equity. The variable is collected from the CompStat database and recorded as
a percentage. Accounting based performance measures are used extensively within
research related to gender and organizations (Adams & Ferreira, 2007; Cook & Glass,
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2014b; Zajac, 1990). Much like firm size, firm performance can influence the overall
behavior of the firm and the resources available to the firm for investment in R&D,
acquisitions and capital expenditures.
Firm size. Firm size is measured by the total number of employees as reported by
the CompStat database. The variable is recorded in thousands. Firm size is important to
control, as larger companies may have greater resources to risk as compared to their
smaller counterparts. Further, the higher visibility of larger firms could influence the
market volatility of their stock returns when compared to smaller firms.
Industry. The Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) is used at the sector
level for industry classification. The GICS was developed in 1999 by Standard and
Poor’s and consists of 11 sector, 24 industry groups, 69 industries and 158 sub-industries
(S&P, n.d.). The two-digit sector code is reported by the ISS database and recoded as
coded.
Analyses. I use a panel data linear regression model with time and firm random
effects to test the research questions. This method has been demonstrated to appropriately
address the repeated firm observations in the panel data (Allison, 1994). Separate datasets
for executives and directors were constructed in order to accurately conduct the panel
data analysis. Panel data must have a single grouping observation per time period. The
observations are grouped according to being a director or executive within a single firm
as an executive/company or director/company identifier. The identification number for
executive/firm is recorded as missing data for director observations, and vice versa.
Therefore, the complete dataset would not work for panel data analysis and must be split
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into executives and directors.
A concern when analyzing panel data is the possibility of unobserved timeinvariant effects, or unobserved heterogeneity. This is of concern to this study with
respect to the claim that an executive or director’s gender affects the risk-taking
accounting measures and /or stock volatility of a firm. The problem of unobserved
heterogeneity relates to the model specification (Peterson & Koput, 1991). Unfortunately,
most statistical models suffer from omitted-variable bias to some extent and are not
completely specified. The two approaches most often used to statistically address
unobserved heterogeneity are fixed-effects and random-effects models. The fixed-effects
model entails treating the unobserved effect as a constant over time and estimating a
constant term for each unit (Allison, 2009). In essence, you are controlling each firm
within, or against itself. The random-effects model treats the heterogeneity as occurring
between, or across firms, as randomly drawn from an underlying probability distribution
(Allison, 2009). I employed a random-effects linear regression model in order to address
concerns of heterogeneity.
The decision to use a random-effects model was based on two considerations.
First, prior research indicates that a fixed-effects model can be biased when used for
panels of a short duration (Heckman, 1981; Hsiao, 2014). Due to all firm-year
observations being collected over a 5-year period, the random-effects model is a better
fit. Second, the fixed effects model does not properly specify a model where timeinvariant variables are included or where the variables do not really change over time
(Allison, 2009). Time-invariant variables, such as gender or race, are best estimated with
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the random-effects model that will ensure that the model is not limited. As a check on the
model specification a Hausman test was generated for each model. The results indicate
that a random effects model is the most efficient. Standard error estimates are clustered
on the executive/company or director/company identifier in order to provide robustness
against disturbances related to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (Cameron & Miller,
2015).
Results
My research examined four hypotheses concerning women leaders. The first two
hypotheses examined whether a woman CEO or CFO impacts risk taking by the firm.
The third hypothesis looked at the gender composition of the executive team to determine
if more women executives influence firm risk taking. The fourth hypothesis examined the
gender composition of the board of directors as a predictor of firm risk taking.
Correlations and descriptive statistics for the variables of interest are presented in Table
3.1.
The first hypothesis predicts that a woman CEO will be positively associated with
firm risk taking, measured by both stock volatility and the natural log of the sum of
investments in R&D, acquisitions and capital expenditures. The data used for the analysis
consisted of all executives within the dataset. I conducted a random effects panel data
analysis in order to test this hypothesis. The amount of risk taking within a firm was
regressed on the explanatory variables of executive gender and then the firm having a

Table 3.1
Correlations and Descriptive Statistics
Variables

Mean

SD

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

1. Accounting risk

6.34

2.06

1

2. Volatility risk

0.02

0.01

0.11*

1

3. Gender

0.14

0.35

0.01

0.02*

1

4. Age

59.90

8.73

0.03*

0.03*

0.08*

1

5. Race

0.89

0.31

0.04*

0.02*

0.06*

0.02*

1

6. Company tenure

10.30

8.93

0.00

0.02*

0.10*

0.14*

0.10*

1

7. Return on equity

24.79

196.10

0.01

0.03*

0.02

0.00

0.02*

0.00

1

8. Size

52.70

128.52

0.24*

0.07*

0.03*

0.00

0.05*

0.02*

0.01*

1

9. Woman as CEO

0.01

0.08

0.02*

0.02*

0.29*

0.01

0.03*

0.01

0.03*

0.03*

1

10. Woman as CFO

0.01

0.08

0.00

0.01

0.19*

0.09*

0.02*

0.01

0.00

0.00

0.0*

1

11. Women executives

0.46

0.68

0.02*

0.02*

0.12*

0.03*

0.03*

0.05*

0.07*

0.01

0.1*

0.09*

1

12. Women directors
1.82
1.07
* Significant at the p < .05 level or above.

0.04*

0.10*

0.04*

0.02*

0.03*

0.01

0.01

0.07*

0.0

0.01*

0.03

12

1
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woman CEO or not. I controlled for executive age, race and company tenure. Additional
firm level controls were included for firm size as measured by employees and firm
performance captured by return on equity. Two models were constructed to test the
hypothesis, the first analyzing the accounting-based risk taking measure and the second,
analyzing the market volatility risk taking measure. The results are reported as model (1)
for executive gender and model (2) for a woman CEO in Tables 3.2 and 3.3. Findings
suggest that there is no statistically significant difference between men and women
executives as it relates to firm risk taking. However, when a woman is CEO of the firm,
there is a positive and significant (p < .05) increase in the amount of accounting-based
risk the firm undertakes. Firms with a woman CEO realize an average increase in
accounting-based risk taking of .42 over those led by men CEOs. Examining risk taking
as volatility, I find no significant difference between firms led by men CEOs and women
CEOs (see model [2] of Table 3.3). While on first glance this may seem like mixed
results for the hypothesis, the construct of risk is presented very differently in both
models. The accounting-based model examines firm spending and executive behavior
leading to riskier expenditures. The market volatility model on the other hand, examines
the stock price fluctuation that results in the firm’s stock being a risk for investors and
employee stockowners. Further, stock volatility is highly contingent on macroeconomic
influences (Beltratti & Morana, 2006; Schwert, 1989). Given the period of the data
(2009-2015), the macroeconomic events related to the global economic crisis 2008, the
subsequent economic downturn and recovery likely confounded results. Therefore, the
findings from analyses examining risky expenditures cannot be discounted due to
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Table 3.2
Random Effects Test of Accounting Based Risk Taking by Executive Gender
Variables
Gender

(1)
Model 1
-0.028
(0.080)a

Woman CEO

(2)
Model 2

(3)
Model 3

(4)
Model 4
-0.086
(0.082)

0.422**
(0.181)

Woman CFO

-0.066
(0.148)

Number of women execs

0.067***
(0.020)

Age

0.020***
(0.004)

0.020***
(0.004)

0.020***
(0.004)

0.020***
(0.004)

Race

-0.101
(0.089)

-0.0990
(0.089)

-0.100
(0.089)

-0.098
(0.089)

Company tenure

0.018***
(0.002)

0.018***
(0.002)

0.018***
(0.002)

0.018***
(0.002)

Firm performance

0.000
(0.000)

0.000
(0.000)

0.000
(0.000)

0.000
(0.000)

Firm size

0.004***
(0.001)
(0.218)

0.004***
(0.001)
(0.218)

0.004***
(0.001)
(0.218)

0.004***
(0.001)
(0.219)

Constant

6.556***
(0.204)

6.552***
(0.204)

6.554***
(0.204)

6.542***
(0.204)

Observations

13,006

13,006

13,006

13,006

Number of executive/company
4,102
4,102
4,102
4,102
identifier groups
Note. Operating Industry is categorized into 11 different industries based upon GICS code. The values are
not reported for space purposes.
a

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

**

p < 0.05.

*** p < 0.01.
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Table 3.3
Random Effects Test of Volatility Based Risk by Executive Gender
Variables
Gender

(1)
Model 1
-0.00023
(0.00065)a

Woman as CEO

(2)
Model 2

(3)
Model 3

(4)
Model 4
0.00017
(0.00070)

-0.00064
(0.00084)

Woman as CFO

0.00042
(0.00081)

Number of women executives

-0.00046**
(0.00019)

Age

-0.00021***
(0.00000)

-0.00021***
(0.00000)

-0.00021***
(0.00000)

-0.00021***
(0.00000)

Race

0.00010**
(0.00046)

0.00010**
(0.00046)

0.00010**
(0.00046)

0.00010**
(0.00046)

Company tenure

0.00000***
(0.00000)

0.00000***
(0.00000)

0.00000***
(0.00000)

0.00000***
(0.00000)

Firm performance

0.00000***
(0.00000)

0.00000***
(0.00000)

0.00000***
(0.00000)

0.00000***
(0.00000)

Firm size

0.00000***
(0.00000)

0.00000***
(0.00000)

0.00000***
(0.00000)

0.00000***
(0.00000)

Constant

0.032700***
(0.00109)

0.032700***
(0.00109)

0.032600***
(0.00110)

0.032800***
(0.00108)

Observations

12,652

12,652

12,652

12,652

Number of executive/company
4,042
4,042
4,042
4,042
identifier groups
Note. Operating industry is dummy coded and categorized into 13 different industries. The values are not
reported for space purposes.
a

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

**

p < 0.05.

*** p < 0.01.
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findings from the analyses examining stock volatility.
Hypothesis 2 predicts that a woman as CFO will lead to higher levels of firm risk.
Data relating only to the corporate executives was used in the analysis. A random effects
panel data regression model was also used to test this hypothesis. Here, firm risk was
regressed on the predictor of the firm CFO being a woman or not. Executive age, race
and tenure were controlled, along with firm size and firm performance. Two models were
once again constructed to analyze both accounting based risk and stock volatility risk.
The results are reported as model (3) in Tables 3.2 and 3.3. Findings were not significant
for the predictor variable and therefore do not support the hypothesis that a woman CFO
leads to increased firm risk taking.
The third hypothesis suggests that having a higher number of women within the
top executive team of a firm will lead to higher levels of risk taking. A random effects
panel data analysis is once again used to test the executive data for this hypothesis. Firm
risk for two models in the form of both accounting measures and stock volatility were
regressed using the number of women on the firm’s executive team as the predictor
variable. Executive gender, age, race and tenure were controlled along with the firm level
controls for size and performance. Findings are reported as model (4) in tables 2 and 3.
The accounting-based risk model supports the hypothesis and is significant at the p < .01
level. The findings suggest that as the number of women executives within the firm
increase so does the amount of risk taking by the firm. The results indicate a .07 average
increase in firm risk taking when the number of women executives in the firm change by
one unit across time.
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In examining the market volatility measure of firm risk, the results do not support
hypothesis 3 as reported in model (4) of Table 3.3. The results for this model indicate a
slight (-.0005) average decrease in volatility risk when the number of women executives
in the firm change by one unit across time. This suggests that the stock price of the firm
is less volatile, or risky, as the number of women executives within the firm increases.
The results instead indicate that higher numbers of women executives lead to differing
types of risk undertaken by the firm.
Hypothesis 4 predicts that firm risk-taking increases as the number of women
directors serving on the corporate board increases. Models were constructed analyzing
firm risk taking predicted by director gender, as the number of directors increases and
based upon critical mass and are reported in Table 3.4. The hypothesis was analyzed
using the same random effects models as the previous analyses, but with the predictor
variables of the number of women directors serving on the corporate board, critical mass
of women directors. The data used for this analysis included only corporate directors, as
opposed to the executive data used for the previous analyses. The results find support for
the hypothesis in three of the models. The first model suggests that women directors do
indeed take on more corporate risk than men directors with a .14 increase in accountingbased risk for women directors over time. This result is significant at the p < .01 level.
Model (2) for hypothesis 4 examines the level of firm risk taking predicted by the
overall number of women directors. The findings for the total number of women directors
are not significant. However, the gender variable is significant at the p < .01 level,
suggesting that women directors continue to be more risk taking than men directors even

96
Table 3.4
Random Effects Test of Accounting Risk Taking by Director Gender
Variables
Gender

(1)
Model 1
0.135***
(0.051) a

Number of women directors

(2)
Model 2
0.136***
(0.051)

(3)
Model 3
0.132***
(0.051)

-0.005
(0.008)

Critical mass of women directors

0.043**
(0.019)

Age

0.012***
(0.003)

0.020***
(0.003)

0.019***
(0.003)

Race

-0.173***
(0.057)

-0.173***
(0.057)

-0.171***
(0.0567)

Company tenure

0.001
(0.003)

0.001
(0.003)

0.001
(0.003)

Firm performance

0.000***
(0.000)

0.000**
(0.000)

0.000***
(0.000)

Firm size

0.004***
(0.000)

0.004***
(0.000)

0.004***
(0.000)

Constant

6.700***
(0.182)

6.705***
(0.182)

6.709***
(0.181)

Observations

23,421

23,421

23,421

Number of director/company identifier groups
6,073
6,073
6,073
Note. Operating Industry is categorized into 11 different industries based upon GICS code. The values are
not reported for space purposes.
a

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

**

p < 0.05.

*** p < 0.01.
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when accounting for the total number of women on the board. In order to further examine
the impact of board gender composition on firm risk taking, an additional model was
constructed to analyze the effect of a critical mass of three or more, versus two or less
women directors serving on the corporate board. Findings from model (3) predicting
higher levels of corporate risk taking when three or more women are on the board are
statistically significant (p < .01) and find support for the hypothesis. Board with three or
more women directors are predicted to realize a .04 increase in accounting-based risk as
compared to boards with less than three women directors. When taken together with
model (2) results, findings suggest that it is not the total number, but a critical mass of
women directors that influences firm risk taking.
Table 3.5 presents the results for the random effects test of stock volatility risk as
predicted by director gender. Similar to the results from Table 3.3, the findings show an
opposite effect for director gender on the risk of stock volatility. Model (1) predicts that
women directors are slightly less associated with stock volatility than men directors with
significance at the p < .01 level. Models (2) and (3) both suggest that firms with higher
levels of women directors decrease the likelihood of volatility risk within a firm, thus not
supporting the hypothesis. All results are statistically significant at the p < .01 level for
the predictor variables. The results also suggest that critical mass is not a factor for
women directors as it relates to stock volatility. Again, I would hesitate to report mixed
findings for the hypothesis based upon the two different operationalizations of risk
taking. Instead, the findings confirm what I saw with the executive sample and may
suggest that women take different types of risk than men.
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Table 3.5
Random Effects Test of Volatility Based Risk by Director Gender
Variables
Gender

(1)
Model 1
-0.0010***
(0.0003)a

Number of women directors

(2)
Model 2
-0.0009***
(0.0003)

(3)
Model 3
-0.0010***
(0.0003)

-0.0007***
(0.0000)

Critical mass of women directors

-0.0015***
(0.0002)

Age

-0.0001***
(0.0000)

0.0000***
(0.0000)

0.0000***
(0.0000)

Race

0.0010***
(0.0003)

0.0009***
(0.0003)

0.0010***
(0.0003)

Company tenure

0.0000***
(0.0000)

0.0000***
(0.0000)

0.0000***
(0.0000)

Firm performance

0.0000***
(0.0000)

0.0000***
(0.0000)

0.0000***
(0.0000)

Firm size

0.0000***
(0.0000)

0.0000***
(0.0000)

0.0000***
(0.0000)

Constant

0.0270***
(0.0016)

0.0278***
(0.0016)

0.0269***
(0.0016)

Observations

22,833

22,833

22,833

Number of director/company identifier groups
5,989
5,989
5,989
Note. Operating Industry is categorized into 11 different industries based upon GICS code. The values are
not reported for space purposes.
a

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

**
***

p < 0.05.
p < 0.01.
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Discussion and Conclusion
This study examined the role of risk taking as a mechanism for mobility into
executive and director roles at the largest U.S. firms. Contrary to conventional thoughts
on women and risk-taking, the analysis was rooted in the notion that in order to reach top
positions, women executives and directors have to be more risk taking than their male
counterparts. I specifically analyzed the role of gender composition within top leadership
on the likelihood of firms undertaking accounting based or market-based risk.
The result analyzing gender alone as a predictor of risk among corporate
executives of the S&P 500 were inconclusive. Based on these findings I cannot suggest
that women executives are more risk taking than men executives. Conversely, I cannot
suggest that women executives are less risk taking than men executives. Out of the
organizations within the sample, 63% of them have no women executives and only 1%
report more than two women executives. The majority of firms within the sample report
just a single woman executive. Research has demonstrated that the ability of numerical
minorities within firms can be severely impacted due to their token or solo status (Kanter,
1977a, 1977b). Token or solo leaders experience high visibility and enhanced
performance pressures (Kanter, 1977a). Further, token leaders may lack the network ties
necessary for enacting change within their organizations (Gorman, 2005; Gorman &
Kmec, 2007). Kanter (1977) emphasizes that token and solo leaders face pressures to
assimilate to the values and attitudes of the dominant group within the organization.
Given that virtually all of the women executives within the sample are numerical
minorities, token pressures may be inhibiting their ability to impact organizational risk
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taking. Results from hypothesis 3 where I analyze corporate risk taking as predicted by
the number of women executives offers confirmatory evidence that token pressures may
be at play. The findings suggest that as the number of women executives within the firm
increase, the accounting-based risk taking of the firm also increases. As more women
reach the executive ranks and alleviate token pressures, I would expect to see higher
levels of corporate risk.
While women in the position of CEO would face the same token pressures as
other women within the executive ranks, the legitimacy and power granted by the
position itself may allow them to overcome these pressures. The results from hypothesis
2 indicate that firms led by women CEOs do in fact take on more accounting-based risk
than those led by men. This aligns with the thesis that women who have reached the CEO
position have become conditioned to embrace and seek out risk as means of career
mobility and leadership legitimacy. However, the evidence does not support women
CFOs being more risk taking than men CFOs. Again, token pressures are likely at work
to hamper the ability of the CFO to impact firm risk. The CFO position is accountable to
the CEO position (Mian, 2001). Indeed, research suggest that the CEO can exert great
amounts of pressure and influence over the CFO (Friedman, 2014). Therefore, the CFO
may not have the discretion to influence corporate risk taking at the same level as the
CEO. Even though women in this position may have the same disposition to risk as those
in the CEO position, they are constrained in their ability to embrace risk by both their
numerical minority status within the organization and their lower level of organizational
power.
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Two very different constructs of organizational risk-taking were presented in the
research. The first, examines expenditures-based risk undertaken by the firm. The second,
examines the stock price volatility of the firm and the perceived riskiness of the firm to
investors. The first, expenditure-based measure lies completely within the control of the
firm’s leadership (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2011). The second, market return measure is
an investor reaction to the actions undertaken by firm leadership. As previously
mentioned, macroeconomic conditions greatly influence the overall stock market
fluctuation (Beltratti & Morana, 2006; Schwert, 1989). Results from the models of
market volatility-based risk taking suggest that risk volatility decreases as more women
enter the executive or director ranks of a firm. The findings suggest that either women
executives and directors have less influence over factors that lead to a fluctuation in
security prices, or that investors react less drastically to firms with more women in
leadership. Taken together with the results from the accounting-based risk models, there
is evidence that women executives and directors may exhibit different types of risk taking
than men. Previous research has highlighted the fact that gender norms and risk taking
vary both across and within various domains (Morgenroth et al., 2018). The implications
of the findings present a scenario where gender diversity among the executive and/or
director teams can lead to strategic risk taking in R&D, acquisitions and capital
expenditures, but at the same time minimize the investment risk to potential investors.
I examined the influence of gender within the board of directors on firm risk in
hypothesis 4. Findings indicate that women directors lead to higher levels of accountingbased risk for the firm. This suggests that women directors have a higher predilection
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toward this type of risk than men directors. Unlike the executive sample, women
directors are not limited by their token status within the boardroom. Only 9.5% of boards
within the sample had no women directors compared to 63% having no women
executives with the majority of boards having at least two women. The findings likely
demonstrate the results of a concerted effort to get more women on to corporate boards.
Groups such as WomenCorporateDirectors (https://www.womencorporatedirectors.org/)
and 2020 Women on Boards (https://www.2020wob.com/) have spent years advocating
for greater boardroom gender diversity. Additionally, both academic and popular press
has placed intense scrutiny on corporations with regards to board diversity (Seierstad,
2015). Activist investors have also brought pressure on firms to increase the prevalence
of women on their boards (Perrault, 2014). The resulting increase in board diversity
provides relief to women directors from the old boys’ club faced by executives. The
results from the critical mass model confirm that as women’s representation increases
past the token stage, they are more willing to drive the firm to take higher accountingbased risks. Unfortunately, findings for the model examining the overall number of
women directors were inconclusive, confirming that three or more directors is the magic
number for releasing some of the token pressures within the boardroom. These findings
support previous research that links gender diversity in the boardroom to critical strategic
outcomes (Bear, Rahman, & Post, 2010; Carter, Simkins, & Simpson, 2003; T. Miller &
Triana, 2009).
The original research on the glass cliff phenomenon examined corporate board
replacement and demonstrated that women were appointed to the boards of companies in
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more precarious situations (Ryan & Haslam, 2005). Recent research has extended the
phenomenon to executives demonstrating not only the precarious placement, but that
should you fail a man would swoop in to save the day (Cook & Glass, 2014a, 2014b).
Taking into account the results from all four hypotheses, findings suggest that the
necessity for risk taking among women leaders, as evidenced within the glass cliff
literature, may lead to higher levels of accounting-based risk taking for the firm.
The findings of my study have far reaching social implications. A propensity for
risk taking by men has been used to explain gender gaps in power, wealth and success
(Charness & Gneezy, 2012; Croson & Gneezy, 2009; Hoffman & Yoeli, 2013). Leading
successful women to advocate for risk taking as a source of career advancement and
power (Sandberg, 2013). However, as evidenced by Ginni Rometty’s earlier anecdote,
women are often put in the precarious position of navigating the fine line between
adhering to gender norms and career ambition, much like rock climbing free solo and in
high heels. Women seeking career mobility need to understand the requirement for taking
risks, including the timing and types of risk that lead to career success.
As with most research my study has limitations. First, the study is specific to large
U.S. companies. Future research may explore if the same types of risk are present with
women executives and directors of smaller U.S. firms or within a wider international
context. For example, an analysis of companies listed on the OSEAX index of the Oslo
Stock exchange or the FTSE 500 index of the London Stock Exchange may shed light on
different cultural norms and pressures related to risk faced by women executives and
directors.
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A second limitation of my study is the sole focus on gender. While race acted
only as a control variable in the study, results indicate that race may act as a moderator
between gender and risk taking. Gender norms and stereotypes vary across cultures and
ethnicities. Examining the relationship between risk and race could help to uncover
potential paths and pitfalls to career mobility for ethnic and racial minorities within
organizations.
Finally, while I obtained research validated measures of risk taking, I was unable
to asses executive and director risk taking directly. Survey instruments, structured
interviews and direct observation could all be useful in discovering a direct measurement
of risk taking for women executives and directors.
References
Adams, R. B., & Ferreira, D. (2007). A theory of friendly boards. The Journal of
Finance, 62(1), 217-250. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01206.x
Adams, R. B., & Funk, P. (2012). Beyond the glass ceiling: Does gender matter?
Management Science, 58(2), 219-235. http://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1110.1452
Alford, A. W., & Boatsman, J. R. (1995). Predicting long-term stock return volatility:
Implications for accounting and valuation of equity derivatives. The Accounting
Review, 70(4), 599-618.
Allison, P. D. (1994). Using panel data to estimate the effects of events. Sociological
Methods & Research, 23(2), 174-199. http://doi.org/10.1177/004912419402
3002002
Allison, P. D. (2009). Fixed effects regression models (Vol. 160). Thousand Oaks, CA:
Sage.
Arenson, S. J. (1978). Age and sex differences in the probability preferences of children.
Psychological Reports, 43(3), 697-698. http://doi.org/10.2466/pr0.1978.43.3.697

105
Arnett, J. (1992). Reckless behavior in adolescence: A developmental perspective.
Developmental Review, 12(4), 339-373. http://doi.org/10.1016/02732297(92)90013-R
Baixauli-Soler, J. S., Belda-Ruiz, M., & Sanchez-Marin, G. (2015). Executive stock
options, gender diversity in the top management team, and firm risk taking.
Journal of Business Research, 68(2), 451-463.
Barnett, M. (2011, October). IBM’s Ginni Rometty: Growth and comfort do not coexist.
Fortune. Retreived from http://fortune.com/2011/10/05/ibms-ginni-romettygrowth-and-comfort-do-not-coexist/.
Bear, S., Rahman, N., & Post, C. (2010). The impact of board diversity and gender
composition on corporate social responsibility and firm reputation. Journal of
Business Ethics, 97(2), 207-221. http://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-010-0505-2
Beasley, M. S. (1996). An empirical analysis of the relation between the board of director
composition and financial statement fraud. Accounting Review, 71(4),Vol. #, 443465.
Beckman, C. M., & Haunschild, P. R. (2002). Network learning: The effects of partners’
heterogeneity of experience on corporate acquisitions. Administrative Science
Quarterly, 47(1), 92-124. http://doi.org/10.2307/3094892
Beltratti, A., & Morana, C. (2006). Breaks and persistency: Macroeconomic causes of
stock market volatility. Journal of Econometrics, 131(1-2), 151-177.
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeconom.2005.01.007
Berger, A. N., Kick, T., & Schaeck, K. (2014). Executive board composition and bank
risk taking. Journal of Corporate Finance, 28, 48-65. http://doi.org/10.1016/
j.jcorpfin.2013.11.006
Bielby, W. T. (2000). Minimizing workplace gender and racial bias. Contemporary
Sociology, 29(1), 120-129.
Borghans, L., Golsteyn, B. H. H., Heckman, J. J., & Meijers, H. (2009). Gender
differences in risk aversion and ambiguity aversion. Journal of the European
Economic Association, 7(2-3), 649-658. http://doi.org/10.1162/JEEA.2009.7.23.649
Branson, D. M. (2006). No seat at the table: How corporate governance and law keep
women out of the boardroom. New York, NY: New York University Press.
Brescoll, V. L., & Uhlmann, E. L. (2008). Can an angry woman get ahead ?
Psychological Science, 19(3), 268-275.

106
Bruckmüller, S., & Branscombe, N. R. (2010). The glass cliff: When and why women are
selected as leaders in crisis contexts. British Journal of Social Psychology, 49(3),
433-451. http://doi.org/10.1348/014466609X466594
Burt, R. S. (2000). The network structure of social capital. Research in Organizational
Behavior, 22, 345-423. http://doi.org/10.1016/S0191-3085(00)22009-1
Byrnes, J. P., Miller, D. C., & Schafer, W. D. (1999). Gender differences in risk taking: A
meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 125(3), 367-383. http://doi.org/10.1037/
0033-2909.125.3.367
Cameron, C. A., & Miller, D. L. (2015). A practitioner’s guide to cluster-robust
inference. Journal of Human Resources, 50(2), 317-372. http://doi.org/10.3368/
jhr.50.2.317
Carr, P. B., & Steele, C. M. (2010). Stereotype threat affects financial decision making.
Psychological Science, 21, 1411-1416. http://doi.org/10.1177/0956797610384146
Carter, D. A., Simkins, B. J., & Simpson, W. G. (2003). Corporate governance, board
diversity, and firm value. The Financial Review, 38(1), 33-53. http://doi.org/
10.1111/1540-6288.00034
Charness, G., & Gneezy, U. (2012). Strong evidence for gender differences in risk taking.
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 83(1), 50-58. http://doi.org/
10.1016/j.jebo.2011.06.007
Chatterjee, A., & Hambrick, D. C. (2007). It’s all about me: Narcissistic chief executive
officers and their effects on company strategy and performance. Administrative
Science Quarterly, 52, 351-386. http://doi.org/10.2189/asqu.52.3.351
Chatterjee, A., & Hambrick, D. C. (2011). Executive personality, capability cues, and
risk taking: How narcissistic CEOs react to their successes and stumbles.
Administrative Science Quarterly, 56(2), 202-237. http://doi.org/10.1177/
0001839211427534
Coet, L. J., & McDermott, P. J. (1979). Sex, instructional set, and group make-up:
Organismic and situational factors influencing risk-taking. Psychological Reports,
44(suppl), 1283-1294. http://doi.org/10.2466/pr0.1979.44.3c.1283
Connell, R. W., & Messerschmidt, J. W. (2005). Hegemonic masculinity. Gender &
Society, 19(6), 829-859. http://doi.org/10.1177/0891243205278639
Cook, A., & Glass, C. (2014a). Above the glass ceiling: When are women and
racial/ethnic minorities promoted to CEO? Strategic Management Journal, 35(7),
1080-1089. http://doi.org/10.1002/smj.2161

107
Cook, A., & Glass, C. (2014b). Women and top leadership positions: Towards an
institutional analysis. Gender, Work & Organization, 21(1), 91-103.
http://doi.org/10.1111/gwao.12018
Coombs, C. H., & Pruitt, D. G. (1960). Components of risk in decision making:
Probability and variance preferences. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 60(5),
265-277. http://doi.org/10.1037/h0041444
Correll, S. J., & Ridgeway, C. L. (2003). Expectation states theory. In J. Delamater (Ed.),
Handbook of social psychology (pp. 29-51). Boston, MA: Springer.
Croson, R., & Gneezy, U. (2009). Gender differences in preferences. Journal of
Economic Literature, 47(2), 448-474. http://doi.org/10.1257/jel.47.2.448
DiMaggio, P. J., & Powell, W. W. (1983). The iron cage revisited: Institutional
isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields. American
Sociological Review, 48(2), 147-160.
Eagly, A. H., & Karau, S. J. (2002). Role congruity theory of prejudice toward female
leaders. Psychological Review, 109(3), 573-598. http://doi.org/10.1037/0033295X.109.3.573
Eagly, A. H., Makhijani, M. G., & Klonsky, B. G. (1992). Gender and the evaluation of
leaders: A meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 111(1), 3-22.
Eckel, C. C., & Grossman, P. J. (2008). Differences in the economic decisions of men
and women: Experimental evidence. In C. R. Plott & V. L. Smith (Eds.),
Handbook of experimental economics results (1st ed., pp. 509-519).
http://doi.org/10.1016/S1574-0722(07)00057-1
Elsaid, E., & Ursel, N. D. (2011). CEO succession, gender and risk taking. Gender in
Management: An International Journal, 26(7), 499-512. http://doi.org/10.1108/
17542411111175478
Elsesser, K. M., & Lever, J. (2011). Does gender bias against female leaders Persist?
Quantitative and qualitative data from a large-scale survey. Human Relations,
64(12), 1555-1578. http://doi.org/10.1177/0018726711424323
Ely, R. J. (1995). The power in demography: Women’s social constructions of gender
identity at work. Academy of Management Journal, 38(3), 589-634. http://doi.org/
10.2307/256740
Ely, R. J., & Padavic, I. (2007). A feminist analysis of organizational research on sex
differences. Academy of Management Review, 32(4), 1121-1143.

108
Ertac, S., & Gurdal, M. Y. (2012). Deciding to decide: Gender, leadership and risk-taking
in groups. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 83(1), 24-30.
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2011.06.009
Faccio, M., Marchica, M.-T., & Mura, R. (2016). CEO gender, corporate risk-taking, and
the efficiency of capital allocation. Journal of Corporate Finance, 39, 193-209.
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2016.02.008
Finkelstein, S., Hambrick, D. C., & Cannella, A. A. (2009). Strategic leadership: Theory
and research on executives, top management teams, and boards. New York, NY:
Oxford University Press.
Fiske, S. R. (2016). Gender stereotypes, risk-taking, and gendered mobility. In S. R. Thye
& E. J. Lawler (Eds.), Advances in group processes (pp. 179-210). Bingley, UK:
Emerald Group Publishing.
Flynn, J., Slovic, P., & Mertz, C. K. (1994). Gender, race, and perception of
environmental health risks. Risk Analysis, 14(6), 1101-1108. http://doi.org/
10.1111/j.1539-6924.1994.tb00082.x
French, K. R., Schwert, G. W., & Stambaugh, R. F. (1987). Expected stock returns and
volatility. Journal of Financial Economics, 19(1), 3-29. http://doi.org/10.1016/
0304-405X(87)90026-2
Friedman, H. L. (2014). Implications of power: When the CEO can pressure the CFO to
bias reports. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 58(1), 117-141. http://doi.org/
10.1016/j.jacceco.2014.06.004
Gardner, W. L. (1992). Lessons in organizatoinal dramaturgy: The art of impression
management. Organizational Dynamics, 21(1), 33-46.
Geiger, M. A., & North, D. S. (2006). Does hiring a new CFO change things? An
investigation of changes in discretionary accruals. The Accounting Review, 81(4),
781-809. http://doi.org/10.2308/accr.2006.81.4.781
Glass, C., & Cook, A. (2016). Leading at the top: Understanding women’s challenges
above the glass ceiling. The Leadership Quarterly, 27(1), 51-63. http://doi.org/
10.1016/j.leaqua.2015.09.003
Golden, B. R., & Zajac, E. J. (2001). When will boards influence strategy? Inclination ×
power = strategic change. Strategic Management Journal, 22(12), 1087-1111.
http://doi.org/10.1002/smj.202
Goldin, C., & Katz, L. F. (2016). A most egalitarian profession: Pharmacy and the
evolution of a family-friendly occupation. Journal of Labor Economics, 34(3),
705-746. http://doi.org/10.1086/685505

109
Gorman, E. H. (2005). Gender stereotypes, same-gender preferences, and organizational
variation in the hiring of women: Evidence from law firms. American
Sociological Review, 70(4), 702-728.
Gorman, E. H., & Kmec, J. A. (2007). We (have to) try harder. Gender & Society, 21(6),
828-856. http://doi.org/10.1177/0891243207309900
Gorman, E. H., & Kmec, J. A. (2009). Hierarchical rank and women’s organizational
mobility: Glass ceilings in corporate law firms. American Journal of Sociology,
114(5), 1428-1474. http://doi.org/10.1086/595950
Gupta, V., Maxfield, S., Shapiro, M., & Hass, S. (2009). Risky business : Busting the
myth of women as risk averse. CGO Insights, 28(April), 1-6.
Halko, M.-L., Kaustia, M., & Alanko, E. (2012). The gender effect in risky asset
holdings. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 83(1), 66-81.
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2011.06.011
Hambrick, D. C., & Finkelstein, S. (1987). Managerial discretion: A bridge between
polar views of organizational outcomes. Research in Organizational Behavior, 9,
369-406.
Hanoch, Y., Johnson, J. G., & Wilke, A. (2006). Domain specificity in experimental
measures and participant recruitment. Psychological Science, 17(4), 300-304.
http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01702.x
Haslam, S. A., & Ryan, M. K. (2008). The road to the glass cliff: Differences in the
perceived suitability of men and women for leadership positions in succeeding
and failing organizations. Leadership Quarterly, 19(5), 530-546. http://doi.org/
10.1016/j.leaqua.2008.07.011
Haslam, S. A., Ryan, M. K., Kulich, C., Trojanowski, G., & Atkins, C. (2009). Investing
with prejudice: The relationship between women’s presence on company boards
and objective and subjective measures of company performance. British Journal
of Management, 21(2), 484-497. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8551.2009.00670.x
Heckman, J. J. (1981). Statistical models for discrete panel data. In D. McFadden & C.
Manski (Eds.), The econometrics of panel data (pp. 114-178). Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press.
Hoffman, M., & Yoeli, E. (2013). The Risks of avoiding a debate on gender differences.
Rady Business Journal, 6, 6-7.
Hsiao, C. (2014). Analysis of panel data. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

110
Huang, S., & Hilary, G. (2018). Zombie board: Board tenure and firm performance.
Journal of Accounting Research, 56(4), 1285-1329. http://doi.org/10.1111/1475679X.12209
Ingersoll, A. R., Glass, C., Cook, A., & Olsen, K. J. (2017). Power, status and
expectations: How narcissism manifests among women CEOs. Journal of
Business Ethics [early online version]. http://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-017-3730-0
Iqbal, Z., Sewon, O., & Baek, H. Y. (2006). Are female executives more risk-averse than
male executives? Atlantic Economic Journal, 34(1), 63-74.
Jianakoplos, N. A., & Bernasek, A. (1998). Are women more risk adverse? Economic
Inquiry, 36(4), 620-630. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.1998.tb01740.x
Johnson, J. E. V., & Powell, P. L. (2005). Decision making, risk and gender: Are
managers different? British Journal of Management, 5(2), 123-138.
http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8551.1994.tb00073.x
Kanter, R. M. (1977a). Men and women of the corporation. New York, NY: Basic.
Kanter, R. M. (1977b). Some effects of proportions on group life: Skewed sex ratios and
responses to token women. American Journal of Sociology, 82(5), 965-990.
Kass, N. (1964). Risk in decision making as a function of age, sex, and probability
preference. Child Development, 35(2), 577. http://doi.org/10.2307/1126721
Khan, W. A., & Vieito, J. P. (2013). CEO Gender and firm performance. Journal of
Economics and Business, 67, 55-66. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.
jeconbus.2013.01.003
Koenig, A. M., Eagly, A. H., Mitchell, A. a, & Ristikari, T. (2011). Are leader
stereotypes masculine? A meta-analysis of three research paradigms.
Psychological Bulletin, 137(4), 616-642. http://doi.org/10.1037/a0023557
Konrad, A. M., Kramer, V., & Erkut, S. (2008). Critical mass. Organizational Dynamics,
37(2), 145-164. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.orgdyn.2008.02.005
Kumra, S., & Vinnicombe, S. (2008). A study of the promotion to partner process in a
professional services firm: How women are disadvantaged. British Journal of
Management, 19(s1), S65-S74. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8551.2008.00572.x
Kumra, S., & Vinnicombe, S. (2010). Impressing for success: A gendered analysis of a
key social capital accumulation strategy. Gender, Work and Organization, 17(5),
521-546. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0432.2010.00521.x

111
Levin, I. P., Snyder, M. A., & Chapman, D. P. (1988). The interaction of experiential and
situational factors and gender in a simulated risky decision-making task. The
Journal of Psychology, 122(2), 173-181.
Maxfield, S., Shapiro, M., Gupta, V., & Hass, S. (2010). Gender and risk: Women, risk
taking and risk aversion. Gender in Management: An International Journal,
25(7), 586-604. http://doi.org/10.1108/17542411011081383
Meindl, J. R. (1993). Reinventing leadership: A radical, social psychological approach.
Social Psychology in Organizations: Advances in Theory and Research, 12, 159203.
Mian, S. (2001). On the choice and replacement of chief financial officers. Journal of
Financial Economics, 60(1), 143-175. http://doi.org/10.1016/S0304405X(01)00042-3
Miller, L. C., Cooke, L., Tsang, J., & Morgan, F. (1992). Should I brag? Nature and
impact of positive and boastful disclosures for women and men. Human
Communication Research, 18(3), 364-399. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.14682958.1992.tb00557.x
Miller, T., & Triana, M. (2009). Demographic diversity in the boardroom: Mediators of
the board diversity-firm performance relationship. Journal of Management
Studies, 46(5), 755-786. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6486.2009.00839.x
Morgenroth, T., Fine, C., Ryan, M. K., & Genat, A. E. (2018). Sex, drugs, and reckless
driving: Are measures biased toward identifying risk-taking in men? Social
Psychological and Personality Science, 9(6), 744-753. http://doi.org/10.1177/
1948550617722833
Ng, T. W. H., Eby, L. T., Sorensen, K. L., & Feldman, D. C. (2005). Predictors of
objective and subjective career success: A meta-analysis. Personnel Psychology,
58(2), 367-408. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1744-6570.2005.00515.x
Olsen, K. J., Dworkis, K. K., & Young, S. M. (2014). CEO narcissism and accounting: A
picture of profits. Journal of Management Accounting Research, 26(2), 243-267.
http://doi.org/10.2308/jmar-50638
Perrault, E. (2014). Why does board gender diversity matter and how do we get there?
The role of shareholder activism in deinstitutionalizing old boys’ networks.
Journal of Business Ethics, 2010(December 2010), 1-17. http://doi.org/10.1007/
s10551-014-2092-0
Peterson, T., & Koput, K. (1991). Legitimacy or unobserved heterogeneity: On the
sources of density dependence in organizational death rates. American
Sociological Review, 56, 399-409.

112
Porter, M. E., & van der Linde, C. (1995). Toward a new conception of the environmentcompetitiveness relationship. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9(4), 97118.
Rajgopal, S., & Shevlin, T. (2002). Empirical evidence on the relation between stock
option compensation and risk taking. Journal of Accounting and Economics,
33(2), 145-171. http://doi.org/10.1016/S0165-4101(02)00042-3
Rawn, C. D., & Vohs, K. D. (2011). People use self-control to risk personal harm: An
intra-interpersonal dilemma. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 15(3),
267-289. http://doi.org/10.1177/1088868310381084
Ronay, R., & Kim, D.-Y. (2006). Gender differences in explicit and implicit risk
attitudes: A socially facilitated phenomenon. British Journal of Social
Psychology, 45(2), 397-419. http://doi.org/10.1348/014466605X66420
Roszkowski, M. J., & Gramble, J. (2005). Gender stereotypes in advisors’ clinical
judgments of financial risk tolerance: Objects in the mirror are closer than they
appear. The Journal of Behavioral Finance, 6(4), 181-191. http://doi.org/10.1207/
s15427579jpfm0604
Rudman, L. A., & Glick, P. (2001). Prescriptive gender stereotypes and backlash toward
agentic women. Journal of Social Issues, 57(4), 743-762. http://doi.org/10.1111/
0022-4537.00239
Ryan, M. K., & Haslam, S. A. (2005). The glass cliff: Evidence that women are overrepresented in precarious leadership positions. British Journal of Management,
16(2), 81-90. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8551.2005.00433.x
Ryan, M. K., & Haslam, S. A. (2007). The glass cliff: Exploring the dynamics
surrounding the appointment of women to precarious leadership positions.
Academy of Management Review, 32(2), 549-572.
Ryan, M. K., Haslam, S. A., Hersby, M. D., & Bongiorno, R. (2011). Think crisis-think
female: The glass cliff and contextual variation in the think manager-think male
stereotype. Journal of Applied Psychology, 96(3), 470-484. http://doi.org/
10.1037/a0022133
Ryan, M. K., Haslam, S. A., Morgenroth, T., Rink, F., Stoker, J., & Peters, K. (2016).
Getting on top of the glass cliff: Reviewing a decade of evidence, explanations,
and impact. The Leadership Quarterly. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.leaqua.2015.
10.008
S&P. (n.d.). Global industry classification standard. Retrieved from
https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/documents/112727-gicsmapbook_2018_v3_letter_digitalspreads.pdf

113
Sandberg, S. (2013). Lean in: Women, work, and the will to lead. New York, NY: Knopf.
Sapienza, P., Zingales, L., & Maestripieri, D. (2009). Gender differences in financial risk
aversion and career choices are affected by testosterone. Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences, 106(36), 15268-15273.
Schein, V. E. (1973). The relationship between sex role stereotypes and requisite
management characteristics. Journal of Applied Psychology, 57(2), 95-100.
http://doi.org/10.1037/h0037128
Schubert, R., Brown, M., Gysler, M., & Brachinger, H. W. (1999). Financial decisionmaking: Are women really more risk averse? American Economic Review, 89(2),
381-385. http://doi.org/10.1257/aer.89.2.381
Schwert, G. W. (1989). Why does stock market volatility change over time? The Journal
of Finance, 44(5), 1115-1153. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1989.tb02647.x
Seierstad, C. (2015). Beyond the business case: The need for both utility and justice
rationales for increasing the share of women on boards. Corporate Governance:
An International Review, 24(4), 390-405. http://doi.org/10.1111/corg.12117
Shen, W., & Cannella, A. A. (2002). Revisiting the performance consequences of CEO
succession: The impacts of successor type, postsuccession senior executive
turnover, and departing CEO tenure. Academy of Management Journal, 45(4),
717-733. http://doi.org/10.5465/3069306
Singh, V., & Vinnicombe, S. (2001). Impression management, commitment and gender.
European Management Journal, 19(2), 183-194. http://doi.org/10.1016/S02632373(00)00093-1
Singh, V., & Vinnicombe, S. (2004). Why so few women directors in top UK
boardrooms? Evidence and theoretical explanations. Corporate Governance,
12(4), 479-488. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8683.2004.00388.x
Sorensen, J. B. (2000). The longitudinal effects of group tenure composition on turnover.
American Sociological Review, 65(2), 298-310.
Sunden, A. E., & Surette, B. J. (1998). Gender differences in the allocation of assets in
retirement savings plans. The American Economic Review, 88(2), 207-211.
Tajfel, H., Richardson, A., & Everstine, L. (1964). Individual judgment consistencies in
conditions of risk taking. Journal of Personality, 32(4), 550-565.
Torchia, M., Calabro, A., & Huse, M. (2011). Women directors on corporate boards:
From tokenism to critical mass. Journal of Business Ethics, 102(2), 299-317.
http://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-011-0815-z

114
Vieito, J. P., & Khan, W. A. (2012). Executive compensation and gender: S&P 1500
listed firms. Journal of Economics and Finance, 36(2), 371-399. http://doi.org/
10.1007/s12197-010-9123-1
Wagner, D. G., & Berger, J. (1997). Gender and interpersonal task behaviors: Status
expectation accounts. Sociological Perspectives, 40(1), 1-32. http://doi.org/10.
2307/1389491
Weber, E. U., Blais, A.-R., & Betz, N. E. (2002). A domain-specific risk-attitude scale:
Measuring risk perceptions and risk behaviors. Journal of Behavioral Decision
Making, 15(4), 263-290. http://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.414
Westphal, J. D., & Fredrickson, J. W. (2001). Who directs strategic change? Director
experience, the selection of new CEOs, and change in corporate strategy.
Strategic Management Journal, 22(12), 1113-1137.
Westphal, J. D., & Zajac, E. J. (1995). Who shall govern? CEO/board power,
demographic similarity, and new director selection. Administrative Science
Quarterly, 40(1), 60-83. http://doi.org/10.2307/2393700
Wigfield, A., & Eccles, J. S. (1992). The development of achievement task values: A
theoretical analysis. Developmental Review, 12(3), 265-310.
Zajac, E. J. (1990). CEO selection, succession, compensation and firm performance: A
theoretical integration and empirical analysis. Strategic Management Journal,
11(3), 217-230. http://doi.org/10.1002/smj.4250110304
Zhu, D. H., & Chen, G. (2015). Narcissism, director selection, and risk-taking spending.
Strategic Management Journal, 36(13), 2075-2098. http://doi.org/10.1002/
smj.2322

115
CHAPTER 4
THE PRESENCE AND INFLUENCE OF WOMEN IN THE BOARDROOM
The recent scandals surrounding false financial accounts and consumer deception
at Wells Fargo Bank has once again brought the role of the corporate board of directors
into the limelight. The criticism and scrutiny received by the bank through public media
outlets, as well as congressional hearings, raises questions of governance within
organizations and demonstrates the importance of the board. In response to growing
criticism, the Federal Reserve announced financial penalties on Wells Fargo of over $1.5
billion (Flitter & Thrush, 2018). Continued questions over the role of the Wells Fargo
board in sustaining a culture that rewards deceptive and even fraudulent behavior led the
Federal Reserve to order Wells Fargo to improve the effectiveness of its board (Guida,
2018). As a result, Wells Fargo replaced four long-term male directors with four new
women directors, including naming a woman as chairman of the board (Keoun & Keitz,
2018). Increased public scrutiny of corporate boards continues to stress the important role
that the board of directors plays in driving organizational strategy. Further, Wells Fargo’s
addition of only women board replacements signals the unique value and legitimacy that
women directors bring to an organization.
The importance and influence of directors, along with the corresponding
composition of boards of directors, has grown from a hot topic for scholars to a point of
concern for all corporate stakeholders (Barker, 2013). Continuing legislation in European
countries mandating female board representation, or quotas, has enlivened the
conversation and sparked continuing research into the gender composition of corporate

116
boards (Bertrand, Black, Jensen, & Lleras-Muney, 2019; Lépinard & Rubio-Marin,
2018). Extant research has analyzed the gendered differences of human and social capital
within the boardroom (Hodigere & Bilimoria, 2015; Ibarra, 1993; Singh, Terjesen, &
Vinnicombe, 2008), as well as the networks that drive board relations (Borgatti & Foster,
2003; Galaskiewicz, 1985; Westphal & Zajac, 1995). Scholars also examine the impacts
of diverse boards on firm performance and strategy (Glass, Cook, & Ingersoll, 2016;
Konrad, Kramer, & Erkut, 2008; Post & Byron, 2015; Torchia, Calabro, & Huse, 2011),
as well as on firm diversity (Cook & Glass, 2016; Skaggs, Stainback, & Duncan, 2012).
However, much less research exists examining the institutional pressures eliciting change
within the board boardroom. Terjesen, Aguilera, and Lorenz (2015) study the institutional
factors that drive gender quotas within Europe. Luoma and Goodstein (1999) explore the
relationship between institutional influences and stakeholder representation on the board.
Grosvold (2011) analyzes Scott’s institutional forces within a cross-national context to
look for institutional pressures leading to board gender composition. However, little
exists examining institutional pressures strictly within a U.S. context. This research fills
this gap by exploring how institutional isomorphic pressures at the international level via
the coercive pressures of legislative quotas, the national industry level through normative
pressures of the percent women in senior management position, and the firm level
through mimetic pressures of board critical mass, impact board gender composition
among the largest U.S. firms. Women continue to be in the minority on corporate
boardrooms across the U.S. (Catalyst, 2018b). The banking crisis and economic collapse
of 2008 led to a call for higher levels of corporate gender diversity within banking and
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finance with the assumption that women would have been more financially responsible
(Prügl, 2012). Indeed, firm scandal and collapse has been linked to the lack of board
gender diversity (Erhardt, Werbel, & Shrader, 2003). The U.S. plays a significant role
within the global economy where a majority of countries are sensitive to developments
within the U.S. and vice-versa (Dees & Saint-Guilhem, 2011). Therefore, examination of
U.S. context of institutional pressures for board diversity has far-reaching implications
for both global organizations and global economies.
Research demonstrates that women continue to be underrepresented on corporate
boards, holding only 16% of S&P 1500 board seats in 2014 (Sharma, Yerger, & Manoff,
2015). Globally, women held 14.7% of board seats within the 3,000 largest global
companies in 2015, which is a 54% increase over the number of global director seats held
by women in 2010 (Catalyst, 2017). Opportunities have obviously opened up for women
seeking director positions and we are seeing the benefit of those opportunities in the
overall increase in the number of women corporate directors. However, in order to
understand the foundation of this change and how to maintain, if not increase, the
momentum, we need to examine the impact to women directors over time. How have
isomorphic institutional pressures influenced the appointment of women directors over
time? Further, what impacts are there from institutional pressures to the overall number
of women directors, and in the authority and influence of women directors? In order to
answer these questions, this study examines a longitudinal panel dataset of all Standard
and Poor’s (S&P) 500 organizations across a 7-year period from 2009-2015. Analysis of
the longitudinal trajectory of women directors helps us to understand how institutional
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factors influence the number of women on boards and in the power granted to women
who attain director seats over time. The two-pronged nature of the analysis examines
pressures that increase both the presence of women in the boardroom and the influence of
women directors.
Scholars have broadly made the business case for board gender diversity in recent
years (Bilimoria, 2000; Nielsen & Huse, 2010; Terjesen, Sealy, & Singh, 2009). Board
gender diversity has been linked to increased firm financial performance (Erhardt et al.,
2003; Singh, Vinnicombe, & Johnson, 2001), better corporate social citizenship (Bear,
Rahman, & Post, 2010; Boulouta, 2013; Byron & Post, 2016), higher levels of firm
innovation (Torchia et al., 2011), and better board performance in terms of firm
monitoring and strategy (Post & Byron, 2015). Beyond the business case, scholars also
advocate a moral argument for gender parity on corporate boards of directors (Gary
Simpson, Carter, & D’Souza, 2010; Gregory-Smith, Main, & O’Reilly, 2014). Therefore,
it is important to understand the drivers for both board gender representation and the
influence of women directors.
The study design also contributes to fill the gap in literature through the
longitudinal nature of the data on U.S. firms. The majority of existing work examining
institutional factors and board gender composition focus on either cross-sectional data or
data specific to European countries. This study seeks to elucidate how isomorphic
pressures work to shape U.S. board composition in terms of gender. As was illustrated
with the Wells Fargo example, there is increasing concern regarding board oversight and
board composition. Exposing some of the pressures at work behind the scenes may be the
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first step in enhancing board gender diversity and in realizing the benefits of a gender
diverse board.
Literature Review
Barriers: Social Closure and Exclusion
A key constraint identified by scholars as inhibiting women’s workplace mobility
is the group bias prevalent within organizations (Gorman, 2006; Ibarra, 1992, 1997).
Kanter (1977) and Weber (1968) both discuss the concept of social closure and how it
leads to group bias. Weber’s theory of social closure concerns itself with the group
process, where by in-group members seek to limit access in order to maximize the social
benefit and rewards of group membership. The basis of exclusion from group
membership is generally based upon social, or physical attributes such as gender, race
language or descent (Parkin, 1974). Early work on corporate conduct by Wilber Moore
(1963) discussed the homosexual reproduction of male managers seeking to reproduce
their colleagues in their own likeness. Kanter extends upon Weber’s and Moore’s
theories concerning social closure in her study of high-level corporate positions to find
that men in these high-power positions tend to hire other men with similar attributes as
their own into top management positions. Kanter terms this exclusionary process
“homosocial reproduction” (p. 63). The application of the theories within a corporation as
related to gender is that women are closed out of corporate leadership positions by men
who are protecting their own power and privilege (R. A. Smith, 2002; Stainback,
Tomaskovic-Devey, & Skaggs, 2010). Indeed, research suggests that women’s efforts at
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work are often devalued or ignored as compared to their white male counterparts
(Maume, 1999). The concept of homosocial reproduction, as previously discussed, has
been used extensively within gender and organizations research (Britton & Logan, 2008;
Glass & Cook, 2016; Gorman, 2006; Huffman, Cohen, & Pearlman, 2010; Kalev, 2009;
Skaggs et al., 2012). In their 2004 workplace survey study, Elliott and Smith found that
the majority of work groups attain power through homosocial reproduction. Further,
Gorman highlighted the role of uncertainty and trust in homosocial reproduction,
indicating that uncertainty strengthens male decision makers same sex preference.
Social network theorists use homophily, an almost identical concept to Kanter’s
(1977), in order to explain why contact occurs between similar people at a higher rate
than among dissimilar people (Mcpherson, Smith-lovin, & Cook, 2001). Studies of
gender and social networks have found that men have a greater degree of homophily
within their networks, while women have more network ties outside of their gender
(Ibarra, 1992). Further research on the effects of homophily among managerial networks
suggest that women in positions of power may need access to the resources provided by a
broader array of network contacts (Ibarra, 1997). However, Burt (1998) contends that
women have a legitimacy problem within organizations and they fare better when they
can rely on the networks of senior male sponsors. Recent research suggests that women
suffer social closure due to their strong same gender network ties and that they would
benefit from forming weak tie networks with broader informational variety (Lutter,
2015). Indeed, prior research suggest that women directors specifically are disadvantaged
due to network closure and the subsequent lack of sponsorship and mentorship
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(McDonald & Westphal, 2013).
Historically, research has supported the notion of systemic bias as a contributing
factor in board appointment for women (Burgess & Tharenau, 2002; Farrell & Hersch,
2005; Singh et al., 2008; N. Smith & Parrotta, 2018). Burgess and Tharenou studied the
disparity between the large number of firms that have at least one female director and the
small proportion of the overall seats that women hold. They assert that some female
directors may hold symbolic positions as figureheads, which are not based on their
human capital or firm contribution. Boards with a single woman or minority director
would fall into this category of symbolic positions. In a later study, Farrell and Hersch
examined the interplay between gender and board appointments through a sample of
Fortune 500 and Service 500 firms. Their results indicate that women are less likely to be
appointed to boards with incumbent female directors. However, when a female director
leaves the board, it is highly likely that the replacement director will also be female. Both
studies were supported by findings from Smith and Parotta (2015), demonstrating both
support for the tokenism of women directors and that boards with one woman or a
woman chair are far less likely to have other women board members. Taken together,
theories of social closure, homosocial reproduction and homophily suggest that women
have a difficult time overcoming systemic biases and barriers in order to attain a
director’s seat in the boardroom.
Overcoming Barriers: Isomorphic Pressures
Other literature suggests a shift away from the symbolic legitimacy granted from
having a single woman director and that greater representation is required in order to
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achieve comparable levels of firm legitimacy (Erkut, Kramer, & Konrad, 2008; Konrad et
al., 2008). Indeed, the number 3 has been indicated as critical mass, or the tipping point,
at which women gain greater board influence (Erkut, Kramer, & Konrad, 2008; Joecks,
Pull, & Vetter, 2013). Institutional pressures are forcing changes in previous patterns of
social closure and homosocial reproduction to open the doors to the greater involvement
of women in the boardroom (Terjesen et al., 2015).
Prior research suggests that a main impetus for declining gender related social
closure and homosocial reproduction may be attributed to institutional isomorphic
pressures (Iannotta, Gatti, & Huse, 2015). Organizations are not exempt from influences
related to their institutional environment (Scott & Meyer, 1991). Indeed, scholars contend
that organizational practices are a reflection of the environment in which they are
embedded (J. W. Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Organizational patterns, actions and activities
become rule-like, and over time they start to become formal aspects of the organization
(Zucker, 1987). As these aspects are normatively and cognitively set, they become taken
for granted as legitimate, or institutionalized (J. W. Meyer, Boli, & Thomas, 1987). Once
activities become institutionalized, there is great resistance to change (Zucker, 1977).
Institutional isomorphism suggests that the pressures exerted by stakeholders,
regulation, and professionals within the institutional environment all contribute to
homogenization amongst organizations in the same field (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; J.
W. Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Scott, 1998). These formal and informal pressures exerted
upon the organization force homogeneity by creating pressure for conformity through
coercive, mimetic and normative means (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Coercive pressures

123
originate from governmental regulations and the social expectations of an organization
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Zucker, 1987). A relevant example of coercive pressure
related to corporate boards involves the legislation of gender quotas for director
positions. Mimetic pressure refers to the pressure to conform to or adopt industry
standard, while normative pressures are placed on organizations through
professionalization (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Mizruchi & Fein, 1999). Research
suggests that professional directors serve as a form of board professionalization, or
normative pressure, within the U.S. (Lorsch, Berlowitz, & Zelleke, 2005). The key issue
at the heart of institutional isomorphism is organizational legitimacy (DiMaggio &
Powell, 1983). Institutionalized elements of the organization are maintained over time
and easily transmitted to new entrants into the industry (Zucker, 1977, 1987). Hence, the
institutional elements become contagious where they can infect both newcomers and
other organizational elements to define what is legitimate (Zucker, 1987).
In terms of legitimacy, the board of directors offers corporate support through board
resources, but also provides a source of legitimacy to the organization (Hillman &
Dalziel, 2003). Not only the actions of the board, but the composition of the board itself
can shape the reputation of the firm and grant legitimacy to the organization (Luoma &
Goodstein, 1999). The institutional forms shape and reinforce corporate behaviors and
perceptions of what is considered legitimate (Powell, 1991). Further, the organization’s
responsibility to their stakeholders, such as employees, customers, industry and
community, shape the institutional pressures faced by the firm (DiMaggio & Powell,
1983; J. W. Meyer & Rowan, 1977).
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Two key pressures previously identified as influential to board gender composition
are legislative quotas, as a form of coercive pressure, and the representation of women
among senior management, which can be construed as a form of normative pressure
(Iannotta et al., 2015; Kogut, Colomer, & Belinky, 2014; Matsa & Miller, 2013; Terjesen
et al., 2015). Research discussing the influence of a critical mass of women directors also
evidences the potential mimetic pressure of having a critical mass of women directors
(Torchia et al., 2011). Additionally, board interlinks, or the number of boards on which a
director serves concurrently, have been used in previous research as a measure of director
influence (Cook & Glass, 2015). Board interlinks speak to the quantity and type of
women being tapped for director positions. Prior work has found that board gender
representation increases with interlinks to other gender diverse boards (Hillman,
Shropshire, & Cannella, 2007).
The influence and authority of women corporate directors is also an important
consideration for overcoming barriers to advancement. Weber (1946) argues that a legalrational type of authority is inherent within the rules of the organization’s granting of the
leadership title. Further, French, Raven, and Cartwright (1959) discuss the legitimate
power granted through an organizational title or structure. Therefore, directors placed
into these leadership roles will have higher levels of power and influence within the
board of directors. Further, prior research indicates that board committee membership
also leads to power and influence (Carter, D’Souza, Simkins, & Simpson, 2010). The
audit committee, the nominating committee, the compensation committee and the
executive/governance committee have been suggested by scholars as the most influential
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and powerful board committees (Carter et al., 2010; Kesner, 1988). Institutional pressures
are crucial for both organizational legitimacy and change (J. W. Meyer & Rowan, 1977;
Zucker, 1977, 1987). Therefore, institutional isomorphic pressures have the potential to
impact both the prevalence in the number of women on boards, and their influence in the
positions and committees on which they serve. Both Coercive pressures in the form of
legislative quotas and mimetic pressures in the form on board interlinks and critical mass
have the potential to increase the prevalence of women on corporate boards in the U.S.
Additionally, the normative pressure of the percent of women within senior management
has the power to increase both the prevalence and influence of women on corporate
boards. Therefore, I posit the following:
H1: Institutional isomorphic pressures will lead to an increase in the number of
women serving as corporate directors.
H2: Institutional isomorphic pressures will lead to an increase in the number of
women corporate directors serving on multiple corporate boards.
H3: Institutional isomorphic pressures will lead to an increase in the appointment
of women directors to powerful board positions.
H4: Institutional isomorphic pressures will lead to an increase in the appointment
of women directors to influential board committees
Methods and Data
Data
An author-constructed dataset consisting of all S&P 500 indexed organizations
and corresponding directors covering the period 2009-2015 was used to address the
research questions. The S&P 500 is comprised of large U.S. companies, representing
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approximately 80% of the total market capitalization of the U.S. stock market (S&P Dow
Jones Indices, 2018). Multiple sources of secondary data were used to build the dataset.
A list of all companies included on the S&P 500 index was queried from the CompStat
database, available through Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS), for each year of
the study. CompStat also provided data on organizational size, performance, as well as
industry information for each firm.
The Execucomp database and the Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS)
database, both available through WRDS, were used for information on all corporate
directors for each firm. The director data contain demographic information such as name,
gender, age, tenure and race. Additional data on board interlinks and committees not
available through the ISS database was collected from biographical and corporate
websites and added to the dataset. Women’s workforce representation was collected from
the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) websites. The complete dataset allows for panel analysis of the director
population for all S&P 500 indexed companies during the study period. Listwise deletion
was used for completely missing data. A unique identifier was manually assigned to each
director for each company board served upon to allow for panel data analysis groupings
by director/company identifier. The final sample for analysis consists of 32,473 director/
year observations covering 7,298 director/company groupings.
Dependent variables. The total number of women serving as directors for each
firm/year combo is queried from the ISS database and recorded as a count variable.
Board interlinks. Board interlinks are recorded as the number of board upon
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which a director concurrently serves. Directors are not limited in the number of boards on
which they can serve. In fact, many directors serve on multiple boards during the same
period of time. Within the study sample, directors served on up to 9 additional outside
boards concurrently.
Director power committees. Director power committees are operationalized as
membership in the audit committee, the nominating committee, the compensation
committee and/or the executive/governance committee. Committee membership is
queried from the ISS database, as well as collected from annual reports, company and
biographical websites. Board members will be coded as 1 or 0 to reflect membership on
the committee. Directors can serve on multiple committees, but only individual
committees will be examined and not aggregate committee memberships.
Director power positions. Positions of board leadership include the Chairman of
the Board, or Board Chair, and the Vice-Chairman of the Board. Leadership positions
will be determined through data provided by the ISS database, as well as corporate
websites, SEC disclosures and biographical websites. A dummy code (1,0) will be used
to indicate if a director fills one or more of these leadership roles.
Independent variables. Institutional isomorphic pressures are operationalized in
three important ways. First, prior research suggests that female labor force participation is
a key element in the growth of both institutional pressures and corporate diversity
initiatives (Terjesen et al., 2015). Further, evidence indicates that board directors are
largely selected from the ranks of senior managers within large U.S. firms (Mattis, 2000).
Therefore, the percent of women within senior management positions per industry is
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included as a predictor variable for normative isomorphic pressures. The variable allows
me to analyze the available pool from which organizations are able to draw qualified
women as directors. Women’s managerial labor force participation is measured as the
total percent of women in senior management roles within the specified industry of the
U.S. labor force for each year of the study. The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)
and the EEOC websites are used to query the data. The North American Industrial
Classification System (NAICS), as reported by CompStat, is used at the 2-digit level to
identify the appropriate industry to query. The complete NAICS code is a 6-digit code
developed by the U.S. Office of Management and Budget and implemented in 1997 (U.S.
Census Bureau, n.d.). Industry is indicated by the first two digits of the code followed by
sector and subsector. The 2-digit code is used because it captures all industries at the
aggregate level and data is available at this level for all companies within the study.
Second, the enactment of national gender quotas for boards of directors has been
shown to increase mimetic isomorphism as countries emulate gender equality practices
(Terjesen et al., 2015). Even though the U.S. has not enacted any type of national quota
legislation, the interconnectedness of international business creates macro-level global
pressures for even the largest organizations (K. E. Meyer, 2006). Gender quotas are
operationalized as a count of the number of countries enacting board of director gender
quotas through legislation for each year. Gender quota legislation varies by country, but
all have similar stipulations concerning a quota percentage, enactment timeframe and
penalty for violation (Terjesen et al., 2015). Therefore, legislative gender quotas are
included as a form of coercive isomorphic pressure. Only countries specifying quotas for
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public companies were included in the quota calculation. Data concerning the country
level quota information is gathered from Catalyst reports. The median quota level across
all legislation is 33%, with a range of 33% to 40% (Catalyst, 2018b). The range of
countries enacting quotas for public companies during the study period ranges from one
in 2009 to six in 2015.
Finally, I will include the critical mass of women directors as a key indicator of
mimetic isomorphic pressure. Extant research defines critical mass as three or more
women directors serving on a single board (Konrad et al., 2008). A critical mass of
women directors has been linked to increased influence and power for women directors
(Erkut et al., 2008; Joecks et al., 2013; Konrad et al., 2008; Torchia et al., 2011). Given
the growing institutional pressure for greater gender representation on boards of directors
(Terjesen et al., 2015), having higher representation in the form of a critical mass of
women serves as a potential mechanism for legitimacy.
Gender. Director gender is queried from the ISS database with missing data
verified from company and biographical websites and recorded as a binary dummy code
with (0) indicating men and (1) women.
Race. The race or ethnicity of each director is collected via the ISS database with
missing information obtained from company and biographical websites. Race is dummy
coded with (1) indicating all non-White races and ethnicities and (0) indicating White/
Caucasian.
Age. The age of the director is collected and recorded for each year of the study.
Age data is queried from the ExecuComp database and from biographical websites.
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Average age of the board of directors. I also consider the average age of the
board of directors, which will be calculated by averaging the ages of all board members
for a given firm each year. Director age will be collected from both the ExecuComp
database and biographical websites. Average director age is an important consideration as
prior research has indicated that older directors may not be as open to innovative board
practices and higher levels of board participation (Zajac & Westphal, 1996).
Tenure. Director tenure is calculated as the total number of years the director has
served on the company board. Data is collected from the ISS and ExecuComp databases.
Prior research suggests that women organizational leaders have shorter tenures than men
(Cook & Glass, 2014; Kesner, 1988). Further, prior studies examining corporate
governance present a positive relationship between tenure in a leadership position and the
power associated with the position (Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991; Miller, 1991).
Therefore, tenure is an important control variable within the study.
Firm performance. Previous research indicates the need to control for the
performance of the firm (Waddock & Graves, 1997). Studies have indicated that firm
performance can drive leadership decisions specific to gender (Ryan & Haslam, 2005). I
use the performance metric of return on equity (ROE) as a measure of firm performance.
ROE is calculated as the annual net income of the firm divided by equity and is reported
by the Compustat database. Accounting performance measures are preferred when
studying organizational change (Keats & Hitt, 1988) and have been used extensively in
research examining gender in relation to organizational change (Adams & Ferreira, 2007;
Carter et al., 2010; Peterson & Philpot, 2007; Triana, Miller, & Trzebiatowski, 2014;
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Zajac, 1990).
Firm size. When examining board diversity, firm size is an important
consideration. Larger firms have more resources at their disposal for both recruitment and
retainment purposes. Larger firms are also more visible and more often in the public
spotlight, leading to increased public pressure and scrutiny (Arthur & Cook, 2009;
Ingersoll, Glass, Cook, & Olsen, 2017). Firm size will be recorded as the number of
employees in thousands as reported by the Compustat database.
Industry. Industry is an important consideration as scholars suggest that women
have to employ innovative tactics in order to overcome higher obstacles when working
within a predominantly male industry (Agarwal, Qian, Reeb, & Sing, 2016). A history of
occupational segregation means that certain industries, such as service industries, employ
women at much higher rates than men (Jacobs, 1989; Kmec, 2005). Therefore, an
industry control is necessary to account for variation by gender within the industry of
operation for the firm. The Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) is used at the
sector level for industry classification. The GICS was developed in 1999 by Standard and
Poor’s and consists of 11 sector, 24 industry groups, 69 industries and 158 subindustries
(S&P, n.d.). The 2-digit sector code is reported by the ISS database and recoded as coded.
Analyses
I conduct a panel data Poisson regression to test hypotheses 1 and 2. The Poisson
regression model is an efficient choice when testing count outcome variables and has
been touted as the benchmark model for the analysis of discrete count data (Cameron &
Trivedi, 2001). The key constraint of the Poisson model is that it assumes the data is

132
equally dispersed, or that the variance of the data is equal to the mean, conditional on the
explanatory variables (Cameron & Trivedi, 1990). Preliminary examination of the data
through summary statistics demonstrates that the unconditional means and variance of the
outcome variables for each hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 2 are not extremely different.
There is no evidence of overdispersion within the data, leading the Poisson model to be
the most efficient and effective test. I use robust standard errors for the parameter
estimates in order to control for mild violations of the underlying assumptions of the
model, as suggested by Cameron and Trivendi (2009).
Hypotheses 3 and 4 are examined using a panel data random effects logistic
regression. The logistic regression, or logit, model is used extensively in research
analyzing dichotomous dependent variables (Allison, 1999; Long, 1997). Research
suggests that a random effects model is a better fit in cases where the model contains
time-invariant variables, such as gender or race (Allison, 2009). A Hausman test was
conducted to assess model fit for each hypothesis, with the results confirming the null
hypothesis, indicating that the unobserved individual level effects are uncorrelated with
the other covariates (Hausman, 1978). The results imply that a random effects estimator
is most efficient model. Robust standard errors are again included for these models.
Descriptive statistics and correlations are presented in Table 4.1.
Results
Hypothesis 1 predicts that number of women directors serving on a board will
increase based upon isomorphic pressures. A random effects Poisson regression model

Table 4.1
Correlations and Descriptive Statistics
Heading

1

2

1. Gender
2. % women in senior mgmt. within
industry

0.18
0.22

0.39
0.07

1.00
0.03*

1.00

3. Number of quotas

3.57

1.67

0.02*

0.03*

4. Critical mass

0.25

0.43

0.08*

0.03*

0.14*

1.00

5. Woman as board chair
6. Woman as board vice-chair

0.00
0.00

0.04
0.02

0.09*
0.03*

0.00
0.00

-0.01*
-0.01

7. Woman on nominating
committee

0.09

0.28

0.65*

0.01*

8. Woman on audit committee

0.08

0.27

0.62*

9. Woman on executive/governance
committee

0.09

0.28

0.65*

0.07

0.26

0.58*

10. Woman on compensation
committee

Mean

SD

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

0.02*
0.01

1.00
0.00

1.00

0.01

0.04*

0.02*

0.02*

1.00

0.02*

0.01*

0.04*

0.03*

0.02*

0.29

1.00

0.01*

0.01

0.04*

0.02*

0.02*

1.00*

0.29*

1.00

0.02*

0.01*

0.04*

0.03*

0.00

0.42*

0.16*

0.42*

10

11

12

13

15

16

1.00

1.00

11. Age
12. Race

63.43
0.87

7.73 -0.20* -0.04* 0.04* 0.00 -0.03* -0.02* -0.08* -0.14* -0.08* -0.09*
0.34 -0.06* -0.03* -0.01 -0.04* -0.01 -0.01 -0.04* -0.03* -0.04* -0.04*

1.00
0.11*

1.00

13. Avg. board age

63.43

3.16 -0.03* -0.11*

0.09*

0.01

0.00

-0.03*

0.00

-0.01*

0.41*

0.04*

1.00

14. Company tenure

8.38

7.28 -0.07*

0.04* -0.02* -0.02* -0.01

0.01

-0.08*

0.01

-0.01

0.45*

0.08*

15. Firm performance

25.23

0.02*

14

0.01

0.00

0.18*

1.00

203.55

0.01

-0.01

0.00

0.01

0.00

0.00

0.01

0.01

0.01

0.00

0.01

-0.02*

0.02*

0.00

1.00

16. Firm size
3033.90 13961.57
* Significant at the p < .05 level or above.

0.01

0.02

0.19*

0.07*

0.01*

0.00

0.01

0.00

0.01

0.01

0.01* -0.01*

0.03*

0.00

0.01

1.00
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with robust standard errors was used to test the hypothesis with results reported in Table
4.2. I exponentiate the reported Poisson coefficients to determine the incidence rate ratios
or percentages for the model. Note that the critical mass variable is removed from this
model. The critical mass variable indicates that the board upon which the director serves
contains three or more women. The outcome variable measures the total number of
women on the board. Inclusion of the critical mass variable would in essence try to
Table 4.2
Panel Data Poisson Test of Women Directors by Key Institutional Pressures
(1)
Model 1
0.00
(0.00)

(2)
Model 2
0.00
(0.000573)

(3)
Model 3
0.00
(0.000573)

Race

-0.07***
(0.01)

-0.07***
(0.01)

-0.07***
(0.01)

Firm performance

0.00
(0.00)

0.00
(0.00)

0.00
(0.00)

Firm size

0.00***
(0.00)

0.00***
(0.00)

0.00***
(0.00)

% Women in senior management within industry

0.39***
(0.0637)

Total women directors
Age

Number of quotas

a

0.34***
(0.06)
0.06***
(0.00)

0.06***
(0.00)

Constant total women directors

0.58***
(0.04)

0.51***
(0.04)

0.43***
(0.04)

Constant ln alpha

-3.85***
(0.65)

-3.86***
(0.65)

-3.87***
(0.66)

Observations

32,903

32,903

32,903

Number of company/director groups
Robust standard errors in parentheses.

7,492

7,492

7,492

*** p < 0.01.
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predict the outcome variable through a subset of the outcome variable. Exclusion of the
variable leads to a more parsimonious model. Three models are examined within the
analysis and presented in Table 4.2. Each predictor variable is analyzed independently in
Model (1) and Model (2). The full model with all predictor variables is presented in
Model (3). Control variables of director age and race, as well as firm level controls for
firm size and firm performance are included for each model.
Model (1) of the analysis examines the impact of normative pressure for the
specified industry on the total number of women directors on a board. The results
indicate that for each percent increase in the number of women as senior managers, the
total number of women directors serving on the board will increase by a rate of 1.47, or
47% holding all else constant. Model (2) analyzes coercive pressure as a predictor of the
total number of women on a board. The results for Model (2) suggest that an increase in
the number of legislative quotas correspond to a 6% increase in the number of women
serving on the board. The full model presented in Model (3) examines both coercive and
normative pressures within the same model. The results for Model (3) suggest that both
the percent women in senior management and the number of legislative quotas influence
the total number of women serving on the board. Legislative quotas remain constant for
model 3 with a 6% increase in the number of women directors for each additional quota
implemented. The impact of the percent women in senior management decreases slightly
in the full model to a 41% increase in the number of women directors for each percent
increase in women senior managers within the industry, holding all else constant. The
results of the analysis find support for hypothesis one. All reported results are statistically
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significant at the p < .01 level.
Hypothesis 2 predicts that board interlinks for women corporate directors will
increase due to coercive, normative and mimetic isomorphic pressures. A random effects
panel data Poisson regression with robust standard errors is used to test the hypothesis
and the results are presented in Table 4.3. The results of the analysis find support for
hypothesis two. Four models are included for the analysis of hypothesis two, each
controlling for director age, race and tenure. Firm controls of firm performance and firm
size are also included in the model. Model (1) examines normative pressure on the
number of other major boards on which a director concurrently serves. The results for
Model (1) are not statistically significant for the main predictor variable. However, the
results for the gender variable (significant at p < .01) indicate that when controlling for
the percent of women in senior management within the industry, women directors will
realize a 10% increase in the number of boards on which they concurrently serve.
Model (2) inspects coercive pressure as a predictor of the number of boards on
which a director concurrently serves. The results of Model (2) demonstrate a 2% decrease
in the number of boards on which a director concurrently serves as predicted by the
number of legislative quotas with results significant at the p < .01 level. However, once
again, the gender variable suggests that women directors realize an 11% increase in the
number of boards upon which they serve as the number of legislative quotas increase.
Model (3) examines the impact of critical mass mimetic pressure on the number of boards
on which women directors serve. Again, women are significantly more likely (p < .01) to
increase the number of boards upon which they serve as predicted by critical mass.
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Table 4.3
Poisson Test of Number of Other Major Boards by Director Gender and Key Institutional
Pressures
(1)
Model 1
0.10***
(0.03)

(2)
Model 2
0.11***
(0.03)

(3)
Model 3
0.10***
(0.03)

(4)
Model 4
0.11***
(0.03)

Age

0.02***
(0.00)

0.02***
(0.00)

0.02***
(0.00)

0.02***
(0.00)

Race

-0.15***
(0.03)

-0.15***
(0.03)

-0.15***
(0.03)

-0.15***
(0.03)

Company tenure

-0.02***
(0.00)

-0.02***
(0.00)

-0.02***
(0.00)

-0.02***
(0.00)

Firm performance

0.00
(0.00)

0.00
(0.00)

0.00
(0.00)

0.00
(0.00)

Firm size

0.00
(0.00)

0.00
(0.00)

0.00
(0.00)

0.00
(0.00)

% Women in senior management within industry

-0.20
(0.14)

Number of other major boards
Gender

Number of quotas

-0.177
(0.14)
-0.01***
(0.00)

Critical mass

a

-0.01***
(0.00)
0.01
(0.01)

0.02*
(0.01)

Constant number of other major boards

-0.98***
(0.11)

-1.10***
(0.11)

-1.03***
(0.11)

-1.10***
(0.12)

Constant ln alpha

0.11
(0.16)

0.11
(0.16)

0.11
(0.16)

0.11
(0.16)

Observations

32,448

32,448

32,448

32,448

7,284

7,284

7,284

7,284

Number of company/director groups
Robust standard errors in parentheses.

*

p < 0.1.

*** p < 0.01.
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However, the effect of critical mass on overall director board interlinks is not significant.
The full model presented as Model (4), finds significant results (p < .01) for
women directors, suggesting that the institutional pressures may increase the number of
boards upon which women directors concurrently serve by 11%. Only two of the three
institutional pressures variables are statistically significant in the model. The critical mass
variable, indicates that having three or more women on a board increases the likelihood
of all directors serving on multiple boards by 2%. The number of legislative quotas is
also significant at the p < .01 level, indicating that as quotas increase the overall number
of interlinks for directorships decrease slightly. This is likely a result that men hold more
directorships than women do, so as women gain more board seats, men’s interlinks
decrease due to the finite nature of board positions.
A random effects logistic regression is conducted to test hypothesis three, which
posits that institutional pressures will lead to a woman as chair of the board of directors
or vice-chair. The results of the model suggest some support for the hypothesis. Control
variables for the average age of the board and director race are included in the model.
Firm level control variables are also included for firm size and firm performance. Two
analyses are conducted to test the hypothesis, the first with the outcome variable of a
woman as chair of the board, which is presented in Table 4.4. The second analysis
examines the outcome of a woman as vice-chair of the board and is presented in Table
4.5.
The first analysis uses a woman as the board chair as the outcome variable and the
normative pressure of the percent women within senior management for the industry, the
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Table 4.4
Logit Regression Woman as Board of Directors Chair by Key Institutional Pressures
Board of directors chair
Avg. board age

(1)
Model 1
0.06
(0.05)

(2)
Model 2
0.18
(0.16)

(3)
Model 3
0.05
(0.05)

Race

-0.53*
(0.32)

-0.63
(0.89)

-0.53
(0.32)

-0.59
(0.73)

Company tenure

-0.66***
(0.20)

-0.26***
(0.06)

-0.67***
(0.18)

-0.27***
(0.0586)

Firm size

0.00
(0.00)

0.00
(0.00)

0.00
(0.00)

0.00
(0.00)

Firm performance

0.00*
(0.00)

0.00**
(0.00)

0.00*
(0.00)

0.00**
(0.00)

% Women in senior management within industry

2.131
(1.96)

Number of quotas

2.064
(2.03)
-1.21
(1.73)

Critical mass
Constant

a

(4)
Model 4
0.17
(0.12)

-1.35
(1.29)
0.43
(0.28)

-34.06***
(3.14)

-49.32***
(8.03)

-32.26***
(3.00)

1.40***
(0.33)
-48.63***
(5.94)

Observations

32,473

32,473

32,473

32,473

Number of company/director groups
Robust standard errors in parentheses.

7,298

7,298

7,298

7,298

*

p < 0.1.

**

p < 0.05.

*** p < 0.01.
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Table 4.5
Logit Test of Woman as Board of Directors Vice-Chair by Key Institutional Pressures
Board of directors vice-chair
Avg. board age

(1)
Model 1
0.24
(0.00)

(2)
Model 2
0.29
(1.52)

-2.95
(0.00)

-0.58
(2.34)

-3.13
(0.00)

Company tenure

-0.81***
(0.09)

-0.45
(0.00)

-0.72***
(0.07)

-0.37
(0.32)

Firm size

0.00
(0.00)

0.00
(0.00)

0.00
(0.00)

0.00
(0.00)

Firm performance

0.00
(0.01)

0.00
(0.02)

-0.01
(0.01)

-0.01
(0.01)

% Women in senior management within industry

10.78
(0.00)

4.731
(8.43)
-1.17
(6.03)

Critical mass
Constant
Observations
Number of company/director groups
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*
p < 0.1.
*** p < 0.01.

a

(4)
Model 4
0.27
(0.34)

Race

Number of quotas

-0.73
(54.41)

(3)
Model 3
0.22
(0.00)

-1.00*
(0.56)
0.58
(1.38)

1.39*
(0.83)

-58.08
(0.00)

-40.81
(0.00)

-51.56
(0.00)

-33.33
(28.46)

32,473

32,473

32,473

32,473

7,298

7,298

7,298

7,298

coercive pressure number of legislative quotas and the mimetic pressure of board critical
mass. Model (1) of Table 4.4 presents results for normative pressure as a predictor of a
woman being board chair. The results for the model were not significant. Coercive
pressure as a predictor of a woman as board chair are presented in Model (2), again the
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results are not statistically significant. Model (3) examines mimetic pressure on the
likelihood of a women board chair. The results for Model (3) are also not statistically
significant. Model (4) presents the full model with all three isomorphic pressures. Critical
mass is found to be a relevant predictor of having a woman chair within the full model. I
exponentiate the coefficient to determine the odds ratio. The findings suggest that the
odds of a women being board chair are over 4 times higher when the board contains three
or more women, holding all else constant. Model (4) findings are statistically significant
at the p<.01 level and account for the percent women within senior management and
legislative quotas. A model including a control for a woman as CEO was also conducted,
but not reported. The results of the CEO controlled model were nearly identical to the
model presented.
The second analysis used to test hypothesis two examined the likelihood of a
woman being vice-chair of the board as predicted by isomorphic pressures. This analysis
finds minimal mixed support for the hypothesis, as indicated in Table 4.5. Model (1) uses
the normative pressure of percent women within senior management for the industry as
the predictor. Model (2) examines the dependent variable using the coercive pressure
number of legislative quotas as the predictor variable. Model (3) uses mimetic pressure of
critical mass as the predictor for a woman being the board vice-chair. Model (4) present
the full model with all three isomorphic pressures. The results for Models 1 through 3
find no statistically significant change in the outcome based upon the individual
isomorphic pressures. Model (4) finds marginal support (p < .1) for critical mass,
indicating that women are once again 4 times more likely to be a board vice-chair when
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three or more women serve on the board. However, the results also find marginal
significance (p < .1) that the odds of a woman being vice-chair of the board are reduced
by 62% for each new legislative quota, or coercive pressure. Again, a CEO controlled
model was analyzed with nearly identical findings. While the model results suggest a
mixed trend, overall the results for this analysis do not find significant support for the
hypothesis.
Hypothesis 4 predicts that isomorphic pressures will lead to more women
directors being appointed to powerful board committees. An analysis was conducted to
test the likelihood of a woman director serving on each the nominating committee, the
executive/governance committee, the audit committee and the compensation committee.
Firm level control variables for firm size and performance were included in the analyses.
Controls for director race, director tenure and the average age of the board were also
included in the models. Table 4.6 presents the results for a woman director serving on the
nominating committee as predicted by institutional isomorphic pressures. Model (1)
presents the results for only the percent women in senior management within the industry
as the predictor variable. There are no statistically significant results for this model.
Model (2) presents the findings for the number of institutional quotas as the independent
variable predicting a woman director serving on the nominating committee. The results of
the model indicate that an increase in legislative quotas is significantly (p < .01)
associated with an increase in the likelihood of a woman serving on the nominating
committee. Upon exponentiating the coefficient, I find that a woman director is 15%
more likely to serve on the nominating committee with an increase in legislative quotas.
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Table 4.6
Logit Test of Woman on Nominating Committee by Key Institutional Pressures
Woman on nominating committee
Avg. board age

(1)
Model 1
-0.03
(0.04)

(2)
Model 2
-0.04
(0.03)

(3)
Model 3
-0.04
(0.04)

Race

-0.98***
(0.30)

-0.80***
(0.27)

-0.98***
(0.29)

-0.83***
(0.26)

Company tenure

0.05***
(0.01)

0.02**
(0.01)

0.05***
(0.01)

0.03**
(0.01)

Firm size

0.00**
(0.00)

0.00
(0.00)

0.00**
(0.00)

0.00
(0.00)

Firm performance

0.00
(0.00)

0.00
(0.00)

0.00
(0.00)

0.00
(0.00)

% Women in senior management within industry

2.45
(1.82)

Number of quotas

1.65
(1.61)
0.14***
(0.05)

Critical mass
Constant
Observations
a

(4)
Model 4
-0.04
(0.03)

Number of company/director groups
Robust standard errors in parentheses.

**

0.13**
(0.05)
0.33**
(0.15)

-11.11***
(2.33)

-9.73***
(2.11)

0.22
(0.15)

-10.30***
(2.28)

-10.26***
(2.14)

32,473

32,473

32,473

32,473

7,298

7,298

7,298

7,298

p < 0.05.

*** p < 0.01.

Model (3) also provides statistically significant support for the hypothesis (p < .05),
demonstrating a 38% increase in the odds of a women serving on the nominating
committee as the board achieves a critical mass of women. Model (4) presents the full
model with all three isomorphic pressures. A statistically significant (p<.05) relationship

144
between the number of legislative quotas and a 14% increase in likelihood that a woman
director will serve on the nominating committee is suggested by Model (4). The results
were not significant for the percent women in senior management within the industry and
the number of legislative quotas.
Table 4.7 presents an examination of the likelihood that a woman director will
serve on the executive or governance committee as predicted by key institutional
pressures. Strong support is offered for the hypothesis by the analyses. Four models are
once again presented, one for each normative pressure (the percent women in senior
management), coercive pressure (the number of quotas) and mimetic pressure (critical
mass) with the full model presented as Model (4). The first model suggests significant (p
< .05) support for the association between the percent women in senior management and
having a women director serve on the executive/governance committee. The results
indicate that the odds of a woman director serving on the executive/governance
committee are roughly 9 times greater as the percent women in senior management
increase. The number of quotas also demonstrate a 14% increased likelihood of a women
director serving on the executive/governance committee (p < .01), as presented in Model
(2). There is also marginal significance (p < .1) for the association between critical mass
and a woman director serving on the executive/governance committee, suggesting a 32%
increase in the likelihood of a woman director on the committee. The full model
maintains strong support (p < .01) for the number of quotas as a predictor of women
directors’ committee membership, demonstrating a 13% increase in the odds of a woman
director being appointed to the executive/governance committee. Marginal support for
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Table 4.7
Logit Regression of Woman on Executive/Governance Committee by Key Institutional
Pressures
(1)
Model 1
-0.02
(0.02)

(2)
Model 2
-0.04*
(0.02)

(3)
Model 3
-0.03
(0.03)

(4)
Model 4
-0.03
(0.02)

Race

-0.81***
(0.17)

-0.78***
(0.17)

-0.30
(0.35)

-0.75***
(0.17)

Company tenure

0.04***
(0.01)

0.02***
(0.01)

0.05***
(0.01)

0.02***
(0.01)

Firm size

0.00**
(0.00)

0.00
(0.00)

0.00*
(0.00)

0.00
(0.00)

Firm performance

0.00
(0.00)

0.00
(0.00)

0.00
(0.00)

0.00
(0.00)

% Women in senior management within industry

2.18**
(0.94)

Woman on executive/governance committee
Avg. board age

Number of quotas

1.78*
(0.94)
0.13***
(0.0426)

Critical mass
Constant
Observations
a

Number of company/director groups
Robust standard errors in parentheses.

*

p < 0.1.

**

p < 0.05.

0.12***
(0.0417)
0.28*
(0.15)

-8.70***
(1.49)

-7.61***
(1.42)

-10.53***
(2.08)

0.20
(0.12)
-8.16***
(1.44)

32,473

32,473

32,473

32,473

7,298

7,298

7,298

7,298

*** p < 0.01.

the percent women within senior management is also suggested by the results, indicating
a 6% increase in the odds of a woman director serving on the committee.
The next analysis for hypothesis four examines the odds of a woman director
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being appointed to the audit committee as predicted by isomorphic pressures and
presented in Table 4.8. This analysis finds no support for the hypothesis with no
significant results.
Table 4.8
Logit Regression Woman on Audit Committee by Key Institutional Pressures
Woman on audit committee
Avg. board age

(1)
Model 1
-0.04
(0.03)

(3)
Model 2
-0.04
(0.04)

(5)
Model 3
-0.05
(0.04)

Race

-0.60***
(0.20)

-0.40
(0.45)

-0.68*
(0.37)

-0.55**
(0.24)

Company tenure

-0.10*
(0.0583)

-0.09
(0.00)

-0.11
(0.00)

-0.10
(0.30)

Firm size

0.00
(0.00)

0.00
(0.00)

0.00
(0.00)

0.00
(0.00)

Firm performance

0.00
(0.00)

0.00
(0.00)

0.00
(0.00)

0.00
(0.00)

% Women in senior management within industry

1.36
(1.11)

Number of quotas

2.40
(2.03)
0.01
(0.06)

Critical mass

a

(7)
Model 4
-0.04
(0.03)

0.01
(0.25)
0.16
(0.18)

0.15
(0.16)

Constant

-7.32***
(1.81)

-9.84***
(2.86)

-9.13***
(2.86)

-8.13***
(2.00)

Observations

32,473

32,473

32,473

32,473

7,298

7,298

7,298

7,298

Number of company/director groups
Robust standard errors in parentheses.

*

p < 0.1.

**

p < 0.05.

*** p < 0.01.
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The final analysis examines the odds of a woman director serving on the
compensation committee as predicted by the three isomorphic pressures and is presented
in Table 4.9. Overall, the analysis suggests support for hypothesis 4. All three of the
individual models find statistically significant support for hypothesis four at p < .05 or
Table 4.9
Logit Regression of Women on Compensation Committee by Key Institutional Pressures
Woman on compensation committee
Avg. board age

(1)
Model 1
-0.05*
(0.03)

(2)
Model 2
-0.06**
(0.03)

(3)
Model 3
-0.08
(0.00)

(4)
Model 4
-0.07**
(0.03)

Race

-0.80***
(0.19)

-0.58***
(0.21)

-0.94
(0.00)

-0.89***
(0.19)

Company tenure

0.02**
(0.01)

0.00
(0.01)

0.03
(0.05)

-0.00
(0.01)

Firm size

0.00***
(0.00)

0.00**
(0.00)

0.00**
(0.00)

0.00*
(0.00)

Firm performance

0.00
(0.00)

0.00
(0.00)

0.00
(0.00)

0.00
(0.00)

% Women in senior management within industry

2.70***
(1.01)

Number of quotas

2.82**
(1.12)
0.17***
(0.05)

Critical mass

0.16***
(0.05)
0.41**
(0.21)

Constant

-6.65***
(1.78)

-5.91***
(1.82)

Observations

32,473

32,473

32,473

32,473

7,298

7,298

7,298

7,298

Number of company/director groups
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*
p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.

a

*** p < 0.01.

-11.20
(0.00)

0.26*
(0.14)
-6.36***
(1.94)
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greater. The odds of a woman director being appointed to the compensation committee
are suggested to increase by nearly 15 times with an increase in the percent women
within senior management. Likewise, the results suggest a 19% increase in the odds
based upon the number of quotas and a 51% increase in the odds for critical mass. The
full model including all three institutional pressure variable continues to support the
hypothesis, suggesting a marginal influence of critical mass and strong association with
the percent women in senior management and the number of quotas. The results of Model
(4) indicate that the odds of a woman director serving on the compensation committee
increase by 18% with an increase in quotas and by roughly 17 times with a percentage
increase in the number of women in senior management.
Discussion and Conclusion
The Poisson and logistic regression analyses confirm that isomorphic institutional
pressures do influence the prevalence and influence of women on boards of directors. The
normative pressure of the percent women in senior management within the industry, the
number of legislative quotas as a coercive pressure and board critical mass as mimetic
pressure all contribute to either the prevalence, power or influence of women directors.
Evidence suggests that both coercive and normative pressures strongly influence the total
number of women serving as corporate directors. However, the power of women
directors, as evidenced through board leadership roles, is linked only to the mimetic
pressure of critical mass through the research. Indeed, as the results of my statistical
testing suggest, coercive pressures may actually hinder the power of women directors.
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Results also suggest that normative pressure has the largest impact on the influence of
women directors, as indicated by committee membership. However, coercive pressures
also are linked to women’s membership on the nominating committee and all three
pressure are statistically significant in predicting membership on the compensation
committee.
Overall, the findings highlight institutional mechanisms for overcoming
significant barriers and bias in order to lead to more gender representative boards of
directors. Businesses, such as Wells Fargo, are beginning to understand the significance
of women directors. However, the results of this research highlight pressures that lead to
an increase in the number and power of women directors outside times of organizational
scandal or strife. The findings propose several key implications for policy and theory,
along with avenues for future research.
First, the research suggests that in order to increase the number of women serving
as directors, industry must first increase the overall number of women serving in senior
management roles. Prior research asserts that women directors are drawn from the ranks
of senior management (Mattis, 2000). Unfortunately, the percentage of women serving in
senior roles has declined from 25% in 2017 to 24% globally for 2018 (Catalyst, 2018a).
In the U.S., the number of women in senior roles decreased even more drastically than
the global average, going from 23% in 2017 to 21% in 2018 (Catalyst, 2018a). The
decrease in representation is concerning not only for the executive ranks, but as the
results demonstrate, also for the director ranks of women. Not only do the results suggest
that the percent women in senior roles relates to the number of women directors, but also
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that senior women are associated with the influence of women directors in terms of the
committees on which they are selected to serve. The odds of women directors being
selected to serve on the highly influential executive/governance committee or the
compensation committee increase with a higher percentage of women in senior
management roles. The efforts to increase women’s representation in the boardroom may
fall flat if the executive ranks are overlooked.
Second, the research touches upon nuances in networks and power through board
critical mass. The results suggest that board interlinks, as well as board power are both
associated with a critical mass of women directors serving on the board. Findings indicate
that it takes three or more women directors serving on the board in order to break through
the network homophily of men directors. Once women directors gain the numbers
necessary for legitimacy, we see an association with the total number of women directors,
the number of boards upon which they concurrently serve, the power of women directors
being selected to board leadership and the influence of women directors. An interesting
element of the results is that I find higher numbers of board interlinks with critical mass.
It would be reasonable to expect a decrease in board interlinks overall as more women
join the director ranks and become spread across organizations. However, the critical
mass finding, as related to board interlinks, suggests that the legitimacy that women
directors gain through numbers leads to a potential in-group status where they are asked
to serve with other directors they may know, or are they may be referred to other boards.
Finally, evidence is presented that coercive pressure, in the form of legislative
quotas, shapes corporate governance and board gender representation. This finding has

151
practical policy implications, as the U.S. has now begun to legislate board gender quotas
at the state level for companies headquartered there (Ortiz, 2018). The results for
analyses of gender quotas suggest that quotas have a positive influence on the overall
number of women directors and upon the influence of women directors based upon the
committees on which they serve. Findings indicate that women directors are more likely
to be tapped for influential board positions on the executive/governance committee, the
nominating committee and compensation committee with an increase in pressures from
quotas. Further, the results also suggest that board gender quotas help bound men’s
network influence in the boardroom by decreasing the positions for which they are
eligible, while increasing women’s network influence via the number of boards upon
which women directors concurrently serve.
As with most research, this study has limitations. First, while every effort was
made to identify and control for all variables that may influence the statistical models,
there are likely confounding influences. For example, the board interlink variable could
be a type of mimetic pressure itself where boards circulates the same women who have
been in-grouped into the board network. Therefore, while the results suggest that
isomorphic pressures have a strong influence on women on board, I cannot specify
causation. Additionally, since the predictor variables are all related to women directors
and women serving on boards, it is impossible to eliminate multicollinearity. While every
effort was taken in the statistical modeling to determine the most robust tests and
measures, there is still a high likelihood of multicollinearity within the models.
Second, the study examines only three key measures of institutional pressure.
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While the results have demonstrated the importance of these particular elements, they are
likely not the only institutional factors to consider when examining board gender
diversity. Future research could broaden the institutional perspective to examine factors
such as women director advocacy groups, institutional investors and state level gender
quota legislation as the information becomes available.
Next, this study examines large publicly traded organizations. The pressures that
impact firms of this type may be very different than those that influence small and
medium size firms, as well as private businesses. While the data to analyze these types of
firms is often limited, it is worth exploration as research suggests that gender diversity
may be higher among smaller and family run businesses (Terjesen et al., 2015). Focusing
specifically on large corporations may be a disservice to the majority of businesses.
Finally, I examine board composition only in terms of gender. Race was included
in the models as a control variable only. However, examination of the race coefficients
presents a very different picture for racial and ethnic minority directors. The findings
suggest that the institutional pressures as examined may have an adverse effect on racial
and ethnic minority directors. Further exploration of other board diversity aspects is
warranted. Specifically, race/ethnicity, social class and educational background should be
examined within future research.
Taken together, the research findings present mechanisms of institutional support
that may advance the career mobility of women directors. Boards from industries with a
high percentage of women in senior management, with a critical mass representation of
women and with pressure from increasing legislative quotas are most likely to have
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prevalent, powerful and influential women directors. The findings extend our
understanding of institutional isomorphic pressures influence on firm structure and
strategy through a gendered lens.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
Summary
Despite the extensive research into the causes of the lack of women in top
corporate leadership positions, women continue to be underrepresented at the highest
levels of the corporation. While women continue to make inroads in the boardroom
through gains in representation, their prevalence among the executive ranks seems to be
shrinking (Catalyst, 2018a, 2018b). This comes at a time when the importance of women
among senior corporate leadership ranks has never been more salient. Recent corporate
scandals and crises have only increased the existing calls for more women to acquire a
larger portion of corporate board seats (Erhardt, Werbel, & Shrader, 2003; Higgs, 2003;
Keoun & Keitz, 2018; Stuart, 2018). While research and public opinion appears to favor
an increase in women’s leadership roles (Holden, 2017; McGregor, 2017), the pace at
which women’s representation is increasing among the top corporate ranks does not
equate.
The reality is that the barriers to women’s advancement are difficult to overcome.
The slow changing social position of women within society, coupled with the rigidity of
social norms lead to slow progress (Eagly & Heilman, 2016). The purpose of this
research is to understand the contexts that support the barriers to women’s advancement
and to identify the conditions under which women leaders overcome the barriers to attain
top corporate leadership positions. I have identified and discussed three distinct
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approaches for understanding how we can increase women’s representation and influence
in the executive and director ranks within top U.S. corporations. The first approach
investigates the complexities of leveraging the social and cultural capital attained through
post-secondary education in order gain entry into the corporate elite. The second
approach examines gendered stereotypes of risk-taking versus the organizational risktaking realities that are inherent in women corporate leaders’ climb to the top. The final
approach considers the impact of institutional isomorphic pressures in increasing the
prevalence, power and influence of women corporate directors. In what follows I will
discuss the key findings from all three approaches. I will then discuss the implications
from the research, limitations of the study and potential avenues for future research.
Social and Cultural Capital
The results of the first approach suggest that executive women within the largest
U.S. companies rely on cultural capital and credentials to overcome preconceived notions
of stereotypical male leadership and to grant them legitimacy within their positions. The
analyses examine a dataset consisting of all S&P 500 executives for the period 20092013. I use logistic regression, ordered logistic regression and a generalized ordered
logistic model to test gender differences in educational attainment, educational
reputation, and educational network benefits.
The results reveal first, that among senior corporate executives, women are more
likely to possess academic credentials. Thus, the results reaffirm extant research
suggesting that women have consistently higher educational attainment rates than men
(Fiske, 2016). Next, results from the examination of the rank of post-secondary programs
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attended by the executives in the study suggest that men executives are more likely to
attend higher ranked schools for their undergraduate degrees, while women executives
are more likely to attend higher ranked graduate schools. Finally, the results from
considering the firm network ties afforded by post-secondary education networks
reaffirm previous work suggesting that men executives continue to have stronger network
ties than women (Burt, 2000; Ibarra, 1992), specifically when it comes to their
undergraduate networks.
Risk Taking
The second approach analyzed the role of gender composition within top
leadership on the likelihood of firms undertaking accounting based or market-based risk.
A dataset consisting of all executives and directors of S&P 500 firms for the period 20092013 was used for analyses. I use a panel data linear regression model with time and firm
random effects to test the research questions. Two very different constructs of
organizational risk-taking were presented in the research. The first, examines
expenditures-based risk undertaken by the firm. The second, examines the stock price
volatility of the firm and the perceived riskiness of the firm to investors. The expenditurebased measure lies completely within the control of the firm’s leadership (Chatterjee &
Hambrick, 2011). The second, market return measure is an investor reaction to the
actions undertaken by firm leadership and is subject to the macroeconomic conditions
that influence market fluctuation (Beltratti & Morana, 2006; Schwert, 1989).
The result analyzing gender alone as a predictor of risk among corporate
executives of the S&P 500 were inconclusive. However, the results from the model
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examining CEO gender indicate that firms led by women CEOs do in fact take on more
accounting-based risk than those led by men. Results of the examination of director
gender also suggest that boards with a higher composition of women directors are
associated with higher levels of accounting-based risk for the firm. The findings for the
market-based measure of risk suggest that women CEOs and directors lead to less risk in
terms of stock volatility for the firm. A finding which suggests either a gendered
difference in types of corporate risk, or an investor reaction to the firm, potentially based
upon gender composition.
Institutional Isomorphic Pressures
The final approach investigates the effect of institutional isomorphic pressures on
the prevalence, power and influence of women corporate directors. Data from all S&P
500 firms for the period 2009-2015 was used for statistical testing. Isomorphic pressures,
as described by DiMaggio and Powell (1983), were operationalized as the coercive
pressure of legislative quotas for board gender composition, the mimetic pressure of a
critical mass of three or more women on a board, and the normative pressure of the
percent of women within senior management for the industry. Poisson and logistic
regression models were constructed to test the impact of isomorphic pressures on
corporate boards related to gender diversity.
Results from the analyses suggest that isomorphic pressures do influence the
prevalence, power and influence of women on corporate boards of directors. Evidence
proposes that both coercive and normative pressures strongly influence the total number
of women serving as corporate directors, while mimetic pressures are linked to the power
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of women directors, as evidenced by their election to board leadership positions. Results
also suggest that normative pressure may have the greatest impact on the influence of
women directors, as evidenced by their appointment to influential board committees.
Overall, the findings highlight isomorphic pressures as a structural influence for
overcoming significant barriers and bias that inhibit gender representative boards of
directors.
Research Implications
A recent critique of research on women and leadership is that current research is
attempting to conform to cultural narratives concerning prejudice and discrimination and
is omitting inconsistent evidence in favor of advocacy (Eagly & Heilman, 2016).
Emphasis is placed on diversity and training to overcome existing barriers and to change
the salience of gender stereotypes (Carnes et al., 2015). However, the effectiveness of
training and interventions is questionable within the literature (Dobbin & Kalev, 2017;
Kalinoski et al., 2013). Scholars argue that the stereotypes that these interventions are
attempting to change are enmeshed within social roles and social norms (Koenig &
Eagly, 2014). Therefore, as long as occupational role segregation persists, so too will bias
and discrimination (Eagly & Heilman, 2016).
This research presents approaches to ease role segregation within the top ranks of
corporate occupations. I suggest means of addressing deficiencies in social and cultural
capital and in altering the gender composition of occupational roles by activating
isomorphic pressures. The results indicate that women executives are best served through
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a combination of credentials and cultural capital offered through post-secondary
education. Additionally, examination of isomorphic pressures suggest that coercive and
mimetic pressures serve to increase the prominence of women on corporate boards.
Further, by focusing on women leaders’ aptitudes for risk-taking, I challenge
conventional stereotypes and present another avenue to combat role segregation. Data
demonstrating that women executives are willing to take risks for the firm dispels myths
of gendered risk aversion. These myths have been used as a justification for women’s
corporate underrepresentation and pay differentials (Croson & Gneezy, 2009; Hoffman &
Yoeli, 2013). Dispelling myths and stereotypes surrounding gender and risk removes the
justification and eliminates the barrier.
My findings also reveal some of the complexity in both the antecedents and
consequences of gender diversity within top leadership of large U.S. firms. This provides
a much needed link between social science and stakeholders (Eagly & Heilman, 2016).
Instead of contributing to the prevailing work focusing on interventions, or the business
case for gender diversity, I convey the organizational and societal contexts that lead to
more diverse corporate leadership. For example, my findings relative to isomorphic
pressures suggest that in order to increase the number of women serving as directors,
industry must first increase the overall number of women serving in senior management
roles.
Limitations and Future Research
A primary concern of this research, as well as other studies of women in
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leadership, is that it neglects other salient categories, such as race and class, which may
influence findings (Berrey, 2014; Torre, 2017; Wingfield & Alston, 2012). The exclusion
of interactions between gender and other salient variables, as well as the lack of
examination of the intersectionality of race, class and gender throughout the structure of
the organization remain a gap within the literature. Further, this study fails to specify
conditions for the majority in-group and the minority out-group without considering the
propensity for internal divisions within groups (DiTomaso, Post, & Parks-Yancy, 2007).
Acknowledging the simultaneous existence of multiple outgroups will bring
intersectionality into the research streams and help incorporate gender and diversity
research into the fold of studies of inequalities.
Next, the availability of secondary data relevant to the CEOs and boards of the
largest corporations make them easy targets of study. However, the size and resources
available at the largest firms allow them to enact programs to combat cognitive bias,
social closure, and homophily, as well as, glass ceilings, cliffs and escalators (Dobbin,
Sutton, Meyer, & Scott, 1993; Kelly & Dobbin, 1998). The mid-size and small firms that
employ the majority of workers are overlooked with the exception of small case studies.
Surveys of small and mid-sized organizations will allow researchers to dig into the black
box of employment in which most women reside. It is time to expand beyond the study of
S&P or Fortune firms within the U.S. context
A final limitation and pathway for future research lies in uncovering the daytoday mechanisms in the workplace that either contribute to the reproduction of gender
inequality or negate it (Reskin, 2000). The concepts of micro-inequities or micro-
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advantages present in daily interaction need to be further explored (DiTomaso et al.,
2007). Uncovering the day-to-day, taken for granted interactions that produce inequality
or advantage within organizations will help to explain the structural embeddedness of
gender within the organization that limits women’s mobility. Women have made solid
progress within organizations since the 1960s, decreased the gender wage gap and gained
management and leadership positions within the largest corporations (Jacobs, 1992).
Women are even close to bridging the gap within the pharmacy profession where
earnings and authority for women are consistent with men (Goldin & Katz, 2016).
However, in looking back over 50 plus years of empirical research into the proximate
causes of and solutions to organizational gender segregation, we see very little has
changed overall. A solution has not been found and continued research is necessary in
order to unlock the answer to organizational gender equality.
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